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Military Affairs

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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-89-018

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20 July 1989

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Opposition to Formation of 'National' Military Units

18010686c Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
20 Apr 89 p 2

[Article by Col. V. Kulpinskas, "A Defense Shield or 'Poteshnyi Troop'?"]

[Text] I well recall the Soviet soldiers of the autumn of 1944. I have many happy memories of them. They were my first teachers of the Russian language.

At the time our family lived in the Telsiai region of Lithuania. Not far away the "Kurland pocket" was churning. Troops would pass through our little town on the way to it, to get the fascists who had fallen into the trap.

There was scarcely an evening when soldiers would not stay at our house for the night. Sometimes several men, at times as many as ten. In the evenings, during our shared "mixed" supper, our father would get into long talks with his "roomers" about what life would be like after the war. I would eagerly soak up every new word, extending my Russian vocabulary, so necessary at that time.

The soldiers would call me by my first name, but each in his own way, Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian. It might happen that they would use other names as well. Only now do I understand that when they looked at me, and crouched down to bestow whatever treat they could, those soldiers were seeing their son or grandson in me. So that the hugs intended for them would come to me.

Soon enough I could express myself fluently in Russian. I prided myself greatly on this before my relatives, neighbors, and contemporaries. Especially when it was necessary to act in the role of interpreter.

Even if I had not become a professional military man, I would retain the fondest and happiest feelings for Russian, Soviet, soldiers. For it was from them and thanks to them that I learned such concepts as humanism, kindness, and sympathy. Of course these words appeared later in my vocabulary, but their essence, their content were assimilated back then. Even when I became an adult, it never ceased to amaze me how the frontline soldiers could live through all the hell of war and still manage to retain their good human feelings, that they not harden their hearts and grow cruel. Of course we encountered scoundrels as well, and light-fingered ones, but they were only a few.

So much for my prelude to the main talk. And I believe it is appropos. For now, some forty years later, I must encounter a different attitude toward the man in uniform. And indeed, to military service itself, which incidentally has always been honored among the people since time immemorial.

I had occasion to be present at the constituent assembly of the Lithuanian "Sayudis", to speak of military affairs with its delegates, to talk with many people in other Baltic republics... And everywhere was the refrain: each republic should have its own army, and the boys called to be soldiers should serve at home. Some even said that the republics should have their own ministries of defense, independent of Moscow.

Let us consider: is this realistic? The army organism is specific. It should be put into action by a single command, a single order, quickly, without delays. Varying interpretations and debates are not acceptable here.

But what will be the result of separating our army into "national" barracks? Will it not become a "tower of Babel", where each speaks in his own tongue, and does not understand the other?

Of course the army is not a rigid organism, where all orders are established for all time. Changes will inevitably touch both the numerical strength of the army and the conditions of serving in it. This was stated quite specifically by M. S. Gorbachev at a meeting with young people of Moscow and its environs. He said: "I think that we are beginning to understand this very important group of problems. Remember, we cannot simply go and disband our army while everyone else keeps theirs and arms themselves. This would be a mistake. So we will take the path of reducing our armies and arms together with other states. But in general we must take a hard look at the question of serving in the army, and at conscription. It can be changed. But this all should be within the framework of a normal process that includes our actions and the steps of our friends and partners. Therefore there is a rational strain in the very posing of the question, but when voices are raised saying: "Why do we need an army?", this is not serious." These words were confirmed by the new Soviet peace initiatives put forward in a speech by M. S. Gorbachev at the 43rd session of the U. N. General Assembly.

I believe that individual suggestions relating to national military formations will be considered. But moving formations is not the same as swapping barracks. To do this requires both time and the resolution of a whole group of problems.

As for the proposal that we shift at once to the territorial principle of manning our Armed Forces, it is my profound conviction that this is unrealistic. I will say more: it comes chiefly not from the conscripts themselves, but from heartsick relatives and individual political figures.

Of course the overwhelming majority of mothers and fathers would like their son to serve close by. And a parent's love and guardianship are truly unlimited. Given free reign, some mothers and grandmothers would settle close to the garrison where their children were

serving. They would bring breakfasts, lunches, and dinners, would wash the uniforms, sew the buttons and undercollars. In short, they would voluntarily become the soldiers' nannies.

This autumn I chanced to talk with many conscripts from the Baltic republics. I asked them this question: where would they like to serve? In fact many did express the desire to stay in the Baltic. Many, but by no means all. And not long ago I spoke with a group of conscripts from Kapsukas and Alitus. They were on their way to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. I asked: didn't any of them want to stay and serve in the Baltic military district? Very many answered no, better to go where we are sent.

We must ask ourselves: do we not infringe on the rights of our boys, do we not impoverish them intellectually if we force them to serve "right next door to the village", or "across the road"? Even if they want to see the country? Do we have to deprive them of this right? And also, will the territorial troops of each republic include all branches and arms, and train specialists in all professions? Of course not.

I also want to note that in the distribution of the conscript contingent no one pursues the goal of sending them off "somewhere far away" to serve. Very many Baltic natives serve in the units of our district. Basically they serve well. Nevertheless officers and warrant officers who come from the Far East and other remote parts say that Baltic soldiers serve better [there] than they do here, and their service brings them greater benefit.

They say that a good way to learn is to compare. So I note: American soldiers serve at more than 1,500 military installations located outside the borders of the U.S. British soldiers also are deployed in the FRG, and in the territory of other states. I had occasion to serve in Czechoslovakia. There they have a federal system: the two sovereign republics of Bohemia and Slovakia are united into one state. But it has occurred to no one to demand that the Czechs serve in Bohemia and the Slovaks in Slovakia. The same can also be said of Yugoslavia, which consists of six republics.

But now imagine for a minute that the territorial principle of formation of the Armed Forces actually exists, and each republic has its own army. Then all of a sudden a military conflict breaks out (remember, we are imagining) or to put it simply, a war starts—an aggressor attacks the USSR. What happens then? Will each republic begin to protect its own borders, waiting until the adversary reaches them? This is quite absurd.

I have not even touched on the purely technical questions: production of military equipment, arms, supplies, the study of materiel, the publication of uniform regulations, manuals, etc. I suppose that every sober persons

would agree: it's a little early to transform our Armed Forces into a "Poteschniy troop". We must be realists, and for the present the reality is harsh.

Once I saw a sign held up by a young demonstrator: "Occupation troops, out of the Baltic!". And at the time I thought: If we really had them, boy, you wouldn't be here long. What do you know of occupation troops?

Residents of my home city of Telsiai, those who are a little older, could tell him the following story from the time of the fascist occupation.

At the time a small group of amateur performers had formed in the city, and they presented shows in a local theater, mainly parodying and ridiculing the occupiers and their greed and arrogance. Of course this was done secretly, without the knowledge of the German commandant. But one day he stole among the onlookers. And when the parodist, the favorite of the crowd, sang satirical couplets with the tune of a popular national song, the commandant drew his pistol and shot the actor dead, right on the stage. Then he coolly rose and left.

Among my old photos there is one which shows a soldier, a driver of an amphibious armored vehicle. In his arms he holds a little girl, rescued during a flood. Before the dam of the Kaunas hydroelectric station was built, such natural calamities were not a rarity in Kaunas. This girl is likely a mother herself now, but she can scarcely have forgotten that day. I wonder how she would react to the label of "occupier" if someone tried to pin it on that soldier, her rescuer.

Who is the first to come to the aid of civilians when there is a natural calamity or other misfortune? The soldiers. Who rushes into danger to save peoples' lives? Again, the soldiers. A most recent confirmation of this, the events in Leninakhan and other cities of Armenia.

And who knows, might it not happen (God forbid that it should, as they say) that one of these miserable demonstrators will require the saving hand of the soldier? It will be extended to him, of course. But I would just like to know: how will the rescued person feel?

War Against the Military; Some Thoughts on the Side

18150076 Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian
23 Apr 89 p 2

[Excerpts] Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian on 23 April, 1989, publishes on page 2 an 1,800-word article entitled "War Against the Military; Some Thoughts on the Side" by Eino Tammer. The article reviews recent demonstrations against the military and questions the wisdom of individual risk-taking when faced with an overwhelming force. The preceding events are summed up as follows:

"Last week there was anti-military demonstration in both Tallinn and Tartu. Meetings in Tartu and Tallinn. The third independent youth forum in Tartu. The funeral of militarism in Tartu. And even a warning hunger strike in front of the military department of the university of Tartu. With a clear demand: to get the military department out of the university."

It was the third independent youth forum held in Tartu, and the inflammatory speeches heard there, that elicited some probing questions on the part of the author, such as:

"Who has the moral right to speak?" ... and "Who will take responsibility for the consequences? Will it be the one who does the inciting? Or the one who actually puts his head on the block (or intends to)? Or the whole of Estonia? These were the questions that kept plaguing me."

A case in point was the cry to boycott the recruitment this spring. The author's comment: "There aren't enough of us to take the course of self-destruction." ... He was also appalled at arguments that if enough people, like hundreds or thousands, would participate in a boycott it can "make them retreat." The author comments:

"Whether we like it or not, the opposition has enough power to take on 2,000, and even enough power to take on the whole of Estonia." ... "When the tanks come (and how can we be so sure they won't?), the young will be the first to sacrifice themselves. But whose heads do we need most the day after tomorrow?" The author continues:

"Yes, the society is developing and changing but the army, a monster that it always has been, goes on being just that." ... "The army is the stronghold of conservatives. It has everything to perpetuate the system indefinitely. And that includes weapons. Weapons to defend the system or, if necessary, to reverse it."

Instead of taking unnecessary risks, the author recommends:

"There has to be parliamentary pressure. There has to be disclosure. There has to be concern over each Estonian boy in the service, and there has to be caring for them. There have to be petitions. Peaceful activities should continue. We should encounter the opposition with our common front: wisdom, cunning and constant pressure."

Questions About Military Answered in Paide
18150077 Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian
30 Apr 89 p 3

[Excerpts] Tallinn NOORTE HAAL in Estonian on 30 April, 1989, publishes on page 3 a 1,200 article entitled "People in Järvamaa Meet Again with the ESSR Military Commissar" by Marko Kadanik. The article reviews an open meeting called by the commissioner on April 27 for

the purpose of answering questions submitted by the public. Fielding the questions were Rein Pöder, ESSR Military Commissar, department head Voldemar Raemets of the Military Commissariat, Rein Eenmaa, Military Commissar for the Viljandi region, Jaan Marks, deputy head of the State and Legal Department of the ECP Central Committee, and Nikolai Bulgakov, Military Commissar for the Paide region.

To the highly emotional questions about the violence in Tbilisi, Commissioner Pöder replied that the perpetrators were probably not regular servicemen. Commenting on the appearance of tanks in the streets of Tallinn and Tartu, Pöder said:

"There has always been military transport moving through the streets of Tallinn. It's just that more attention is paid to it now because of recent events. War machinery that was viewed with interest and curiosity before, has now acquired a singular significance. That some of the machinery differs from those seen before is due to innovations in combat technology. In this case we were dealing with a military training maneuver involving the whole Baltic region, and conducted personally by Army General V. Varennikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, and USSR Deputy Minister of Defense."

Commenting on demands for better enforcement of regulations in the army, specifically as it applies to the personal safety of young recruits, R. Pöder replied:

"These demands are stemming primarily from incidences of dedovshchina now prevalent in the army... Dedovshchina started spreading after 1967, when the length of service was reduced. This brought about the disappearance of the sergeant in the best sense of the word."

The commissar also said that due to the growing ratio of minority nationals in the army, especially from the Islamic areas, a lot of Russian boys have also been subjected to dedovshchina. He added:

"I also disagree with the view that violations involving the army are suppressed, and that officers go unpunished... In the case of Arturas Sakalauskas 40 officers and generals were discharged or otherwise punished."

J. Marks: "Two commissions have been formed at the ESSR Supreme Soviet for the purpose of controlling army activity. One of them deals with environmental concerns, the other with personnel."

When asked about national service units, J. Marks replied:

"Even though the ECP Central Committee supports the idea of national military units, creation of such units is not very realistic, considering the categorically negative position taken by the USSR Ministry of Defense..."

R. Poder: "More realistic than national units, would be the creation of territorial forces, something that also has no direct opposition from Army General V. Varennikov. We have also suggested increasing the ratio of Estonians in units that participated in the liberation of Estonia, those bearing the names of Estonian cities, and units based within the Estonian territory..."

Also discussed at the meeting were the alarming lack of interest in military careers among Estonians, difficulties of supplementary training, vacation and discharge timing, and alternate service options, all of which are coming up for discussion at the 25 May meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The article concludes on an optimistic note that dialogue with the military is possible, after all.

Lithuanian Army Officer Lauds Language Tolerance

18001284 Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 10, May 1989 pp 42-47

[Article by Lt Col Yu. Zurlis: "National Sentiments and Nationalistic Emotions"]

[Text] About the author: Yuozas Kazio Zurlis graduated from higher military-political school as an external student, and by correspondence from the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin. He has served as deputy commander for political affairs of a training company, a club chief, secretary of the party buro and deputy commander for political affairs of a regiment. He is presently serving in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany as a political worker.

I serve far away from the motherland—in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. But from this place, all of us follow the events occurring in our homelands with special interest. And these events cannot but elicit concern in many of us. I, for example, am troubled by the fact that interethnic relations have grown extremely tense in my republic, Lithuania. Attempts by some "patriots" to direct the processes of our society's democratization into the channel of nationalistic aspirations are obvious. Such attempts, in my opinion, bear destructive force. And this is evident from many facts.

For example we can observe a tendency for division of the population into Lithuanians and non-Lithuanians. On one hand we have the rather widespread "Sayudis" movement, while on the other hand we have the "Yedinstvo" ["Unity"] movement. Both are operating under the slogans of perestroika. They hold rallies and demonstrations, the participants of which state their opinions on how to help perestroika along, and to solve faster the social problems that have accumulated in the republic. But besides the constructive proposals, we also hear appeals such as "Liberate Lithuania from the Russians,"

"Reinstate the Lithuanian Ministry of Armed Forces and the national officer corps," "Get Soviet troops out, and invite UN troops in their place" and so on.

What is going on? What are the causes of the situation we now see? Even in the most reactionary years of czarism, after all, Lithuania was never distinguished by nationalism, even though the destiny of my homeland has been extremely complex.

Prior to 1939 part of the republic had been forcibly separated away and placed under bourgeois Poland. The Poles renamed Vilnius Wilno. Lithuania's capital was moved to Kaunas. Then the war came, during which numerous trials fell to the lot of the Lithuanians. As with the other Baltic republics and all Soviet people, Soviet Lithuania withstood the fire of war.

Then came a complex period. The republic's laborers restored what had been destroyed by the war, created and strengthened the republic's economic base, put their life in order, raised children and made plans for the future. Together with other union republics Lithuania actively joined the restructuring effort. And suddenly negative processes leading to separation—into Lithuanians and non-Lithuanians—have begun.

Where are its roots? Could it be that it all has to do with language as a means of communication? Today, the issue of Lithuanian as a state language has injected itself into a number of highly important social problems. I recall when it was noted at a meeting of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet held in June of last year that the coming together of our peoples and unification of effort would proceed on the basis of further flourishing of all peoples and all cultures, and development of national language. Language is in fact our treasured possession, we must be proud of it, and it must be protected and developed. An obvious truth, one would think. But most likely it has not yet been understood by all. What else could explain the fact that recognition of Lithuanian as a state language in the republic was met so painfully by some? It would have been absurd, after all, to accuse Lomonosov or Turgenev of chauvinism for their fabulous words about the great Russian language. But are such accusations not equally absurd when words expressing the merits of Lithuanian, Belorussian, Ukrainian and Kazakh come from the mouths of Donelaytis, Martinskyavichus, Adamovich, Oleynik and Suleymenov?

Over a hundred nations and nationalities live in our multinational country, and they are simply obligated to understand one another. This is achieved owing to Russian. Why has precisely this language become the means of international communication? Because most of the population of the USSR speaks it. That's logical. But what is to be done with most of the indigenous population of a union republic? Should other laws operate here? A sizable part of the country's non-Russian population cannot speak Russian today, and some see this almost as a manifestation of nationalism. But apparently this is

not at all so. And yet do we ever come across persons of non-Russian nationality residing permanently in cities of the RSFSR—for example in Moscow, Sverdlovsk and Leningrad—who do not know Russian? I in any case have never met such people. But then, why is it that in other republics, ignorance of the local language on the part of people of a “nonindigenous” nationality is assumed to be the normal order of things?

Clear reference points are offered on this account in the resolution of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference “On International Relations.” It is noted there that we should create all of the conditions for harmonious, natural development of national-Russian bilingualism, display greater concern for active functioning of national languages in different spheres of state, social and cultural life, and encourage study of the language of the people bearing the name of the republic by citizens of other nationalities residing within its territory, and chiefly children and the young.

But here is what I have noticed. Whenever you speak before an audience of officers and warrant officers, and tell them that there are many examples in the Baltic republics where persons who do not know Russian are appointed to executive positions and in the sphere of public services, you encounter approval. And when you say that persons who do not know the language of the republic are also often accepted for these positions, you sometimes hear it said in the hall that this is nationalism, that this is oppression of and discrimination against the “nonindigenous population,” and so on. But why such categorical thinking? Where does it come from?

It seems to me that wherever respect of one another and elementary tact do not exist, wherever a desire to understand one another is not expressed, international tensions and insults begin.

What all of this can lead to was described in one of the issues of PRAVDA by Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Administrative Secretary V. Kiyevik: “Last week we received a letter from Tallinn. It turned out to be written in Estonian. After mulling it over a bit we came up with a solution: We sent the reply written in Moldavian.”

What good would ever come of it if Russian begins to disappear from the traditionally good mutual relations between fraternal republics—a language comprehensible to all parties, one which has brought people closer together over many years, and helped them in their life and work, and in the acquisition of knowledge? And how are we to communicate with our neighbors? As I understand, “Sayudis” favors placing priority on Lithuanian in all areas of communication. Here is what I would ask of “Sayudis” activists in this connection: What language would they use to coordinate their plans with persons of like mind in Latvia, Estonia and Belorussia? I am still waiting for an answer.

As a citizen of a multinational motherland and as a representative of my tiny Lithuania, I am pleased by the changes and by the eagerness with which Soviet people have joined the restructuring effort. And there is apparently nothing surprising in the fact that given such high activity of the popular masses, there is a pluralism of opinions concerning particular vitally important issues. But when it comes down to the point that certain activists of “Sayudis” find even Lenin Prospect, Kutuzov Square and the Pushkin Monument in Vilnius to be “superfluous” and “unnecessary,” it is evident that some of them are in fact losing their sense of reality and measure.

I would also like to share some thoughts about certain military issues of the “Sayudis” program. Having served almost a quarter of a century in the USSR Armed Forces, my knowledge of the army’s problems comes from more than just hearsay. The army is my life—together with all of the joys, misfortunes, problems and so on. And I can in no way agree with those leaders of the “Sayudis” movement, and especially of the “Free Lithuania League” and similar movements that degrade the serious matter of ensuring our country’s security almost down to that of playing militarized “Zarnitsa” games.

In the meantime it is known even to schoolchildren that while in World War I there were a few dozen military specialties in the armies of the warring countries, now there are over 2,000 of them. Which of them would young Lithuanians in “national formations,” and especially in the conditions of republic cost accounting, be able to master, and how? How would high-class military specialists be trained? I, as an equal citizen of the USSR, graduated from a higher military political school and from the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin. Other representatives of union republics, including Lithuania, have done the same thing as well. But were the republic to function under full cost accounting, young Lithuanians would not always have the opportunity to enter military and other VUZes outside their republic. Judging from the statements of “Sayudis,” this issue would be examined by the republic’s government. Lithuania does need such cadres—there is agreement there. But there are other solutions.

It seems to me that such cost accounting would lead to unpredictable social consequences. And chiefly to national separateness, to self-isolation.

I made a decision to prepare my son for study in a Suvorov military school. I learned that there is a specialized boarding school in Vilnius that prepares young men for further study in military schools. This pleased me, because while I would be serving abroad, my son would at least be living closer to his relatives, who would be able to visit him. I telephoned the school from the republic military commissariat. They asked me if my son knew Lithuanian. No, I replied. My wife is Estonian, I am Lithuanian, and my children know only Russian, which is what we speak in the family. And what is so

strange about that? During my years in the army I have served in several garrisons in different republics. The children simply did not have an opportunity to study either Estonian or Lithuanian. During these years it was even impossible to obtain the appropriate literature so that they could study on their own. This is what I told them at the boarding school. They heard me out, and then they refused to accept the application. It was then that a question came to mind: Are these the kind of schools which will lay the foundation for future military cadres for national formations of an "independent" Lithuania?

Each day, history, and life itself, provide us with sufficient examples that only jointly, only by working together would we be capable of solving those great and complex problems life sets before us.

Yes, mistakes had been made in the history of the Soviet Union, repressions occurred during the period of Stalin's cult of personality, and Lithuanians are not the only ones who still bear resentments. But there were also the joys of victory, there were also real successes. Is it really not obvious where we started and how far we have come? The 19th All-Union Party Conference awakened everyone to active social and political life, perestroika is breaking the ice of the stagnant times, and we must put all of our effort into helping this along, we must soberly evaluate the situation, correct the mistakes of the past, and in the course of perestroika direct the activities of the popular masses toward resolution of the most urgent problems.

But which way are individual leaders of "Sayudis," and especially of the "Free Lithuania League," pushing us? Toward destruction of our unity, toward national separatism, toward strife among all in our common home?

I think that it would not be superfluous to recall more frequently the fact that our army, which is a fragment of Soviet society, not only mirrors national relations but is also capable of actively influencing them. Evidence of this can be found in the entire history of the Soviet Armed Forces.

"The Red Army," said M. V. Frunze, "is not a national army: It is also a union, but a fighting union, into which the laborers of all of our Soviet republics send their sons to stand guard over Soviet land."

And today our army, fulfilling its principal mission in defense of the socialist fatherland, is at the same time a real school of internationalism. Every Soviet soldier, irrespective of his rank and position, is constantly relating with representatives of other nationalities. In the army he has a good opportunity to learn about the spiritual culture of many nations and nationalities, and to discover many things about them. I could demonstrate this with examples from the life of the military collectives of units serving in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany as well. I will confine myself to just a few of them.

Whenever young replacements come to the group's units and formations, we organize evening and morning discussions such as "I Introduce Myself to the Collective" and "Meetings of the Union Republics at the Map of the Motherland." We conduct 10-day celebrations of the union republics, during which we publish radio newspapers, show movies and set up book exhibits devoted to the union republics, and organize performances by amateur groups. And our military cooks even manage to prepare national dishes on these days.

Correspondence of commanders and political workers with the parents of soldiers and with the collectives in which they had studied or labored prior to joining the army also plays an important role in educating the soldiers and unifying the multinational military collectives. We make it a practice of acquainting young replacements from national republics with soldiers from the home country completing their tour of duty, and of transferring weapons and combat equipment in a solemn ceremony.

Much is also done to teach the officers how to work well in multinational military collectives. An atmosphere of respect for the rights, customs and national and psychological features of soldiers of different nationalities is created, and a battle is waged against verbal abuse and against names and jokes that outrage the national worth of servicemen.

When the tremendous disaster occurred on Armenian soil, soldiers of the Soviet Armed Forces acted as outstanding models of internationalism. The main burden of the rescue operations essentially fell upon the shoulders of servicemen.

Soldiers of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany also perceived the common misfortune with all of their heart. They organized collection and shipment of basic necessities to victims in Armenia, and chiefly to the families of servicemen. Women's social organizations took an active part in the collection of materials. The first airplane carrying medicines, tents, blankets, streetwear and food was sent to Leninakan. Officers, NCOs and privates from cities and towns within the zone affected by the natural disaster were sent there on this trip as well. Soon after, one more airplane landed in Leninakan with cargo for the earthquake victims.

The group's servicemen also collected considerable amounts of money. One million eight hundred twenty-three thousand four hundred rubles by the end of January 1989. Of this amount, 1,145,000 rubles were transferred to the current account of the Transcaucasian Military District to render assistance to military families that suffered from the earthquake, and 678,400 rubles were transferred to an Armenian bank.

Many soldiers of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany—representatives of all nationalities—expressed their readiness to donate blood for the victims. Among

them were the Russians Agafonov and Bychkov, Lithuanians Yankauskas and Chetvertinskas, Georgians Silagadze and Kanadze, Ukrainians Rudenko and Zhikharenko, and hundreds of others.

No, the friendship of the peoples of our country is not just words, but a real accomplishment of October, of socialism. It was paid for by all of our country's history. Which is why we are so astounded when we hear evidence of some people wishing to disintegrate the foundation of this friendship. Certain phenomena which we are sometimes compelled to observe in some of the republics raise concern. Take for example the impression left by a recent discussion with Private Roylyan, a Moldavian. He had returned from a short leave. He talked enthusiastically to me about the changes occurring today in the republic. It was impossible for me not to share in his joy concerning the positive changes in Moldavia—for example the fact that Moldavian was to become a state language. But Roylyan went on to tell me something else. The issue of replacing the Cyrillic alphabet by the Latin alphabet has been raised in the republic. The soldier talked about this with the same enthusiasm. But when I asked him to explain to me what was behind the desire to change the alphabet, he was unable to offer me any sensible explanations. The thought that comes to me is this: What are we to do with the kind of "restructuring" in the social life of the republics which seems to me to be based more on emotions and the latest style than on the realities of life? One often senses a premeditation in such statements which is not difficult to expose as a certain kind of nationalism. Who needs a rebirth of nationalism?

The discussion on improper mutual relations in the army milieu has now spread to Lithuanians as well. The army is taking decisive steps to eradicate the causes of this phenomenon. But don't we also know that the social roots of this evil must be sought chiefly not in military life? They extend down into the entire way of our life of the last 20 years. And if "Sayudis" and the "Free Lithuania League" feel that only Lithuanians and other minorities suffer from improper mutual relations, this is far from so. To my great regret I have encountered even my own fellow countrymen among the perpetrators of such things. For example Private Ratautas from Jonava assumed the path of a disrespectful attitude toward fellow servicemen of a more recent call-up after serving only half a year, for which he was expelled from the Komsomol and subjected to severe disciplinary punishment.

It seems to me that the vocational-technical schools and tekhnikums have become a favorable medium for the birth and spread of unhealthy interpersonal mutual relations, discrimination and social injustice. They possess the most inhomogeneous collectives—graduates of eight-year schools with no experience in mutual communication, young adults who had served their time in the army, and even persons who had served sentences in correctional labor colonies and prisons. I myself had to

endure this "school" prior to being called up for military service, and I was witness to some of the things that happened. This is why young people carry the "virus of dedovshchina" into the military barracks. Understandably, if the leaders of a subunit are passive, and if commanders and political workers are unaware of the state of affairs in the subunits, or if they do not have sufficient experience in unifying multinational military collectives, the disease begins to progress. And sometimes it leads to a tragic outcome.

Journalists have calculated that in the last year, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA received a record number of responses from the entire country (14,247) to its article "Incident in the Special Car." It described how Private A. Sakalauskas, driven to despair by improper mutual relations, took brutal revenge upon his tormentors. This extraordinary incident shook many people, and it pained the hearts of those with sons and grandsons who have yet to serve in the army. It was especially disturbing to the residents of Lithuania, since Sakalauskas was one of their emissaries. And on the general background of the relationship of young people to service in the army in this republic, this problem became even more acute. It is being actively discussed by students and by active members of "Sayudis" and the "Free Lithuania League." The question as to national military formations and military service only in one's own republic is weighing heavily.

Persons having absolutely no relationship to modern army problems sometimes speak actively about the army and service in it. In particular this is typical of the intelligentsia, and certain of its representatives such as, for example, V. Reymeris, a respected person and a prominent Lithuanian writer. And who has not heard the various opinions expressed by director E. Ryazanov on relations in the army? A woman who recently graduated from the university dared to seriously discuss the army's problems on the program "Vzglyad" ["Viewpoint"], and students who have not even served in the army yet are talking about them everywhere. T. N. Rudokas, a novice Lithuanian writer, writes quite openly: "...I did not fight in Afghanistan, and I have not even served in the USSR Armed Forces (due to a head injury)." Nonetheless he takes it upon himself to describe what it was like to serve in Afghanistan, where it is best for young Lithuanians to serve, and how much Lithuania needs national formations.

What can I say? No one is prohibited from discussing vitally important state problems, but I would think that in order to make proposals, one must understand the essence of the problems deeply and comprehensively. It would be much better for everyone to take care of his own business, and to be responsible for his own business.

In these complex and contradictory times, it would hardly be possible for a clear-thinking person to completely ignore military preparation of preconscrip youth, and service in the USSR Armed Forces. But who

is to defend the country? Or has the need for doing so already disappeared completely? The lessons of history, and the present situation in the world as well, continue to summon us to vigilance and to a constant readiness to stand in defense of the motherland.

Such that words alone and noisy declarations are not enough. There is still a need for real power, and in order to possess it, speaking in Lenin's words we need to study military affairs in the way they should be studied. But they have not come to understand this truth in "Sayudis." The movement's leaders feel that we need to "...constrict or totally annul military training in schools and VUZes," and that "...the term of mandatory military service must be reduced."

Let's assume that this would be better. But life and troop experience show that if we do reduce the term of active service, in many ways we would have to do so precisely at the expense of improving military training of preconscrip youth in the schools and VUZes. Isn't this obvious?

Unfortunately the line of reasoning expressed above can be encountered not only in Lithuania and not only in the program documents of public movements. However, it would be pertinent to recall here that at the same time that some are discussing in all seriousness the advantages of a cadre-militia system, and the need or lack thereof of military training and service, here in the FRG, right next door to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the expenditures on arms have grown, and the scale and quality of training for preconscrip youth have increased. And this is a fact!

"Sayudis" declares: "The existing means of satisfying the military obligation in the USSR Armed Forces are obsolete and immoral." As far as it being obsolete, yes, there are many things that need to be improved. I feel that it would be suitable to provide student deferments—students must be allowed an opportunity to finish their higher education. After all, the Law on Universal Compulsory Military Service sets the conscript age at 27 years. Those who graduate from a military department could be released from the draft, while if the VUZ does not have a military department, the graduate could be called up for 1 year. This would be a highly educated soldier, an NCO, an independent, mature person—the first assistant of officers in unifying military collectives. He will also be the first assistant in the struggle against improper mutual relations. There is also a need for a more differentiated approach to determining the novice's place of service in accordance with his education and occupational training. There is still very much disagreement in this area.

When it comes to service being immoral, "Sayudis" is clearly in the wrong. It was not that long ago that even in Lithuania, I often observed parents hopefully awaiting the departure of their sons for service in the army, believing

that in the army they would undergo a school of maturity and courage, and acquire a specialty, and saying to wayward sons that "they'll make a man out of you there."

I am deeply convinced that every citizen of the USSR must relate to military service as to a matter of great social meaningfulness, as to defense of the socialist fatherland, as to something that is most precious in his life, something that is in his deepest interest, that unifies and brings people together, and generates relations of mutual trust and friendship.

History has shown that our country's multinational make-up is one of the sources of its power, and we do not have the right to transform it into a source of weakness.

In and of itself, the "national factor" will not work in favor of perestroika. No measures, even the best-conceived, will produce an impact if they are not followed by practical deeds, if people do not feel personal responsibility for the destiny of not only their own land, their own people, but of the entire country as well. And it is important for everyone to clearly recognize this, so as not to yield to emotions and transform the "national factor" into a nationalistic factor. We cannot place the interests of one nation above the interests of all of the peoples in the country.

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Roundtable Discussion on Pacifism

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[Report under the rubric "SOVETSKIY VOIN Debate Club": "The Roots and the Crown"]

[Text] The society's growing interest in the army and navy is only natural.

At the same time, one cannot fail to see that the profusion of opinions and viewpoints expressed include attitudes which belittle the role of the Armed Forces in the provision of essential security for the state and the nation's life and in the indoctrination of the youth.

The regular session of our Debate Club was devoted to the problem of pacifism. Taking part in it were Col O.A. Belkov, doctor of philosophical sciences; Col B.I. Krasnov, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent; I.Ye. Malashenko, candidate of philosophical sciences and scientific secretary of the USA and Canada Institute; Col N.M. Moroz, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent; and Col I.N. Panin, candidate of philosophical sciences.

[O. Belkov] The development and stockpiling of nuclear missiles has made us acutely aware of the possibilities for and the limits to the employment of nuclear force in the modern world. Mankind's survival demands the rejection of many concepts which developed in the past.

Other aims and priorities are needed. A rethinking of many positions is occurring in the area of defense development in the situation of glasnost, which is opening up areas formerly closed to public discussion. Let us honestly admit that it is not always at the initiative of military institutions—it sometimes even involves overcoming their opposition—that the society is learning more and more about the Armed Forces, about their internal life, their missions and the difficulties of the restructuring in the army and navy.

The combination of these two circumstances is increasingly raising politically urgent questions for the people, even the question of whether we need an army. One can distinguish in all of the diverse views two extreme, essentially opposite approaches.

On the one hand, the public awareness still retains the former concepts according to which the nation's security is ensured by its superiority of military strength over that of any combination of likely enemies. Up to one fourth of the people questioned in sociological studies in our nation believe that it is essential for the USSR to be stronger militarily than the USA. A total of 43% of the Americans advocate military superiority for the USA over the USSR.

It is apparent today, however, that it is fundamentally impossible to win the arms race. The further stockpiling and improvement of weapons only increases the common danger. The level of military confrontation already reached makes mankind a hostage to circumstances in many ways. Drastic measures are being taken to reduce weapons and armed forces. This reduction has to be such that it does not tempt anyone to encroach upon the security of the USSR and its allies, however.

On the other hand, one cannot agree with those who advocate not resisting evil with force. General appeals about the urgent need to totally reject wars, no matter what efforts are being made in the military area, are politically naive. We have no basis for assuming that the meeker we are in the face of possible pressure, the more easily and successfully all problems of world policy will be resolved. Ideas to the effect that we do not need an army are an extreme expression of these sentiments.

[B. Krasnov] Unfortunately, such sentiments exist and even find their way into the press. The logic of the authors is approximately the following. Who needs our impoverished and ecologically devastated nation? What could they get from us? No one is planning to attack us, and is it therefore "not time for us to disband the army or at least switch to volunteer manning"?

What can one say to this? First of all, such opinions reflect an unpatriotic and timeserving position. Indeed, why engage in self-depredation because of our backwardness? Is it not better to seek ways to overcome it? Furthermore, when, as a result of the restructuring and the renewal of socialism, the Soviet Union moves into

the forefront in all areas—and we are confident that this will happen—what then? Patiently rebuild the disbanded army? Finally, history has shown that a potential aggressor has always selected as the object of his imperial aspirations one who is weaker than he and not one who is stronger.

At the present time, one cannot fail to see that the military leadership of the USA and NATO openly call the Soviet Union their main likely enemy. Enormous military power is concentrated against the USSR and other nations of the socialist commonwealth. It is also no secret that there are scenarios for a nuclear attack on us. This is the reality which forces us to concern ourselves with the nation's defense capability and to maintain our army as the main weapon for protecting the socialist commonwealth.

[I. Panin] The army is not a self-possessed entity. The reasons for its emergence lie in the system of economic and political relations developing within the state and in the international arena. The current situation is such that the power factor continues to play a large role in policy. And we must take this into account. Ideally it would be good not to have an army, of course, to free ourselves of military expenses. Policy must take reality into account, however. The reality is such that the Soviet Union also needs military power in order to conduct its peace-loving, independent policy. What the quantitative and qualitative features of that force should be is another matter. I would say unequivocally that we need an army, but a qualitatively different army.

[I. Malashenko] I doubt that there are very many people who question whether we need an army so starkly. All the more, people who answer the question negatively. I believe that there is agreement today about the need for an army, but several other questions are being asked. Did we do everything right in the past? What kind of army do we need? Is everything all right in our army? These questions appear to be advancing to the center of public discussion. And one is surprised at the pained reaction of our military comrades even to the first, timid attempts to involve civilian experts and the public in their discussion. They assume a mute, defensive stance: these are our problems, you see, and we will find the best solution to them ourselves.

In the meantime the army is expected to ensure the security of our nation, our society and all its members: military, civilian, even the pacifists—anyone at all. It is therefore natural that everyone has a right to participate in the discussion of its problems. The most diverse positions can be expressed: wholesome, well thought out, naive, even absurd. The sensible solution will be worked out from the juxtaposition, even the collision, of these.

[O. Belkov] No one objects to that. While we recognize the possibility of absurd, unacceptable positions, however, we also retain the right to have our own opinion of them. Among other things, there is a certain spread of

pacifism in our society today. Generally speaking, pacifism as a trend did not just now come into being. Back in the 15th century a Czech king advanced the concept of establishing universal peace through the rejection of wars among the European states. The German philosopher Kant worked out a concept for eternal peace and is considered to be the founder of pacifism. Pacifism as a trend is therefore hundreds of years old. Today, however, some of our publicists say that it is producing new political thinking. This is not a new phenomenon. It is internally contradictory on the substantive level, however. We therefore do not have an unequivocal attitude toward it. From the universal perspective pacifism is oriented toward a nonnuclear and nonviolent world. One has to share and support these peace-making concepts.

As a political trend, however, pacifism counts on achieving its goals with propagandistic and civil actions. Its proponents call for "creating a moral climate in the society, in the world, on the planet, in which it would not be prestigious and not be less shameful to have a bomb than it is to have concentration camps, death factories and Auschwitzes today." But what are we Soviet people to do today, when such a situation has not yet been created in the world? Will we not find ourselves in the unenviable position of the person who decided to undress in order to feel the warmth faster? One cannot agree with this, because it is impossible to achieve a nonviolent world as the ideal for the organization of human communal life while adhering to the principle of nonresistance to evil....

And the pacifists are in glaring conflict with history, logic and common sense when they try to convert their antiwar sentiments and distaste for war into slogans condemning the army and military personnel. Is there common sense in views proclaiming the premise that ideally Soviet military personnel should not love, should even hate, their work? Does it not follow from this logic that the worse they perform their duty, the better? But how does one explain the justifiable indignation of the Soviet public at instances in which our military personnel do not prove themselves to be up to the demands made of them—the unintercepted flight of the West German sport plane, for example? The loss of accurate reference points leads to a situation in which antiwar sentiments turn into condemnation of the very existence of an army capable of defending and prepared to defend the homeland.

This goes against the historical experience of the people, however, and the Soviet people's feeling for law and order. From century to century the soldier's valor has lain in his ability to protect the people and the homeland. And so long as there exists even the slightest danger to them, this ability needs to be developed in every honorable son of the homeland.

[I. Malashenko] Speaking of the military service and attitudes toward it, we need to admit that we are paying for the legacy of the past, for those years in which this

problem was never discussed, for all of the flaws of the system of administration by order and decree. It is now clear in the economy what this system has brought the nation to. Absolutely the same system functioned in the military and in foreign policy. And what do we have? Did it pull down the economy but have no negative consequences in the military? That is a strange presumption, is it not?

In my opinion, no one has a monopoly on patriotism, not even the military. Just as the security of our society is also not a monopoly of our army. Security is ultimately the cause of the entire society.

There are people with doubts about compulsory military duty, and they have the right to express their opinion.

What kind of army do we need? In the recent past we would have answered that it must be a very large army, in support of which all our resources—both material and technical, including human resources—should be mobilized.

You know that better than I, but this is not the only way to resolve the problem.

Today there exists the point of view that it is possible to have a military manned on a volunteer basis, and this matter needs to be seriously considered. We need to have the figures in hand to demonstrate that we cannot afford this for a number of reasons. Among other things, we cannot yet pay volunteer soldiers as much as the U.S. military pays, and so forth.

Variant thinking is not proof of lack of patriotism or of immorality, however. There are people who for various religious and moral convictions do not share the generally accepted positions, even with respect to serving in the army. And most nations, as you know, have a law which permits alternatives to be found.

If I am not mistaken, we had such a law at the end of the '20s, when people who did not want to serve in the military were sent to perform heavy, distasteful or unpleasant work—if I remember correctly, to all sorts of infirmaries, infectious disease hospitals....

We are not prepared to accept this fact today, perhaps, but it obviously does not make sense to reject it out of hand.

There are no subjects closed to discussion today. And since the society is discussing it, we obviously need to think about why it occurred and how we reached that point, and about the fact that we possibly did things wrong in the past. We cannot merely write everything off to the intrigues of our ideological foes. I apologize for the fact that we did this for several decades. But the trouble which has been revealed in many areas today is still a result of our own blunders and errors. This is what we are dealing with..

[N. Moroz] Unfortunately, the idea of not needing to serve in the military produces some sad practical conclusions. A certain part of our youth openly express a disinclination to serve in the military, and evasions of military service are no longer isolated incidents.

[I. Panin] The compulsory military duty established in our nation is an element of the Soviet society's democratic nature. I cite V.I. Lenin: "Universal military duty, not just on paper but in fact, is undoubtedly a democratic reform... It is a break with the social hierarchical system and introduces equal rights for citizens.... We have not yet actually had universal military duty, because the privileges of distinguished origin and the privileges of money generate a lot of exceptions." We need to admit that such exceptions have occurred also in our reality.

Who were the parents of the soldiers/"Afghaners," for example? Blue-and white-collar workers, kolkhoz workers.... And did soviet and party workers and enterprise directors not have sons? What was this, happenstance? No. Until recently lead workers have applied powerful pressure to have their offspring exempted from the military service or at least to get them stationed somewhere near home. And these are also matters of social justice, after all. It is a task of enormous importance, both political and moral, to resolutely eradicate these occurrences.

[B. Krasnov] It is sometimes asked whether the service is moral. In my opinion, it is immoral not to serve, not to bear responsibility for one's motherland, for the homeland's fate.

I feel that a person who refuses to serve in the Armed Forces is committing an immoral act. I am certain of that.

[I. Malashenko] Our discussion is still based on a narrow understanding of pacifism as a dislike for any war or violence. We classify as pacifist the positions of civilian experts who advocate certain reforms.

I do not know how far our unilateral reductions can go. This problem can be resolved by the society itself based on open debate. The concern of our public about the unilateral reductions is discussed little in our press, however. I do not know of a single publication which has clearly explained why we are eliminating more missiles than the Americans. Perhaps we have built an excess of weaponry? The same is true of the unilateral reduction: why a half-million and not a million or a million and a half?

Let us put the question bluntly. Are we certain that our security will not suffer? Personally, I am confident. It seems to some people that the unilateral reduction is an unjustified concession to the West. Here we encounter another very large problem, however: the fact that we have very little information for our discussion.

[B. Krasnov] We need not a "large" army but an efficient one, which will be able to defend the nation no matter how events develop. Reasonable adequacy for defense at the lowest possible level—these are the principles underlying Soviet military doctrine. The organizational structure and the armaments of the army and navy, military strategy, operational art and tactics, the combat and political training of the personnel are being restructured on this basis. One thing alone is not changing and cannot change: our certainty of the public need for and the great importance of military work. The entire history of the Soviet people has led them to the conclusion, legally established in the Constitution of the USSR, that the defense of the socialist homeland is a sacred obligation and service in the Armed Forces is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR.

The situation is not the best for the soldiers, physically, psychologically or morally, to be sure, particularly during the first period of their service. There is work for the commanders and political workers in this area to see that the Armed Forces contribute even more actively to the development of the individual and to the spiritual and moral enrichment of the soldiers. The radical democratization of military life is assuming particular importance today, and its legacy from the period of stagnation is being eradicated.

[N. Moroz] One cannot agree with the attitudes of dependency toward the military, however. The draft notice is not a pass to a sanatorium, and military service is not an exemption from the obligations of life. Military life needs to be improved, of course. A great deal is being done in this respect. It will always be military life, however, involving hardships and deprivations, to put it in the language of the regulations, not characteristic of civilian life. The military is work, hourly and daily, intensive work. Its very nature rules out softness, disorganization and infantilism. When appeals are voiced for an alternative to military service and the exemption of certain categories of the youth from the military draft, we therefore need to ascertain whether this is more public concern for the "democratization" of defense development or an egotistical attempt to keep unchanged the comfort of one's personal life. Incidentally, how frequently of late we have come to savor the subject of the "easy money" of the military riding on the society's back and eating free bread. If that is so, then why is it so difficult to find applicants for the military schools? Does this not indicate a lack of understanding of the fact that the officer does not effortlessly obtain his far from fabulous money?

[I. Malashenko] It seems to me that we have come to a very important subject. I would call that subject "the army and society." In fact, the situation is very simple. The army does not exist outside the society, but our debates frequently create the impression that the army exists separately, the society separately.

In its responses to Yu. Polyakov's story "100 Days Before the Order," the military press attempted to show that the problem of "the old ways" was not created in the army, that it reflects processes occurring in our society, that people "not properly educated" are entering the army and that relations develop among them which reproduce those existing in the society's life. This point of view was shaped by a certain isolation of the army from the society's problems. This obviously accounts for the sharp reaction to criticism on the part of public opinion.

[O. Belkov] While in no way trying to justify the unthinking defense of the uniform's honor, I would like to direct attention to another aspect. It needs to be acknowledged that civilian authors frequently indicate a willingness to express their opinion on the Armed Forces without concerning themselves with its substantiation and competence at all. Here is one example. A senior scientific associate speaks in a roundtable discussion in a very popular, large-circulation magazine and states that he does not know about the moods in the army or in the officer corps. According to him, this is a closely guarded secret. "As something to think about," however, he cites information derived from acquaintances according to which the commander in a certain subunit punished a soldier for reading "subversive literature"—M. Shatrov's play "Further, Further and Further...." He concludes meaningfully: "I do not know and probably no one knows whether we have many such officers."

Just what is that if not deliberate disparagement of the military?

[I. Panin] I believe that this is due in great part to the fact that we have recently relaxed our attention to the patriotic indoctrination of the workers. Since the fatherland's defense is the mission not just of the military, however, but that of the entire nation, the entire society must be prepared to defend it. Every member of society should be taught the fundamentals of military affairs. In other words, patriotism certainly has a military aspect. It calls not just for love for the homeland, but also the capability and the possibility of defending it if necessary.

[I. Malashenko] Yes, no matter how much against war an individual is, he must counter a military threat if one arises. This is an obligation of any citizen of the society. It is difficult to agree with the way the question of military-patriotic indoctrination is put, however. The very term proclaims a monopoly, as it were, on patriotism by the army and military personnel. No one has such a monopoly, however. Our entire society must develop patriots.

[O. Belkov] We should not lose sight of the essence of the matter in our discussion of concepts. What does the appeal to engage in antiwar indoctrination instead of military-patriotic indoctrination lead to? A certain Maj Vektur says that we "must change priorities in the political-indoctrinational work with the servicemen in

the interest of demilitarizing the mass awareness and of indoctrination in a spirit of peace." This absolutely emasculates any concept of possible aggression and preparedness to repel it. It is something with which one cannot agree.

Another thing. Let us think about why patriotism has become so solidly linked with the word "military." Is it because the military structures have monopolized patriotism? No, it is a result of disregard by other public institutions for the development of patriotic feelings in the people, a disinclination and an inability of the system of administration by orders and decrees in the situation of ideological and psychological stagnation to strengthen patriotism. Here is the disheartening confirmation. A sociological survey conducted in Moscow showed that only 39% of those questioned were "very proud" of their Soviet citizenship. Compare that with 67-79% for the same question among Americans surveyed. And it is proposed that we reject even that part of the patriotic indoctrination which still retains its essence and efficacy!

This is not a debate on terminology. If we agree that a true patriot is always a selfless defender of the fatherland, that certain knowledge, abilities and skills are needed to fulfill one's duty in the contemporary situation and that purposeful work is required to shape these qualities in the individual, then we shall not argue about what things are called. It is important to unite the efforts of the entire society to see that every Soviet individual is prepared to the maximum to fulfill his constitutional duties of defending the homeland. This work is made even more important by the fact that priority is being given to qualitative criteria in Soviet defense development—with respect both to technology and military science and to the composition of the Armed Forces.

The Soviet government's unilateral measures toward reducing the army and navy must not result in even the slightest weakening of the nation's defense strength. They must be offset by improving the combat and political training of the personnel, strengthening discipline, enhancing the combat readiness of the army and navy, and improving the mass defense work, particularly among the pre-draft and draft-age youth.

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Political Officer Cadets Unprepared To Respond on Baltic Issues

18010662a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Article by Cadet A. Kislitskiy: "How To Respond to an 'Informal'"]

[Text] Quite recently, cadets of the graduate courses of the Pushkin Higher School of Electronics of Air Defense returned from their tour of duty in line units. Our training group did their tour of duty in one of the air

defense units of the Moscow Military District. The impression of the tour was generally positive. The attitude toward us was favorable, and the officers tried to help, explain, and show.

Within the framework of the program developed by the school's command for the tour of duty in line units, we were to conduct a political training class with the soldiers on the topic of "Knowing and Respecting the Ways, Customs, and Traditions of the Peoples of the USSR—the Basis for Consolidating a Multiethnic Military Collective." I was fairly well prepared for it, I thought.

The class was going according to schedule. Not keeping track of time due to a lack of experience, I outlined the material in the first hour and asked if the soldiers had any questions. A corporal stood up and had barely begun to speak, when went in a totally different direction. It turned out that before being drafted into the army he had lived in Lithuania. Everyone knew what the situation is right now in Lithuania and the other Baltic republics. The soldier was quite sharp and at first glance convincingly refuted what I had just said. Of course, the historical facts which he literally spouted were chosen in quite a biased manner. The program provisions of Sajudis that he cited were largely, in my view, controversial, and some were generally unacceptable. For example, restricting the so-called migration of population from other republics to the Baltic, transition to the territorial principle of manning the army, and many others. He stated all this clearly, confidently, and emotionally. Meanwhile, my fellow classmates and I had a fairly general idea about the "Sajudis" movement for perestroika in Lithuania and the popular fronts in Latvia and Estonia. So, it was difficult for me to defend my point of view. Under conditions of glasnost and democracy, it is necessary to be able competently to debate and engage in polemics with an opponent. Without convincing facts and arguments, relying only on general statements, one cannot prove the fallacy of individual program provisions of informal social organizations.

The graduation of young officers in the country's military schools is approaching. Many will end up in command positions, and it is very possible that members of these informal organizations will serve in their subunits. Therefore, in the time remaining it is desirable to organize classes in the schools during which the cadets can be familiarized in detail with the situation in the Baltic and in other regions of the country.

Military Candidates in Run-Off Elections

Candidate Lt Col Sologub Profiled

18010662b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 May 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Maj V. Nagornyy: "In the Interests of Man"]

[Text] Our country will hold run-off elections for USSR people's deputies on 14 May. There are 18 candidates registered for Leningrad Rural National-Territorial Electoral District No. 20. One of them is Lt Col V. Sologub.

The biography of Vladimir Yemelyanovich [Sologub] is perhaps similar to those of many of today's officers. He was born in 1949 in the village of Koleno, Voronezh Oblast. He graduated from school in 1967 and enrolled in the Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute. After his second year, he transferred to a military school. And now, 18 years later, he does not regret that step.

After school, he served in various corners of our homeland. The special marks are not only in his service record, but duty in Afghanistan as part of the limited contingent of Soviet troops also left a mark on him himself.

Lt Col Sologub accurately guesses the hopes of people and is always willing to help out and, without acting against his conscience, to tell the truth. The two Orders of the Red Star attest to his personal courage.

The election program of Vladimir Yemelyanovich contains specific proposals related to improving care for soldier-internationalists, veterans of the Great Patriotic War, and invalids. It also contains a broad view of today's problems that concern many. These include distribution of goods by coupons, empty store counters, the ecological situation in the region and the country, maternity care, problems emerging with informal groups, and, naturally, present-day concerns of the armed forces. The people's deputy candidate not only cites the shortcomings, but also proposes bold ways to resolve them. Incidentally, individual problems are already being resolved today with his help.

The candidate was asked at one of the pre-election meetings: "How can you, a military man, resolve strictly civilian problems in the supreme body of power?" To this he answered:

"I have already been asked this question. The thing is, some of the people I talk to forget that we in the military are the same kind of people as the rest of the citizens. My interests are the interests of my voters."

As a military man, V. Sologub has occasion to say much about military service, its difficulties, and existing shortcomings in the army. This is natural: questions of military organizational development today concern society. This was also confirmed by the general meeting of the collective of the Kaliningrad Oblast Hospital, which nominated him as a candidate. The question was asked at the hall: "How can you influence stamping out relations that are at variance with regulations?" The candidate has his own opinion about the struggle against this evil, and the person presenting the candidate, L. Gotovets, a department chief of the hospital, answered this question: "We have become accustomed to looking for shortcomings in others," she stated, "but how do we bring up our own sons? What do we know about them? By what do they live and what troubles them? Will each of us answer this? But the time is coming, and we will bid farewell to our offspring: They will teach you in the

army. Haven't we had enough of dumping everything on some 'uncle,' and isn't it time that we, through joint efforts, struggle for moral purity of society, and that means the army, too?"

Candidate Lt Col Kulakov Interviewed

18010662b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Mar 89 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Lt Col A. Kulakov, USSR people's deputy candidate, by Col N. Mulyar, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Firm Guarantees Are Needed"]

[Text] Col N. Mulyar, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, asked Lt Col A. Kulakov, USSR people's deputy candidate and deputy commander for political affairs, to answer several questions.

[Mulyar] Aleksandr Fedorovich, voters of the Leninsk Territorial District of Moscow Oblast will be voting for you at the run-off elections for USSR people's deputies. Please tell me, how did your nomination come about?

[Kulakov] The thing is, when the first round of voting took place, I was one of the people presenting P. Ryabtsev, director of the Kolkhoz imeni V.I. Lenin. The farm which he heads is profitable, and the people live there prosperously. In short, the rural people appreciate Ryabtsev. But now they had to campaign for him and participate in the meetings. But it turned out that neither P. Ryabtsev nor his alternate candidate V. Mosolov gained the necessary number of votes in the elections. They began nominating other candidates. The soldiers in my unit suggested me. Other military collectives and as well as teachers of a local secondary school also nominated me.

[Mulyar] I know that there are six other candidates registered for this district. Naturally, you have to conduct an election campaign. What difficulties are you encountering?

[Kulakov] Honestly? A military man's opportunities to campaign are limited. Other candidates are allocated money by enterprises for printing leaflets, appeals, and photographs. A military unit does not have all this. I turned to the rayispolkom and was told there is no money. Therefore, I had to print my election program on a typewriter. And I hand it out during meetings with voters.

[Mulyar] What is the main thing in your election program?

[Kulakov] There is no simple answer. In the political area, for example, I will fight for creating a political system which would correspond, in deed not words, to the tenet: "Power to the Soviets!" Look at the rural soviets. Legally they own land today, but practically it is managed by the kolkhoz or sovkhoz management.

Or take another sphere—economics. State enterprises are converting to first and second models of cost accounting. But these enterprises remain dependent on departments. They take away up to 80-90 kopecks from every ruble of profit. It is nothing more than "robbery in broad daylight." To prevent this, we need a cost-accounting mechanism in which the enterprise would keep 45 percent of the profit. We need firm guarantees of improving the life of Soviet people.

[Mulyar] Experience of elections has shown that the voters are most interested in military issues, particularly when a service member candidate speaks with them. How are you wording these issues in your program?

[Kulakov] Yes, your observation is correct. There has not been a meeting at which the people were not interested in the state of affairs in the army. Many are concerned that the reduction in USSR Armed Forces will affect combat readiness. Therefore, I advocate a reduction to a level that guarantees security of the homeland. We urgently need to revise the wages of officers. Due to this, we are already beginning to lose our best cadres. The way of life of service members is the worst in the country; their families have no social protection. These and other issues must be raised at the Congress of People's Deputies, and specific decisions must be made on them.

Former Officer Loses Faith in Army After 9 April Tbilisi Events

18300661a Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
9 May 89 p 4

[Interview with writer Boris Vasilyev by Besik Urigashvili: "Boris Vasilyev Says, 'I'm a Russian, I'm a Military Man...'"]

[Excerpts] There was a meeting in Moscow on 23 April with Boris Vasilyev, the well known writer and playwright, the author of such popular works as "The Dawns Here are Quiet...", "I Did Not Enroll in the Lists," "Don't Shoot at the White Swans," "Tomorrow It Was War," the novel "Once Upon a Time," and a number of plays and screenplays.

At that time he had been to Tbilisi among a group of USSR deputies from the Cinematographers Union. The deputies' questioning of the group was published in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. Soon after, he was interviewed in VECHERNIY TBILISI, and then he appeared on Central Television's program Vzgl'yad, where he expressed his views on the Tbilisi tragedy. Nevertheless, much of what we discussed in Moscow was left out of the newspaper articles and the Vzgl'yad program. For this reason, the editors have decided to publish this interview in order to emphasize those issues which, in our opinion, are of interest to the reader.

[Urigashvili] Boris Lvovich, I believe you used to be a cadre officer. But to me, judging from your works, you are primarily a major humanist and a genuine Russian intellectual. How are these two factors getting along inside you now after what you have seen and heard in Tbilisi?

[Vasilyev] The fact is that I am the son of a cadre officer. I spent my whole childhood in military compounds. My father always taught me that the army is the defender of the people. Naturally, I have seen the conditions under which military cadres live, the difficulties and deprivations they experience. I was an infantryman and an airborne trooper during the war. I graduated from the Armored Corps Academy and served as an engineer and a cadre officer. And I really did know and love the kind of army that defends its people.

But since what has happened in Tbilisi, I have experienced a huge psychological letdown. Here for the first time we came up against the military's punitive acts having nothing in common with the law, directed against the people of our own country. They were not there to disperse the people. They were there to punish the people. For what? For nothing. At that moment the people weren't doing anything against the law. It is wrong to punish people for their views, for expressing what they think.

[Urigashvili] I served my two years almost eight years ago, and I could tell even then that the army was seriously sick. Of course, its sickness is a reflection of the state of society. But again, in connection with the events in Tbilisi, the following question naturally arises. As a result of those actions, faith in the army as the defender of the people was partially undermined. This is understandable, because the army carried out a function that is totally inappropriate to it. And now how are we to explain to those who were on the square that day, those who possess certain information, that the time may come when they will have to perform their military duty?

[Vasilyev] In connection with this I will quote the words of an elderly Georgian whom I talked to in the hospital: I won't send my boy to the army; I'd rather see him in jail.

You're right, of course, the army is experiencing a crisis. And in my opinion there are two reasons. The first is that the army really does reflect all the ills of society. The second—and this is purely my own opinion—is that we have learned the wrong lessons from the shameful war in Afghanistan.

The army gained two kinds of experience in Afghanistan. The first—and this has been proved by Tbilisi's Afghan vets—is the positive experience of mutual help, standing by one another, military brotherhood, tested under the harsh conditions of war. This kind of experience needs to be propagandized and supported. And thanks to Tbilisi's Afghan vets for having brought this back with them.

However, an enormous number of soldiers and officers brought back a different kind of experience from Afghanistan, the kind of experience gained by fighting guerrillas rather than regular army. Combat experience is acquired through conflict with regular units. But in the case of fighting against guerrillas, the army's functions come to be punitive. This is inevitable, because there is individual combat and routing of people who are not professional soldiers. This kind of experience ought not to be studied, propagandized, and passed down to succeeding generations. As an example of this I should like to cite the fact that the American army disbanded all the units that fought in Vietnam. The Americans have done a wise thing, in my opinion. We have not acted as wisely.

And now in Tbilisi it has become clear how this negative experience can work. It is so explosive, the accumulation of brutality in a man can easily spread.

[Urigashvili] As a people's deputy, a representative of delegated authority, do you intend to undertake anything in this regard?

[Vasilyev] It is essential to create a special deputy commission to tour the special units [spetspodrazdeleniya] and determine the principles governing the conduct of operations, their tactics, how the soldiers are instructed, what they are and are not authorized to do, who monitors it, and, finally, how things stand with regard to unpleasant but safe equipment for dispersing demonstrations. As is well known, such equipment exists in all the civilized countries. If we can't make it ourselves, let's buy it. I definitely intend to raise this issue at the Congress of People's Deputies. And I will attempt to do so along with my friends and fellow-thinkers on the overall platform.

There needs to be a permanent deputy commission which monitors the army and the special units. Moreover, it is essential that video and movie cameras be utilized during such actions if they recur (and they undoubtedly will). Why is it forbidden to take pictures, to use cameras and video cameras? What are they, afraid of glasnost? Are they acting illegally? If they are acting illegally, they are liable for strict punishment. But if they are acting within the law, then they themselves ought to be interested in such films. It is not absolutely essential that these films be broadcast on television. It would be sufficient to screen them for deputy and community commissions which need to be created in any such situation in order to carry out an independent investigation.

I emphasize that such actions, assuming we can't avoid them, must be strictly regulated by the law and in keeping with all the international legal acts signed by our country—whether it be the Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Acts, the Vienna Accords, or whatever. Taking account of the experience of the civilized countries. This is what I personally carry away with me from the Tbilisi tragedy. [passage omitted]

Officer Defends Army's Actions in 9 April Tbilisi Events

18300674a Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 19, 12 May 89 pp 16-18

[Article by Major A. Abramkin, Transcaucasian Military District: "Let a Military Man Speak: We Must Tell the Truth"]

[Text] An investigation is underway into the circumstances of the tragic events in Tbilisi. Various assessments and versions of what happened are being aired in the newspapers, journals, and on television. A government commission is working on it.

Our weekly newspaper has been getting letters from readers, including collective letters, which express alarm over what happened in the capital city of our fraternal republic. Calls for restraint are being heard. Many rumors are circulating, conjectures, inaccurate information. There are those who are ready to look for "the hand of Moscow" in the tragedy. However, as was stated at the press conference for foreign and Soviet journalists by CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee Secretary V.A. Medvedev, "The decision to use troops was taken locally by Georgian republic authorities. As for what happened in Tbilisi on the night of 8 and 9 April, that is, the use of military force to clear the square in front of Government House, Moscow found out about that after it was done."

Today we publish a letter from political officer A.A. Abramkin of the Transcaucasian Military District.

In turning the floor over to him, the editors are proceeding on the indisputable proposition that all testimony is important in the search for the truth.

The four years of my service in the Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District have come in the period since the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and have coincided with the processes of renewal and perestroika unfolding there. It is not just that the characteristics of the social-political and economic development of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, the national-territorial factor, have influenced the nature, intensity, and direction of processes of perestroika and the actions of the forces opposing them. These characteristics, in my view, have practically conditioned the development of events and channeled these processes into the mainstream of national-ethnic problems.

After all, the Transcaucasus has been in turmoil for a year and a half. Recurrences of the disease, effective means for the treatment of which have yet to be worked out, continue to emerge with new force. The pulse of the social-political life of the Transcaucasus is beating increasingly faster. The use of the forces of public order to liquidate hotbeds of tension has ceased to be a forced, extraordinary measure, a "surgical intervention" to relieve emotional tension in interethnic relations, and

has become an everyday phenomenon. State of emergency, curfew, huge rallies, demonstrations, riots, and disorders rooted in nationalism have become a kind of attribute of the local reality. They include the forces for the maintenance of public order, which are defined, in the common parlance (and elsewhere too) by the word "army." The emergence of this epithet, and attitudes toward it on the part of the people of the republics of Transcaucasia and the local organs of authority, constitute the reason for my letter.

"The military command took the only correct decision—not to allow the overheated crowd into the Armenian districts (of Kirovabad). Army patrols were stationed at all the bridges across the River Gyandzhachay...The soldiers stood stoically, but they understood that it could not last long. The crowd surged forward, provocateurs yelled about 'our brutally murdered brothers.' And only then was the decision made to push the crowd back from the bridge. Ranks of soldiers moved forward. The crowd gave way and retreated. At that point, from the rear, from an alley, a truck hurtled out...The murderer at the wheel did not hesitate; he did not step on the brake at the last moment. He ran over several people at full speed. The vehicle ran into the curb, but the driver managed to straighten it out. But all it took was his momentary confusion to allow Lt Viktor Popov to jump on the running board. With his entrenching tool he knocked away the knife that was aimed at his chest. The blade slashed his arm...The lieutenant held on, and the murderers, it was not clear, would not be getting away. Right then, however, there was a hail of stones...How could the soldiers allow perfectly innocent people to be killed? Why did headquarters, knowing about the situation in the city, not give the order to move out to the bridges with weapons?" (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY No 297, 25 December 1988.)

"In addition to clubs, military units used entrenching tools and toxic chemical agents...This action, unprecedented in its brutality, has aroused the rage and profound indignation of our whole community" (from the message of the USSR Academy of Sciences to the CPSU Central Committee plenum and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, titled "Perestroika in Danger," ZARYA VOSTOKA, No 97, 23 April 1989).

And so, the central figure in the events is the army, military people, although neither term is actually correct, or at least not always correct. I will discuss this a little further on. But we cannot ignore the fact that the number of wounded, injured, and suffering military personnel responsible for maintaining (imposing) public order already stands at several hundred.

On 27 February 1988, during the first hours after troops were brought into Sumgait (where they arrived from their permanent stations in Baku 2 to 3 hours after receiving the appropriate orders, having broken through the raging crowds at the approaches to the city), the military people's situation was extremely grave. All they

had to defend themselves with against sharpened pokers, rebar rods, chains, knives, and clubs were their fists and their closed ranks, which they put into the service of protecting people's lives.

In late November and early December 1988, in Baku and Yerevan, Kirovabad and Nakhichevan, in Stepanakert and other cities, the military men again took upon themselves the outbursts of nationalistic passions; they were obliged to defend gorkoms, rayispolkoms, and procuracies, help release hostages, and protect women and children who were frantic from grief and horror. The onset of cold weather also affected the weaponry of those persons who placed their nationality allegiance above all else. Rifle fire against military patrols and whole units, the use of home-made hand grenades, and the widespread use of bottles containing inflammable mixtures—all of these factors seriously heated up the atmosphere. Five units of armored equipment were burned in Kirovabad (seeing that it was very convenient in the city), including one infantry combat vehicle during the defense of the Azerbaijan Communist Party gorkom. The driver, who escaped the fire, was savagely beaten by the crowd.

And again, the soldiers' only protection was their helmets and armored vests, and their only means of self-defense was small entrenching tools.

Last October in Stepanakert, during an operation to stop attempts to foment mass disorders occasioned by the detention of Manucharov, the leader of the Krunk nationalist movement, the town's central square was cleared of a crowd of 1500 persons by means of the displacement [vytesneniye] method. Several soldiers went to the hospital with dagger wounds in their arms—their left arms, the ones which held their shields. Their lives were saved by their armored vests, which left their arms uncovered. This was one of the first experiences of the "displacement of an unarmed, peaceful demonstration," which can be defined in everyday language as the exclusive use of shields to push people back—shields which serve as the weaponry of the internal troops and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] troops. Soon after, on 5 December 1988, this method was used more successfully in Baku in clearing a crowd of 5000 persons out of V.I. Lenin Square. Again, internal and MVD troops were involved in this action, for which they had not only special weaponry but also special training.

The Central and republic newspapers cited examples similar to the above from the experience of the use of public order forces in Armenia. At the same time, other, more effective methods were used there, including the participation of Soviet Army troops. This necessity was dictated by the fact that so-called "national self-defense" detachments were attacking refugee columns and by the necessity of emergency measures to secure the safe passage of columns of equipment headed for the natural disaster zone and to prevent mob scenes on roads and streets at a time when the whole country was helping the victims of the disaster as best it could.

However, merely recounting the positions of the two sides involved in the interethnic conflict—the crowd and the army—would portray a picture that was incomplete, damaging, and far from reality. After all, this conflict was participated in by local organs for the maintenance of public order (unfortunately, what was said above concerning actions to maintain public order does not apply to them), local law enforcement organs, and, finally, local organs of government and local mass media.

Valeriy Vladimirovich Vasilenko, the representative of the USSR Procuracy who was temporarily serving as acting procurator of NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], agreed with me that reporting in the press the killing of two Azerbaijanis in a conflict between the inhabitants of Agdam and Askeran, without additional clarifications, was inappropriate given the explosive situation. There are many who believe that it was this report that served as the match setting off the powder keg that exploded in Sumgait (A. Vasilevskiy's essay "Cloud in the Mountains," AVRORA, No 10, 1988).

"Given the urgency of the situation, the mass media and propaganda organs bear high responsibility...A number of broadcasts by republic television and radio were the fruit of political thoughtlessness and shortsighted carelessness....There were deviations from the well-considered and sober position; a number of articles served to inflame passions and aggravate the situation...The newspaper AZERBAYDZHAN PIONERI allowed the publication of a report calling on school children to take part in unsanctioned rallies. Statements by certain figures in culture on television and radio were opportunistic and ideologically damaging, and some of the television and radio broadcasts essentially supported the ultimatums that were voiced at unsanctioned rallies. Gross errors were committed by sectorial and factory newspapers" (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, No 296, 23 December 1988).

A few words about the actions (inaction) of local law enforcement organs and public order maintenance organs. A. Vasilevskiy's essay "Cloud in the Mountains," to which I have already referred, cites evidence given by eyewitnesses to the events in Sumgait concerning this matter:

"After those three days, my hands shook for a week. We slept two or three hours a night. We worked in the crowd in civilian clothes and without 'barrels' (that is, without weapons); they did not issue them, fearing that the weapons might fall into the hands of the bandits. We circulated among the crowds. We carried belts or sticks so they wouldn't get wise to us. We picked up the worst bandits by means of a ruse. We'd call one of them aside, say 'we found a suitable apartment,' lead him to a quiet place and push him into the vehicle. But we didn't catch the biggest fish. I think the main ringleaders and instigators got away."

That's the kind of "fine-meshed net" that was cast over the city. But when the military personnel went into the

city, they were puzzled: "Where are all these thousands of rioters coming from, and where is the militia?" It turned out that the militia were also in the crowd. They were catching fish in muddy waters.

This last statement is fully applicable to practically all the "hot spots" of the Transcaucasus.

And now, Tbilisi. BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THAT TRAGIC NIGHT. "The catastrophe was brought on by the indifference of a portion of the public, and the instigation of certain persons who were motivated by immorality, corruption, careerism, personal ambitions, and personal grievances. For five days, unsanctioned rallies and demonstrations were held in Tbilisi in front of Government House; as a result, life in the capital city and the entire republic was practically paralyzed. Recently the organizers of the rallies and demonstrations were increasingly and openly calling for disorder and strikes, which posed a threat to public safety; there were open calls for the government to resign, slogans that were blatantly anti-Soviet, anti-state, anti-communist, and anti-socialist, which insulted our state and social structure. There was an attempt at the rally to create a so-called 'national committee' functioning as a provisional government. The organizers of the rallies and demonstrations, the extremist leaders of the informal associations, openly told people not to obey the authorities or the law enforcement organs; they called for bloodshed, for overthrowing the existing system. There was the real threat that the extremists would seize the most vital facilities of the republic's economy...Labor collectives were regularly threatened by blackmail...The city transportation system was paralyzed. The Georgian Television building was the target of constant attacks by the extremists for several days. Studies in the VUZes practically came to a standstill and, to a certain extent, in the public schools as well. The dramatic tension of the situation was heightened by the fact that dozens of young people, egged on by the extremists, declared a hunger strike in front of Government House" (from the report of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, published in the republic press on 10 April).

"Let's mentally rewind the tape of this tragic chronicle. The first demonstrations appeared on the streets. They were taken as a sign of a new era, born of democracy, so no one was very worried. Slogans started to appear on the facades of VUZ buildings. Some of them were definitely of anti-Soviet character. 'It's the cost of glasnost' we assured ourselves, thinking that they would disappear the next day. But they didn't. We had become so slack internally that we let the moment slip when events, gathering speed, began to bring us closer and closer to certain tragedy. And here are scenes from that chronicle, which we must run in slow-motion in order to see them better and fix them in memory. The column of demonstrators is followed by children carrying book bags and briefcases. Imitating their elders, they shout the

slogans without, of course, understanding what they mean. The kids are happy and excited, feeling that they are taking part in events of which they have only the vaguest understanding. They are unaware of the danger that lurks in wait for them" (N. Zhordaniya, director of Secondary School No 128, VECHERNIY TBILISI, No 85, 12 April 1989).

"I assume, incidentally, that at least the 'leaders' had a good idea of the true state of affairs; they understood that, to our great shame, the republic is unable to clothe and feed its people, to say nothing of the major concern of exporting our goods to other countries, their competitiveness in the world market. They knew it. But they 'diplomatically' kept silent and pushed young people toward the brink—young people who, naturally, because of their inexperience and, alas, inadequate information, were unable to evaluate the whole complexity of the situation. They knew about the unacceptable anti-Soviet slogans under which the rally participants were demonstrating. They knew, but...They were unable to get a handle on things and put forth convincing arguments to show that the platform being advocated was bankrupt both in political and in economic terms" (G. Kurtanidze, caster in the Tsentrolit Plant, Hero of Socialist Labor, VECHERNIY TBILISI, No 86, 13 April 1989).

"The situation on the square was totally in the hands of the leaders of the informals or, as they call themselves, the 'radicals.' They even had their own orderlies wearing green arm bands. At my request one of the orderlies brought Irakli Batiashvili, one of the informal leaders, to see me; he was accompanied by a couple of strapping young men. We got off by ourselves at a medical station that had been set up in the Artists' House and had a quiet talk. Batiashvili told me the details of the political platforms of the 'radicals' in Georgia. As I listened to him I understood an unforgivable blunder all of us workers on the ideological front had committed by failing to engage these leaders in dialogue in good time. None of us, of course, could have foreseen what a ghastly tragedy this blunder, to put it mildly, would result in. Our talk was interrupted by D. Patiashvili's speech, which was relayed to the square by radio. We went out to listen. His words sounded so half-hearted that they failed to evoke a response in the demonstrators, who were excited by the speeches of the 'radical' leaders. No sooner had Patiashvili stopped speaking when the voice of Tsereteli rang out. I had never seen him, I did not approve of his position and his slogans, and I was shocked at his unpardonable anti-Sovietism, but I do have to admire his oratorical skills, his ability to hold an audience, and that is of great importance in making contact with it. The main point, however, is that the leaders of the 'radicals' were constantly among the demonstrators, in whose eyes they, being unafraid of the law enforcement organs, delivered 'terribly' bold speeches and, naturally, looked like heroes. Yet while a substantial percentage of Tbilisi's young people were out in the streets, the republic's leaders—distinguished and respected people—went on television to try to persuade

them to disperse. Whom did they think they were persuading—grandmas and grandpas? Why didn't any of them go out on the square, stand at the microphone, and hold a dialogue—direct, well substantiated, persuasive, and wise—with the young people? Why were the rally organizers so well prepared for this dialogue with young people, while we workers on the ideological front, we party and Soviet leaders of the republic, and many representatives of the intelligentsia and the working class—were taken by surprise by the impending events, which resulted in the tragic events of 9 April?" (VECHERNIY TBILISI, No 96, 25 April 1989).

The same article and the same author: "I was on the square at 7:00 in the evening. I watched as a high school boy, undoubtedly imagining himself to be a hero, hung slogans on the statue in front of Government House. His comrades held him up from the rear. And the adults nearby looked on placidly as these events took place. Law enforcement officers joked with the girls; 24 hours later, these law enforcement officers would have to risk their lives to save these girls."

And now, Tbilisi, Rustaveli Prospekt, 0400 hours.

"At 4:00 in the morning, without any warning, four armored personnel carriers in a line advanced up the street at a speed of about 10 kilometers per hour. At that time, the pavement was cleared by the demonstrators themselves. The crowd let the vehicles through and then closed up again. Right behind the personnel carriers came soldiers wearing armored vests and carrying shields and clubs. When they confronted the line of people they stopped. I was about 5 meters away from the standoff and heard the yelling. Some woman threw a shoe at the formation. It may be that someone in the crowd couldn't restrain himself, although at the rally there had been calls for nonresistance. At this stage of the drama, I didn't see any stones or sticks. Then, as if on command, the clubs flew up. Other groups of soldiers came out of a side street. Those who did not have clubs used their entrenching tools. The soldiers began to push back the demonstrators, who resisted actively. Stones came into play, also sticks broken off of the barrier and clubs taken from the soldiers. Persons who didn't have time to run but remained behind the cordon and hid in the bushes hoping to escape were wounded. Tear gas grenades flew into the fleeing crowd. One grenade fell right next to me. A sharp pain in my eyes, and my tears, made it impossible to take pictures. In the ensuing panic the crowd ran over persons who could not stand up due to blows to the head and also persons who could not keep up and fell down. I failed to dodge a blow from a club, took it on the back, and started to run...In an hour the street was cleared of demonstrators; there on the pavement were stones, a broken video camera, various things, and several buses and trucks which the demonstrators had used to close the main streets and the avenue to protect themselves against a possible tank attack" (Yu. Rost, "Tragic Night in Tbilisi," MOLODEZH GRUZII, 13 April 1989).

"Our unit began to move from Lenin Square in the direction of Government House. We proceeded peacefully up to its traverse [traverz]. The crowd gave way into two parts. Then we were confronted by women and children. They were sitting down. When we started to pick them up to proceed further, we were hit by metal objects and stones. I distinctly heard the pop of four explosive packets that were hurled from the crowd into our formation. Several of my comrades fell down. They were wounded. I belong to an internal troops unit. I will be discharged in May of this year. I have had to take part in maintaining order more than once. But we have never had so many wounded as we had that night. Nevertheless, we kept ourselves under control. We made increasing use of defensive techniques. When we came to the big building with the columns [the Tbilisi Hotel—author's note], a hard blow to the head knocked me off my feet" (Jr Sgt Igor Polyakov, ZakVO [Transcaucasian Military District] newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, No 89, 18 April 1989).

"I can't tell you very much. The fact is, I barely had time to get information and run a few steps when I got hit. What happened after that I don't remember. In the hospital they told me that I was unconscious for two days" (Pvt S.N. Pryakhin, LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, No 87, 16 April 1989).

"I'm not exaggerating. I was a witness, an eyewitness and participant in everything I'm telling you. I myself saved some frightened little girls from getting hit [at 4:00 in the morning—author's note] and took some youths with broken heads to my own home. Their blood was all over my face and clothing, because they held on to me as I was carrying them, wounded, away; probably that's why the rumor got started that they had killed Vakhushiti Kotetishvili. No, people, I'm alive, but what does a life like this mean to me?!" (KOMUNISTI, 11 April 1989).

"The fact is that stones and boards were flying at us from out of the crowd. A bottle hit my comrade's shield and shattered. It smelled of alcohol. Guys jumped out of the crowd, jumped up and kicked our shields. But seeing that we were practically invulnerable behind our shields, they began to throw stones at our legs. I got hit hard on the leg. At some instant, I spotted a tall guy with a crowbar in his hands. All this time the crowd was advancing toward us. I got hit with a board and fell down. And then it started...." (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, No 89, 18 April 1989; recounted by Pvt V. Korolev).

A statement by A.N. Tsintsadze, a department head in the Physicians' Refresher Institute: "Among the persons who came to us in the early dawn that day, many had served in the army; two of them were 'Afghans,' and two others were unarmed-combat experts. Tough guys, not easy to knock down. They said that when the soldiers saw that they were resisting they sprayed them with some kind of substance" (ZARYA VOSTOKA, 29 April).

"They weren't dispersing the demonstrators, they were beating them up; they blocked the exits from the square. They pursued persons who managed to get away and continued to beat them up. How come entrenching tools came into play? How come they used tear gas and other unknown chemical agents? Why is all this still being denied, despite the evidence, and they don't even want to tell the Tbilisi medical people the composition of the chemicals that were used in order to make it easier to treat the victims more effectively? Has anyone thought about how all this changes people's attitudes toward the army, toward Soviet soldiers? They didn't even get around to announcing the curfew in time—they did it just a few minutes before it went into effect, so that they caught hundreds of people, and one Tbilisian was killed when he didn't stop his car when ordered to do so by a patrol" (From an inquiry of USSR People's Deputies from the USSR Cinematographers' Union, VECHERNIY TBILISI, 20 April).

Esteemed People's Deputies, chosen by the people! In describing your visit to Tbilisi you report a broad spectrum of contacts in search of the truth about the events of 9 April. There are representatives of the creative intelligentsia who witnessed the events, and deputies to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, and Georgian medical personnel and journalists, and the families of the dead victims, and representatives of the Georgian SSR MVD. Only they didn't get around to meeting with us military people, attitudes towards whom you are so concerned about. I myself take the liberty of answering certain questions you have raised.

First, regarding the purpose of the operation as I see it. The first echelon—the main group of MVD and internal troops which was supposed to clear the square in front of Government House and all of Rustaveli Prospekt—was supposed to be followed by fire trucks and ambulances. Internal and MVD troops in reserve as well as airborne commando units bringing up the rear were supposed to close off the side streets to Rustaveli Prospekt as the units moved forward in order not to allow a regrouping of the people. Thus, the airborne units, whose field equipment includes small entrenching tools, according to the plan of the operation DID NOT HAVE direct contact with the demonstrators. As far as the internal and MVD troops are concerned, their equipment does not include small entrenching tools, and in fact the purpose of this implement is quite different from what you ascribe to it in your inquiry.

As far as the use of toxic agents against the demonstrators is concerned, you are probably already aware that the District troops are not supplied with them. As far as the MVD is concerned, they obviously don't have toxic agents either. To attribute to them the use of "cheremukha [bird-cherry]" tear gas, obviously, is also wrong, because the USSR Ministry of Health would hardly permit it to be included in the table of agents authorized for use. But certain side effects of certain types of "cheremukha" (and, as far as I know, there are several

may still be unknown or inadequately studied, which could be the cause of the poisonings. For this reason, the question can be resolved in collaboration with the USSR and Georgian SSR MVDs and the health care organs. But you, following the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet's medical community commission, continue to hold the USSR Ministry of Defense and ZakVO (the army), among others, guilty of it. Moreover, the airborne units, which were in reserve, that is, not in direct contact with the participants of the rally on the square, could not have been assigned the task of using any gas or aerosols.

On the other hand, this insistence on having the community commission demand that the USSR Ministry of Defense reveal the secret of the toxic agents merely attests to the level of its competence and its attitude toward the army.

Returning again to the purpose of the operation, I refer to the statement by journalist Yu. Rost, whose objectivity the community has no reason to doubt. He states that the side streets leading away from Rustaveli Prospekt were deliberately blocked with heavy buses and trucks by the organizers of the rally. I can vouch that the trucks were loaded with crushed stone, which can be used either as ballast or as projectiles. Notice: they were loaded with crushed stone, not sand.

The same kinds of vehicles and buses blocked the entrances to Rustaveli Prospekt both from the direction of Lenin Square and from the direction of Republic Square. These "measures" made it impossible to use fire trucks. The personnel carriers coming from Lenin Square had to cross high barriers, which fire trucks filled with water could not have done. So the public should not view this fact as an attempt on the part of the military people to "aggravate the antagonism."

This is attested by certain other facts, which were skirted by the USSR people's deputies. I take the liberty of asking them a few questions. Why did the republic's GAI [state motor vehicle inspectorate] fail to carry out its assignment of preparing for and supporting the operation, and why did it allow the grouping of vehicles and buses at the entrances to Rustaveli Prospekt and in the side streets? In response to questions by the officials of the operation, the leaders of the GAI could only spread their hands in embarrassment, as if to say, We're sorry. How come more than 2500 representatives of the Georgian SSR MVD failed to show up at the assembly point before the operation began? It was their responsibility to inform the demonstrators about the forthcoming operation and persuade them to stop the rally in order to avoid clashes and casualties. Finally, how come the Georgian SSR minister of internal affairs himself did not head up this operation, preferring the role of observer? Since he was present on Lenin Square, how come no one has asked him the question, "What agents were used by the forces of public order, and when, how, and in what connection did they do so?"

I do not intend to assess the level of military training of the person who was assigned the overall direction of the operation (it was probably forced on him); his service record and his present post speak for themselves. But the academies where Col Gen I.N. Rodionov trained do not teach the art of dispersing rallies and demonstrations. The techniques, principles, and tactics or such actions fall within the province of the MVD; there is no way they form part of the training and functions of the Soviet Army. So why, in the events of that night (and not just then, either) is all of this lumped together, as if purposively, and depicted as "the military people," "the army"?

One more "why." Why is it that in the rallies that preceded that night no more than 1000 persons remained on the square before dawn (which predetermined the choice of the time of the operation), whereas on that tragic night a crowd of 10,000 had gathered? Could it be that the composition and number of troops brought in to take part in the operation were calculated to deal with between 1500 and 2000 people? If so, then here's a question for the people's deputies—"point-blank," so to speak: Was the purpose of the square-clearing operation opposed by some other "scenario"?

And now let us summarize all these "whys." The command of the operation was assigned without regard to the person's readiness and ability to supervise such actions; there were, after all, more suitable candidates—for example, Internal Troops Maj Gen Yu. Yefimov, head of the USSR MVD's Internal Troops (incidentally, I find it difficult to attribute the arrival of units subordinate to him just to the decision of the republic's leadership); and the Georgian minister of internal affairs (the reason for the absence of his subordinates on the square is unknown). The forces of public order that were brought into the operation were weakened by the absence of the local militia, fire trucks, and armored personnel carriers. The absence of local MVD forces and fire fighters on the square provided the soil for the germination of rumors and conjectures about the "anti-democratic, anti-perestroika orientation of the military, who have allegedly taken upon themselves the function of defending the "conservatives" and forces executing their will using such un-perestroika means. The forces of the opposing side were increased many times over. The cordon of buses and trucks loaded with crushed stone, coming from who knows where, created a relatively large but still enclosed space, which required the use of the harsher measures remaining in the arsenal of the Internal Troops and turned the whole operation into a ferocious clash, hampered the order of the "troops," forced the second echelons and reserves to take direct part in the confrontation, brought them into direct contact, and placed the essentially unarmed airborne units in a position where they had to defend themselves.

The fact that this necessity arose is attested by video tapes and articles by local journalists. In particular, the scene where "a guy who is insane with grief is pounding on a passing armored personnel carrier with a flag pole."

Believe me, or, rather, check it out: any flag pole would have shattered into pieces on first hitting the armor. But several blows were shown on the tape. My version of this story is that he hit it with a crowbar. I can't bring myself to explain its presence on the square by the desire of the hunger-strikers to use it to open tin cans. But I can believe that it was used to inflict an open craniocerebral injury on Pvt S. Pryakhin. Just as I can believe the use of "stones and sticks" which, according to Yu. Rost, "were broken off of" the missing barrier. Just as I believe the use of these "peaceful, parliamentary" means by "the strapping young men" who accompanied the leaders of "radicals."

And now it's your turn to grant that these means, which were brought to the peaceful rally from who knows where, might be used to attack the airborne troops. If you were in a similar situation and all you had was a small shovel, you probably wouldn't like it. In presenting to you my vision of the facts, I will not impose my conclusions on you, but I do ask writer B. Vasilyev to consider my view and not avoid it when assessing the events of 9 April.

But that's still not my whole story. There is still the AFTER.

"They didn't even get around to announcing curfew in the normal way, in good time; they did it just a few minutes before it went into effect and caught hundreds of people. One Tbilisian was killed...." (from the same message of the USSR people's deputies, in which it was suggested that someone take thought about "how all of this is changing people's attitudes toward the army, Soviet soldiers").

"The situation in Tbilisi, as in the republic as a whole, remains extremely complex. Curfew has been instituted in Georgia's capital in peace time, during a period of renewal and democratization. There are dozens of tanks and armored personnel carriers in the streets. This is creating an explosive situation" (from the account of E.A. Shevardnadze's meeting with representatives of the public and the scientific and creative intelligentsia of the republic, ZARYA VOSTOKA, No 85, 11 April 1989).

Oh, those military! You see, they received the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase at 22:15 hours on 9 April and announced it thirty minutes later. And just where did they come from? Why did they come, and who called them, anyway? (See KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 April). After all, the Ukase was not in the republic newspapers on 10 April (!); there was only Col Gen I.N. Rodionov's message, with reference to that Ukase—but there was no Ukase in the newspapers on 9 April! They just came in, uncalled and unbidden, and created an explosive situation. In this, the best representatives of the public and the scientific and creative intelligentsia of the USSR and the Georgian USSR are unanimous.

A week after the "military coup," the public finally got itself together, collected its thoughts, and "overthrew" the military. The Georgian Communist Party Central

Committee Buro petitioned to have the curfew lifted, and the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium passed a Ukase and had it published. But the image of the "military as bandits and anti-perestroika forces" was already in place. And although E.A. Shevardnadze stated that the "military" had resisted carrying out functions not proper to them, this image was being successfully and hastily implanted by the mass media and by both local and visiting members of the community. "They poisoned people, beat them with shovels, and chased children and old people down Rustaveli Prospekt; they instituted curfew as a secret scheme of provocation; they shot and caught hundreds of people"—this is the tone and background of all the publications and reports. The people have given a hostile reception to the modest reports of the Central mass media concerning the actual state of affairs, saying they're slander and unobjective.

One indirect but still very strong and "long-playing" reproach directed at these "military people" is the lack of any information whatever about their feelings and tribulations, about their life and position in the period before and after the events; their existence is completely ignored by local and visiting leaders and the public. Everyone who comes down meets with all "types" in the community and the intelligentsia—members of the clergy, people called upon to maintain public order (but who have for some reason forgotten about it), medical people, and so on and so forth. But as for going to the military and extending a hand, asking about their daily life, their woes and difficulties—no one, no way. So that "the community" has come to the conclusion that the military are "blood-thirsty social outcasts, pathological killers" hateful even to look at, and has conducted itself accordingly. In 3 weeks there have been 50 cases (and that's obviously not all) of psychological and physical assaults on officers and the members of their families. The weaponry, again, is quite diverse—from nunchaki [unidentified] and "yoko-giri" to the head, to foul cursing. Nor is the position of the "keepers of order" subject to any doubt: they are now riding high, "friends of the people."

Meanwhile, finally, the ideological organs have gained a great deal. There are briefings, and press conferences, on-the-spot analyses, meetings, and exhibits. It's only the military who do not get a chance to tell their side. While the curfew was in effect, members of the airborne troops tried for three days to get on Georgian State Television and Radio. Finally they did: they were given 20 minutes of unscheduled air time, at 3:00 on a work day. Thanks a lot. The military district newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA devoted two editions to interviews with participants in the events and distributed copies among the population. Thus, one of the ladies on the public commission to investigate the events of 9 April, the Georgian poetess Iza Ordzhonikidze, threatened to bring suit for defamation and "hindering the work of the public commission," although she herself gave an interview and made announcements without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation. All it took was for Central Television to let it slip that the military's situation in the city was far from

good, and in 15 minutes local television broadcast a denial and accused the Center of slander and nonobjectivity. All it took was for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA to write about the necessity of a balanced approach to assessing the events, and MOLODEZH GRUZII immediately accused Karkhanin of prejudice and nonobjectivity, alleging that the slogan "Russian Invaders Get Out of Georgia" was changed by the author of the article and given in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA as "Russians, Get Out of Georgia" (here, you see, the subtext is political rather than ethnic, MOLODEZH GRUZII notes); moreover, the slogan was not waved around, as Karkhanin said, it was attached to the facade of Government House. So those are two "quite different differences." And someone from the community, during a television press conference, constructed an accusation out of the fact that SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA had misspelled the last name of a 16-year-old girl who died on the square.

So I understand the noble rage and emotional coloration of the messages sent to the CPSU Central Committee and the Congress of People's Deputies by the scientific and creative intelligentsia. Unfortunately, their representatives in Tbilisi have acted on the principle of the Roman Caesars: "I came, I saw, I accused." Their program left out one very important point, namely "I found out." Their idea, it seems, was to let someone else "do the dirty work." The republic leadership's accusation of ignoring the military people, unfortunately, was not backed up by example.

Yet these "stepsons of society" have been dealing with "states of emergency" for one and a half years now, instituting curfews, leaving their homes in order to carry out political decisions made by who knows who and who knows how, going where they are sent by their elders and commanders, who actively protested these decisions. The community has not the slightest idea about all this, yet it continues to publish things about the "old soldiers' privileges [dedovshchina]" and listens to rumors that the earthquake in Leninakan was caused by an atomic bomb—set off by the military, of course—on Novaya Zemlya.

Please forgive me if my letter seems excessively emotional. Having served in the Transcaucasus for several years, I like to believe that I have deep empathy and respect for the peoples who live here, and I respect their national traditions. So that my emotions stem from many months and weeks in a "state of emergency," the grief of Sumgait, Stepanakert, Kirovabad and Tbilisi, the horrors of Leninakan and Spitak, the tense voice of the battalion commander on the telephone reporting, "The crowd has forced us off the square. We have sustained losses. We are forced to abandon the first stage. We request reinforcements, we cannot retrieve our wounded." Where do you think that happened? No, not in Afghanistan. It was in the Soviet city of Kirovabad. My emotions are the result of the eyes of the comrades-in-arms of the airborne troops who with their own bodies guarded the bridge and the people beyond the bridge. My words reflect my personal grief over the events in all

these "hot spots" where I have had to serve. These words reflect my personal grief over the fact that it is now too late to ferret out who made the decision to put troops into Afghanistan. These words reflect my personal grief over the fact that if these attitudes towards the army continue, then we military people, who covered with ourselves the bonfires of nationalism in the Transcaucasus and who know where Leninakan and Spitak are (and not just from the newspapers)—all we can do is emulate the example of the submarine "Komsomolets," hoist the signal "I'm dying but I do not give up," and slowly sink into the depths of public scorn under the salvos of the aroused community.

As for the events in Tbilisi, they remind me of the following episode from the patriarchal past. Outskirts of a village. A kolkhoz granary. Summertime. Sunshine at noon. The kolkhoz watchman, leaning on his double-barreled shotgun, asleep at his post. Nearby, some kids are fooling around with matches. A little smoke. The smell startles the old man awake. Not yet fully alert, before he knows what's going on (that often happens with watchmen), he grabs for the gun, a shot rings out, and... So the people of the village come running, hit the old man, and begin to kick the gun. Not a pretty story, I tell you. Either for the victim or for the gun, which is also a victim. How about the old man? After what happened, the old man vows to stand guard with a big scoop shovel. Is that it?

Civil, Military Legal Experts Investigate 9 April Tbilisi Events

18300661b Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII
13 May 89 p 2

[Article by N. Leonidze under rubric "Facts and a Jurist's Commentary": "Concerning an Unprecedented Situation"]

[Text] The Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet commission to investigate the facts of what happened on 9 April in Tbilisi continues its work. Two questions: What happened that night in front of Government house, and how did it happen? This question is still at the center of the public's attention. The cause-and-affect mechanism of events that took place in Georgia's capital city is of interest to all. However, jurists have come up against a situation that is without precedent in legal practice....

How are we to qualify the actions of the special troops? How are we to view the cause of the bloodshed in front of Government House—as a violation of orders, the personal initiative of the military personnel, or in fact strict compliance with a directive, which was carried out precisely?

Otar Gamkrelidze, head of the criminal law sector of the Scientific-Research Center of State and Law, Georgian Academy of Sciences, expresses the opinion of the juridical community: According to preliminary data, we are

dealing with a planned action. Accordingly, the legal ruling is handed down on the basis of the following propositions.

If it is shown that the carrying out of the military action was preceded by an order, then it must be kept in mind that regulations prescribe and stipulate that all orders are to be carried out precisely and immediately. There is one exception, however, when the order should not be carried out—or, to put it another way, the person to whom the commander has given the order has the moral and the juridical right to refuse to carry it out. This refers to a situation in which the order is of a clearly criminal character because the consequences ensuing from carrying it out could lead to people's deaths, which is what happened.

If a crime has been committed, then there are criminals who must be responsible. What does that mean in this case?

Someone has to answer for carrying out a criminal order. Responsibility rests with both the person who gave the order, if he prescribed the use of entrenching tools and toxic chemical agents, and the person who either carried out the order directly or abetted it.

The person who gives the criminal order is viewed as the instigator to murder. Because the order itself is qualified as a kind of instigation, while the actions of the person who carries it out is characterized as murder.

The investigative commission has information, supplied by persons who were on the avenue at that time, stating that they heard the order, "Unsheathe!" That is, this is something eyewitnesses have reported. Hence, this is one more confirmation that entrenching tools were used, quite apart from information given by doctors and experts who have testified about the scars and cuts caused by the shovels.

In addition, the military people also threatened the lives of militia officers who were stationed in front of Government House to maintain order. In the event that this threat to their lives is proved, the persons who are determined to be guilty will be held accountable in accordance with Article 209¹ of the Georgian SSR Criminal Code: "Encroachment on the life of an officer of the militia or volunteer militia in carrying out their official duties with regard to maintaining public order." This article calls for imprisonment for a term between 5 and 15 years or, in the case of aggravating circumstances, death.

[Leonidze] What do jurists think about the circumstances leading to the killing of 28-year-old Giya Karseladze on 10 April?

[Gamkrelidze] Karseladze was killed soon after curfew. He was going home in his friend's car. Moreover, none of

the people in the car knew that curfew had been instituted in Tbilisi. The driver sitting next to Giya did not obey the patrol's order to stop, and that was a mistake. But an even greater mistake was the announcement of the curfew scant minutes before 23:00 hours, when it went into effect.

The conclusion is obvious: the actions against Giya Karseladze can be qualified as deliberate murder. While the specific persons who committed the illegal actions on 9 April are as yet unknown, the soldier who killed Karseladze is known but has yet to be arrested.

In an interview published in *MOLODEZH GRUZII* on 13 April, Lt Gen Yu. Kuznetsov, the deputy military commandant of Tbilisi, commented on the rights and duties of the military personnel who were responsible for the situation in the city during the curfew. He said that "According to instructions, the use of firearms is categorically forbidden except in extreme situations when persons involved in maintaining public order are being attacked—that is, for purposes of self-defense, or in cases where there is a threat to the safety of other citizens".... The deputy commandant also said that "There were casualties [izderzhki] that first night." Unfortunately, the curfew, which was announced belatedly for unknown reasons, caught the city's inhabitants and their guests by surprise. In commenting about this absurdity, Lt Gen Yu. Kuznetsov provided valuable information: "Many people were on the streets at the time the start of curfew was announced—it was almost 11:00. For this reason, the guard stations were ordered not to detain passers-by but only to check the papers of suspicious persons."

[Leonidze] Nevertheless, a shot rang out, and it was by no means self-defense, am I right?

[Gamkrelidze] This case, along with all the others, is being investigated. It is being conducted by the military procuracy, and I hope that the investigators will deal with this difficult assignment with a sense of professional duty and total responsibility.

While this interview was being prepared for press, information came in about a routine meeting of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet commission. During it, Justice Maj Gen Vladimir Vasilyev, Deputy Chief Military Procurator of the Transcaucasian Military District, reported the following: A special brigade is in charge of the criminal case instituted against military personnel. The charge relates to the military personnel's abuse of their official position, exceeding their authority, and using chemical agents.

Investigation is also underway concerning what factors contributed to the increase in the number of participants in the unsanctioned rally, why it was not stopped in time, and why the specific chemical agents which the military personnel used were not immediately named. V. Vasilyev said that the actions of those who concealed the name of the chemical substances for so long were cowardly.

Justice Maj Gen Vasilyev also reported that the man who killed Giya Karseladze had been identified. It was Capt Lokhin. The request to have him escorted in Tbilisi has been submitted, and the appropriate measures have been taken.

He went on to note that there were two troop units on the square on 9 April. They included special troops sent in from Voronezh and Perm, permanent troop units which undergo training according to a special program.

Participants in the same meeting heard reports from Roman Gventsadze, chief of the city administration of MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]; journalist Irakli Gotsiridze, who was given permission to conduct his own journalistic investigation into the events of 9 April; and Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Otar Cherkeziya, concerning the facts that took place in Tbilisi on the night of 9 April.

Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Otar Cherkeziya stated that he will not try to justify himself. And although he still does not know who gave the directive to bring troops into Tbilisi, he is convinced that the republic's leadership had not acted properly.

Georgian Journalist Attacks Officer's Defense
18300674b Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
23 May 89 p 3

[Article by Roman Miminoshvili, writer, editor in chief of *LITERATURNAYA GRUZIYA*: "Request Permission To Speak, Comrade Major!"]

[Text] More than one month later—on 12 May—the newspaper *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA* "elucidated" the tragic events of 9 April in Tbilisi, with a lengthy article by ZakVO [Transcaucasian Military District] political officer Maj A.A. Abramkin, suggesting that "in the search for truth, all (?) testimony is vital." After I studied the article I got the impression that a typographical error had been made in the title: instead of "tell [skazat]" (as in, "We Must Tell the Truth") it ought to read "gloss over [smazat]"; that would be more correct. The author of the article has turned his back on the eyewitnesses to the tragedy, the people's deputies of the USSR, and the Georgian community; without blinking an eye he assures the readers of *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA* (who he thinks are gullible) that the army was defending itself against the people and now has to defend itself against the people's deputies. But may one ask which army he's talking about? Isn't it the **people's** army?

But let's trace the course of the operation as the Comrade Major sees it. In his words, "the first echelon... was supposed to be **followed** by **fire trucks** and **ambulances**," while troops kept in reserve were supposed to close off the side streets in order to prevent a new massing of people. Are we to presume that the firefighters were

assembled to rout the demonstration and the first echelon of troops, using powerful streams of water? Otherwise, why were they supposed to follow the troops?

Perhaps I don't understand something about military maneuvers, and that's why the wisdom of this seems absurd to me. In fact, however, if the fire trucks were going to be used, it was not for peaceful purposes, because as the political officer himself goes on to assert, the exits were closed off by the demonstrators themselves, using trucks. The question arises: In that case, what were the reserve units supposed to close off? Another question: How did the tanks come onto the avenue prior to the operation, tanks which were met, incidentally, with the singing and applause of the demonstrators, if all of the exits were closed off? After all, this procession by the tanks and armored personnel carriers, with headlights turned on, is recorded on video film and has been documented. It is not easy to write the truth, but it is just as hard to write lies too; even skillful false witnesses are not insured against contradictions. We can see, incidentally, that A.A. Abramkin is not all that skillful. Here's one contradiction: "How come over 2500 representatives of the Georgian SSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], who had been assigned the task of informing the demonstrators of the forthcoming operation, did not show up at the assembly point?" Let's keep in mind: 2500 had been assigned to "inform" the demonstrators, but through someone's ill will they didn't show up. And how do you like the author's next question: "Finally, how come the Georgian SSR minister of internal affairs himself didn't head up this operation?" Which one, the "information" operation? And immediately, literally four lines later, the author blurts out why this happened: "I do not intend to assess the military training of the person who was assigned the overall direction of the operation (it was probably forced on him); his service record and his present post speak for themselves. But the academies where Col Gen I.N. Rodionov trained don't teach the art of dispersing rallies and demonstrations." In that case, who did command the bloody parade? Who was assigned the job, or had it forced upon him? Who was dismissed? Let the reader judge and tell the results.

I should like to direct the reader's attention to another circumstance: concerning the introduction of USSR MVD internal troops into the republic under the command of Maj Gen Yu. Yefimov, the author notes parenthetically, "incidentally, I find it difficult to attribute to the arrival of units subordinate to him just to the decision of the republic's leadership." Let us believe the author, that he finds it difficult to answer. But do the editors of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, whose editorial note categorically denies that "the hand of Moscow" was involved, have the answer?

The author of the article states that entrenching tools are part of the "field equipment" of airborne troops but not

of MVD units, and that the purpose of this "tool" is quite different. Could it be that the soldiers were going to dig pits on Rustaveli Prospekt, and our girls would hold their heads under them?

How does the author view the toxic agents—OV [toxic agents], as the esteemed A.A.A. is pleased to call them? "The District troops are not supplied with them. As far as the MVD is concerned, they obviously don't have toxic agents either." It is obvious where he is pointing the finger: at the "schemes of the agents of international imperialism"! But until such a command is given, the Major confines himself to the remark that several types of "cheremukha [bird-cherry]" have been authorized for use by the USSR Ministry of Health, but he immediately cautions, "the effects may still be unknown or inadequately studied, which could be the cause of the poisonings." I just bet! The Ministry of Health authorizes their use—without knowing the effects?

But the author, accusing the deputies of incompetence, does not stop there: "This insistence on having the community commission demand that the USSR Ministry of Defense reveal the secret of the toxic agents merely attests to the level of its competence and its attitude toward the army." One wonders whether the author is capable of blushing, when the facts he has been so at pains to conceal come bobbing to the surface. After all, didn't the military authorities actually reveal the secret—though to be sure, after a delay of 24 days? As for the people's deputies of the USSR, evidently the author has his own attitude toward them; he takes the liberty of using such expressions as, "facts which the people's deputies of the USSR skirted," "a question to the people's deputies, 'point-blank,' so to speak"... Good thing it's only a question....

The author is also displeased by these words from the deputies' message: "They didn't even get around to announcing curfew in the normal way, in good time; they did it just a few minutes before it went into effect, caught hundreds of people, and one Tbilisian was killed...." Again, "Oh, those military people!"—this inventive author goes on sarcastically, and then gets into some vague statements about the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase, which was allegedly received by the military authorities at 22:15, acting as if he did not understand that this does not justify killing. Even under curfew, as we know, no one has the right to resort to firearms unless the proposed victim constitutes a threat to the life of the law enforcement officer or other citizens. Incidentally, is the author convinced that Comrade I.N. Rodionov, when he announced the curfew, already had in his hands the constitutionally enabling juridical documents, the Ukases of the presidiums of the USSR and the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviets? I don't believe it! And he ought to keep in mind the appropriate article of the USSR Constitution which was revised recently, near the end of November 1988.

A. Abramkin goes on to say that in the space of 3 weeks there have been 50 cases of psychological and physical assaults against officers and members of their families by inhabitants of Tbilisi. As is well known, one of the officers lodged a complaint about some unknown men who had attacked him. It was later determined that he had been the victim of an assault by his own driver. So you see, it was easier for him to accuse Georgians of nationalism than to admit the shameful fact that his own subordinate had beat him up. Is he one of the 50? Or the 51st?

The author, it seems, is sympathetic—deeply so—toward the peoples of the Transcaucasus and their national traditions. He is also ready to understand the noble rage and emotional coloration of the messages sent by the scientific and creative intelligentsia. As far as we are concerned, sympathy like that deserves nothing but sincere gratitude—if this sympathy were really sincere. In fact, the author has “understood” something else: the position taken by MOLODEZH GRUZII with regard to Karkhanin’s article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA has aroused the Georgian public. “MOLODEZH GRUZII accused Karkhanin of prejudice and nonobjectivity, alleging that the slogan ‘Russian Invaders, Get Out of Georgia’ was remade by the author of the article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and changed to ‘Russians, Get Out of Georgia.’” Then he explains sarcastically, “Here, you see, is a quite different, political subtext, MOLODEZH GRUZII remarks.” It is difficult to believe that this fact should put the political officer in a sarcastic mood... True, these are completely different slogans. And it is not by chance that the author in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA substituted the one for the other: his aim was to set the Russian people against the Georgian people, and our sarcastic author is in solidarity with him! A. Abramkin goes on to say that one of the persons who went on television constructed his accusation only on the basis of the fact that SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA had misspelled the last name of a 16-year-old girl that died. Permit me to inform you, Comrade Major, that that’s not true. This was mentioned by the way, but you have to agree that it’s not very nice to misspell the name of someone who has died tragically; it contains an element of disdain.

It is appropriate at this point to recall how, with reference to the Georgian press, Karkhanin gave information about the Georgian leaders of the informal associations. This information was not given in the republic press. Where did the author find these sources? In which organizations?

Moreover, Comrade Major, you go on to say that the representatives of the Georgian intelligentsia “acted on the principle of the Roman Caesars: ‘I came, I saw, I accused.’” The principle is somewhat different, to be sure, and I understand that you were intentionally distorting Julius Caesar’s familiar phrase, *Veni, vidi, vici*; but you did it in order to show that the Georgian intelligentsia would rather accuse than find out. So let’s

restore the actual wording of Julius Caesar’s saying and think about whom the words “I came, I saw, I conquered” fit best—you, or the intelligentsia that has been aroused by the Georgian press?!

Military Restructuring: Fight Against Bureaucracy
18010665 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 May 89 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed article: “From Working with Paper to Working with People”]

[Text] The processes of renovation are encompassing deeper and deeper layers of our country’s life. An intense struggle is under way to further establish perestroika, accomplish political reform and major changes in the social and economic area, and expand democratization and glasnost in the Soviet society. Perestroika is also gaining momentum in the USSR Armed Forces.

The turn toward the living person, decisive rejection of administrative-force methods, and the ability to comprehend the new processes from today’s positions are typical of the style of activities of many commanders, political bodies, and party and Komsomol organizations. At the same time, experience shows that there is still a considerable amount of work left to dismantle the braking mechanisms that are revealing themselves to this day. The struggle for qualitative parameters of combat readiness, combat training and discipline, and uniting of multiethnic military collectives is above all a struggle with bureaucracy which has infected part of the military cadres and which is becoming a serious obstacle to implementing the restructuring programs.

An effective means in the struggle against resistance to change and formalism was the transition of commanders, political bodies, party committees, and party bureaus from working with paper to working with people; strengthening and developing strong ties with the masses; intensifying democracy; and expanding independent principles in public life.

The new conditions are changing people, increasing their political and social activeness, and giving rise to a strained attitude toward recurrences of injustice. People are reacting most critically and in principle to manifestations of arrogance, high-ranking inattention to their needs and requirements, parochialism and high-handedness, and violations of Soviet laws. This is evidenced by the high volume of mail being received by the central bodies from the localities.

Maj A. Grechishnikov, for example, reports that red tape bureaucrats from the Turkestan Military District held his submission for promotion for almost a year in their office “maze.” One of the units of the Pacific Fleet acted in the same lackadaisical and indifferent manner toward sending a certificate to the wife of first-term service member Ye. Ozerovoy to obtain benefits for a child.... These “petty,” as some consider them, facts result in

people not believing in justice and interfere with normal working and living. But the main thing is to participate actively in the affairs of the collectives and to demonstrate inquisitiveness and initiative, without which it is impossible for the new to become firmly established.

Bureaucratic obstacles are broken down in the places where people are better informed and where restructuring creates a new political situation. That is why communists of the Army and Navy approve of and support the desire of commanders, political bodies, and party organizations to master persistently political methods of leadership and to overcome diktat in practice and excessive organization. They fervently support the established system of listening to communist-leaders about personal contribution to perestroika and reviewing the cases of offenses of all communists, without exception, in primary organizations.

In the critical struggle against secrecy and against making erroneous and rash decisions, various forms are being developed for widespread involvement of communists, Komsomol members, representatives of social institutions of units and ships in resolving the most important issues of life, combat training, and service. More and more often, military collectives are openly and comprehensively discussing problems of selecting, assigning and educating cadres, especially party cadres. Their elections are conducted, as a rule, on an alternative basis. Such steps for democratization of party life are a concrete contribution to implementing the principles of democratic centralism and fulfilling a basic tenet of Lenin—establishing broad ties with the masses and accountability to them.

Bureaucracy is a specific phenomenon. It is erroneous to make it appear that only armchair bureaucrats and desk heads hinder energetic progress. The bearers of bureaucracy are everyone who displays arrogance, disregard for people, red tape, and callousness, and who destroys the innovative thought of commanders and party-political cadres. Recently, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported that the regiment in which officers Antonovich and Pozdneyev serve last year received 12,000 documents; 3,000 sheets of paper were typed concerning them. There simply is no room left for vital, creative work in such a constant flow of paper.

Unfortunately, there are quite a few cases like this. This shackles initiative and efficiency and places an obstacle in the path of achieving qualitative parameters of combat readiness and discipline. That is why the position of commanders, political bodies, and party organizations determines so much in the work to get rid of deformations and layers of stagnation. They are obligated to set an example in observing the principles of democratic centralism, establish Leninist traditions and criteria firmly in the social consciousness, and establish an atmosphere of party comradeship and closeness to people.

We must bear in mind that a resourceful bureaucrat adapts quickly to today's conditions. Particularly in those collectives that lack efficiency and that have less accountability in a specific section of work. There the weeds of excessive paperwork lushly flourish. And although there are many calls to reduce it, in practice it does not decrease at all. Today, this should be viewed as a political issue. Paperwork is still tying many officials to the desk, continuing to form the traits of that unsound administrative-bureaucratic style that was clearly displayed during the course of the pre-election campaign, in the inertness and formal approaches to the job on the part of some political bodies and party committees, and in their inability to correlate decisions with the new social and political situation that has taken shape in the country.

The question of the work of the apparatus remains critical. Its primary task is competent, thoughtful, and talented organization of the matter; simplification of decision making; liberation from playing it safe; and distinct delimitation of functions of command and political personnel, staffs, rear services, and other elements. It is necessary persistently to raise the authority of the leader and to enhance management standards.

The April 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum demanded that party organizations rely on political methods of leadership and contact with people in their work. Every communist, regardless of the position he holds, must become an active participant in perestroika. Today, passivity and the desire to shift responsibility to others are totally unacceptable. It was precisely for these reasons that officers A. Sarayev, I. Kozubov, and certain other party committee secretaries were not trusted recently. Military collectives are more and more actively rallying to a new, higher level of monitoring fulfillment of party decisions and implementation of criticism and proposals of communists.

The 19th All-Union Party Conference called for unleashing an uncompromising and consistent struggle against bureaucracy and developing a set of measures to eliminate it completely from socio-political life and in the spiritual-moral and social sphere. This set of measures is to unite the energy of all service members, workers, and employees of the Army and Navy. The wealth of experience embodied in one-man command, in regulations and orders, and in the experience of working to strengthen military discipline should be skillfully combined with the process of democratization, broad glasnost, efficiency, and constant criticism and monitoring.

It is difficult to overcome bureaucracy without improving all ideological work and restructuring the consciousness of people. It is necessary persistently to raise the level of overall standards and professionalism of party-political and law-enforcement cadres, and instill in them an active vital position. This will benefit the interests of combat readiness of the armed forces and the interests of perestroika.

**GSSR Supsov Official Blames Military
Authorities for Misuse of Curfew**
18300678 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
24 May 89 p 3

[Article by V. Kvaratskheliya, secretary of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and I. Chikovani, chief of the legal department: "Necessary Clarifications"]

[Text] The tragedy, which occurred in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989, caused everyone enormous pain.

A thorough and scrupulous investigation of the circumstances, which took place in Tbilisi, is the civic duty of all individuals participating in this lofty mission. Only truth and candor will help people to gain faith in the shaken ideals of the democratization of the Soviet society, which had embarked on the path of renewal, and to relieve the tension.

It was precisely because of public opinion and with a view to ascertaining the truth that the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium saw fit, in view of the aforementioned tragedy, to form a commission responsible to the supreme organ of government instead of an ordinary government commission. As is generally known, the commission is comprised of very competent individuals—deputies of the republic's Supreme Soviet and prominent public figures.

Inaccuracies in such an important matter could lead to an incorrect representation and do a disservice to everyone, to whom the interests and future of Georgia are dear.

When we decided to express our opinion with regard to the subcommittee's findings "On the legality of the imposition of a curfew in the city of Tbilisi on 9 April 1989", which was published in the 23 May 1989 issue of ZARYA VOSTOKA, we were guided by exactly these considerations.

We are not disputing these findings in the least, but for the sake of clarity we consider it necessary to make some needed corrections to this document.

First of all, as the press has already reported, the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium did not make any decision whatever about bringing troops from any arm of the service into the republic's territory, neither prior to 9 April nor afterwards.

Secondly, as was correctly pointed out in the subcommittee's own findings and we quote: "Thus far, the content of the implemented articles 119 of the USSR Constitution have not defined a single normative act which falls under the concepts of "a state of emergency" and "a special form of control". The procedure for declaring the emergency measure of "a curfew", which has come into practice, is just as obscure and vague.

It should be noted that as far back as 23 November 1988, a session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet while considering the course of the discussion in the republic concerning the draft law on changes and addenda to the USSR Constitution, emphasized that martial law or a state of emergency must be implemented in accordance with laws governing martial law and states of emergency and raised the question of the necessity of adopting such laws before the USSR Supreme Soviet. Unfortunately, as of the present time the aforementioned laws have not yet been passed.

It is at this point that we consider it necessary to underscore one very important inaccuracy which has crept into the subcommittee's findings.

The point of contention is the reference in the subcommittee's findings to the Union edict dated 22 June 1941 "On martial law". It was adopted on the day that the Great Patriotic War began and corresponded to the problems and spirit of that time. For the sake of information we will state that in this edict there was not even a mention of "curfews". In spite of this, the subcommittee's findings assert that principles which embody the substance of the concept of curfews are set forth in detail in paragraph 3 of the aforementioned edict.

Now for the main point. As the subcommittee's own findings have emphasized, a standard Union law on the order and procedure for implementing a curfew does not yet exist.

Such is the state of affairs. At the same time, as is generally known, the maintenance of public order is entrusted to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium by the republic's Constitution.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium passed the resolution concerning the implementation of a curfew at 17:00 on 9 April, that is after troops had already moved into Tbilisi and the tragedy of 9 April had become a fait accompli. It will suffice to recall the situation on that ill-fated Sunday: the party and Soviet organs did not handle the situation properly. Troops were stationed in the city and the danger of new excesses and undesirable incidents had not been eliminated.

That is exactly why the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium assumed responsibility and passed the resolution on the implementation of a curfew.

Under those extreme conditions and in view of certain difficulties, we did not manage to assemble the required quorum for conducting a session of the Supreme Soviet Presidium until 16:00. By 17:00 the resolution was adopted unanimously and was sent on according to procedure.

As regards the time that the curfew took effect, this should have been announced by an official, who should have been appointed the commandant of the city. At the

same time the commandant was obliged to explain the regulations, which defined the gist of the curfew, to the population. Unfortunately, this was not accomplished on time, but through no fault of the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Cases of the most flagrant excesses, abuses of power, and arbitrary rule with respect to the peaceful population, which were displayed by individual representatives of military units after the announcement of the curfew, aggravated the situation even more in the capital and in the republic as a whole. As a result, one citizen was killed and two were injured.

Criminal proceedings have been instituted concerning these cases and a full-scale investigation is being conducted. The perpetrators will undoubtedly be punished to the full extent of the law.

This is everything that we wanted to explain, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth, concerning the reasons for the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium passing the resolution on the implementation of a curfew in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989.

Call for Publication of New Combined-Arms Regulations

18010686a Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
First Edition 24 May 89 p 1

[Letter to editor from Maj L. Karlov, "What We Expect From the Conference"]

[Text] A Word About Defense

More than once during the election campaign we had occasion to hear speeches from candidates to the post of deputy. And here is something that struck me: many of them (even those who never served a day) felt it their duty to communicate their opinions about the army. And only in a negative vein. Some went so far as to call into doubt the capability of the Armed Forces reliably to defend the country, in the heat of argument forgetting the main thing: that it is only thanks to the army that the Soviet people have lived and worked under peaceful skies for more than forty years now.

I do not know if the Congress of Peoples Deputies of the USSR will address defense problems. If it does, I would like to hear from the mouths of the deputies some words of concern at the growing negative attitude toward those who do their hard, soldierly duty. I know that the work is truly hard from my own experience in a quarter century of service. We work without days off, we have no adequate housing, we bounce with our families from garrison to garrison. Our wives have no work. Nevertheless there are people who have never experienced the soldier's grind who rebuke us for parasitism.

Of course the prestige of the army and military service will not be raised by appeals alone. We need specific

deeds, a qualitative shift toward combat proficiency and strengthening of discipline, and we need a more profound democratization of army life. Finally, we need legal acts that meet the spirit of the times.

The army lives and operates on regulations. They were approved by the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1975. Great changes have occurred since then, but there are no new regulations. Even though we know that the draft has long been developed and discussed by officer and warrant officer groups in line units. It seems to me that in the general course of renewal of the legal foundations of the state, we must speed up adoption of the new combined-arms regulations.

Col Gen Kuzmin's Views at Beginning of Congress of Peoples' Deputies

18010686b *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
First Edition 25 May 89 p 1

[Response to *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* questions by Col Gen F. Kuzmin, excerpt from article: "What We Take With Us to the Congress"]

[Excerpt] Col Gen F. Kuzmin, Commanding General, Baltic Military District

1. As do all Soviet people, I hope that the USSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies will make decisions on a historic scale. They will allow us to speed up the processes of perestroika, to deepen and expand democratic transformations, and to resolve in more compressed time periods many socioeconomic, ecological, and other problems disturbing the Soviet people.

One of them is perestroika of the Soviet Armed Forces in keeping with the requirements of defensive military doctrine. Not for an instant should we forget the defense of the socialist Motherland.

Today we are criticized, and often justly, for the state of military discipline, for such negative phenomena as "hazing". I believe it is time to state honestly and openly that its roots should be sought not only in the shortcomings of political educational work in the Armed Forces, but also in the troubles of educational work with youth in the country as a whole. Here, as they say, fighting this evil is everyone's business. And I believe that it is extremely necessary for the Council of Peoples' Deputies to examine a vital question like work with youth.

2. There is no point in enumerating all of them. The mandates of my voters cover ten pages of printed text. But I will mention a few.

In Latvia, as in other Baltic republics, there is an urgent housing problem. It is a complex situation to provide housing to officers, warrant officers, and members of their families. And people are right to hope that the USSR Peoples' Deputies will take a most active part in resolving this difficult problem. There is no end to the letters raising questions of inter-ethnic relations in the

Baltic republics. Unfortunately, some elements take advantage of negative phenomena that have accumulated over many years to exacerbate the situation, and spread about the idea of the occupation of the Baltic republics. People demand improvement of inter-ethnic relations, that they be resolved with calm and restraint, subordinating emotions to common sense. I expect that some specific decisions will be elaborated at the Council on this question.

3. I made achievable promises in my election program. I did not promise "mountains of gold" that do not exist, and cannot in real life, but proceeded from concrete possibilities and tried to address general state problems through daily assistance to specific individuals.

As a Peoples' Deputy of the USSR, I have already held three receptions for citizens. I have received around 80 people, and provided help to many in resolving the problems that concerned them. I have received more than a hundred letters.

Many voters instructed me to show constant concern for veterans of war and labor and soldier-internationalists, and to seek to implement the principle of social justice. We looked at these questions at a session of the district military council and ratified a work plan to provide benefits to soldier-internationalists, and to improve commercial and consumer support to service members and veterans of the Armed Forces.

In questions of conserving the environment, close coordination is being organized between military collectives and Party and Soviet organizations of the Baltic and Kaliningrad oblasts. Elimination of the consequences of an accident at a chemical combine in the Lithuanian SSR was an example of such cooperation. The soldiers of the district are helping to improve the ecological situation in Yurmala and on the Riga seashore and other sectors of the Baltic Coast.

Reflections on Appropriate Purpose, Size, Costs of Military Forces

18010690 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 May 89 p 3

[Article by A. Kalinin: "...And Are Our Tanks Fast? Is Defense Possible Without Offense?"]

[Text] In recent years in the statements of political figures in the East and West, one encounters more and more frequently the concepts "defensive military doctrine," "defensive strategy," "defensive sufficiency," "non-offensive defense." These are not merely pretty phrases, but are key elements of a new philosophy of international security. Its essence is to bring, in time, military-technical resources into accord with the requirements for ensuring a realistic and common security, equal for all states. Moreover, these concepts do not remain academic abstractions. They are being realized,

in any case by the USSR and its Warsaw Treaty Organization allies, and even these unilateral steps are clearly contributing to reducing the military threat, to detente, and to establishing more constructive relations between East and West.

All this is good. However, questions arise. Did the USSR and its allies not adhere to a defensive doctrine in the past? Is not the powerful military potential of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, created at the cost of huge expenses, a guarantee of our security and even of peace throughout the world?

We will attempt to clarify the meaning of the two key concepts—security and defense. It would seem that here as well there is nothing to discuss. Everything has been long and well known to everyone. Security is, if not the complete absence of a threat of attack from without, then at least the limitation of such a threat with the aid of a complex of measures, including military. Defense is the ability to give a crushing rebuff to any aggressor.

Ten years or so ago these definitions of security and defense, for the majority of Soviet citizens (and this author was no exception), were entirely acceptable. Nor were there any particular doubts that the military component of security played the decisive role, and that for the sake of strengthening and improving this component no expenses were excessive. Defense capability was thought of as primarily the function of military might, and defense as the implementation of this might in case of attack from without. I think that the amazing patience with which we endured the miracles of the era of stagnation, can be explained largely by our readiness to sacrifice a great, great deal for the sake of strengthening military might, which we gradually began to equate with security. Just as long as there is no war...

The true aspiration to prevent war is also the result of our bitter, tragic collective experience. However, we did not assimilate all of the lessons of the past, and seemed to forget that the enemy, in a few weeks, was able to seize a huge part of Soviet territory, approach all the way up to Moscow, and then move to the Volga and the passes of the Caucasus Mountains, not because on the eve of the war the USSR did not devote sufficient resources to the needs of defense, but primarily and most importantly as a result of the crimes and catastrophic political and military mistakes of Stalin and his followers.

Now it is already recognized that following the war the USSR allowed itself to be dragged into an arms race. However, it is still to be recognized that, having entered the arms race not by our own will, we gradually acquired a taste for it, began to be proud of our military might, and stopped noticing that the game we were playing so fervently was destroying us, beginning more and more tangibly to undermine our true security. And security, of course, is not only limiting the threat of attack from without, but is the guaranteed physical survival of each

person, under conditions that provide for maximum realization of the creative capabilities of individuals.

Such a definition of security may seem to be far-fetched, false and distorted. However, let us recall that in the new thinking the person is the measure of everything. It does not matter to the person whether he perishes from weapons, from contamination of the environment, low-quality products, the lack of necessary medical assistance, or from the inability to actualize himself. The indices of childhood mortality and average life span in the USSR indicate that, with respect to security in the above sense, matters are not going well at all for us. And if we take into account the ecological consequences of our economic management, and such indices as power and material expenditures per unit of production, its quantity, quality, and cost (not in rubles, yen or dollars, but in expenditures of time), availability, etc., the picture that takes shape is very gloomy. The pity is not even that we are forced to cultivate spartan traits in ourselves (all the way to drunkenness), but that the majority of us are denied the opportunity for self-realization, and that life, which is given one time, is meager, uninteresting, and becoming more and more dangerous.

And now we ask ourselves: How many military personnel, combat and military transport aircraft and helicopters, large antisubmarine warfare ships, volley fire weapons systems, tanks, BMPs, reconnaissance-strike complexes, ICBMs (with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles and single warheads), SSBNs, cruise missiles (sea-launched and air-launched), etc., do we need to reduce infant mortality and increase the average life span? To improve the everyday living and housing conditions of the population and the environment? To reduce the number of nitrates on vegetables and raise pensions, stipends, and the minimum wage, the amounts of which barely provide for the mere reproduction of the worker himself? And for introducing economical, low-waste, clean technologies, which, in combination with the growth of labor productivity, will enable our country to occupy a decent, if not the leading, place in the system of international division of labor, and satisfy the, in no way extreme, needs of our very unspoiled people?

Let us not provide hasty answers and fool ourselves with simple, easy solutions. It is the easiest thing to say: "Not any" or "Let the government (Supreme Soviet, Politburo, Central Committee, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Staff, and Political Consultative Committee decide, individually, in any combinations, or altogether, but without us)."

After thinking a little, we seemingly will answer the above questions regarding the scale of necessary military might: "The less, the better." However, obviously, such an answer requires clarification: How much less military might can we allow ourselves under the existing, far from favorable, external conditions, and not cause the policy of limiting our military might to lead to a worsening of these conditions?

Undoubtedly, limiting arms is fraught with economic, social and other costs on the domestic plane. It is necessary to note that some people will consider the very posing of the question about the interrelationship of military construction and the level and quality of life, to put it mildly, incorrect: Sausages, single-use syringes, etc., cannot be produced from the same raw materials, using the same technologies, on the same equipment and with the use of the same professional skills as those needed to produce weapons. And there is considerable truth in these arguments. Truly, the conversion of military production, even on the micro-level, is a complex matter, frequently painful, and requiring considerable expenditures. We do not know the scale of militarization of the economy, and, therefore, cannot imagine the costs associated with even partial conversion of military production. And there is also science, the degree of militarization of which, no doubt, is higher than the degree of militarization of industry. Thus, we will recall that conversion will also require expenditures, and entail costs, in any case in the near-term future. Disarmament is also fraught with expenditures, at times considerable (By some assessments elimination of one chemical munition costs three or four times more than producing it.).

I think that many people will be found who will perceive in posing the question of the interrelationship of military might and the level and quality of life an attempt to discredit our armed forces, a criminal infringement on the defense capability of our homeland, and an underhanded readiness to disarm in the face of aggressive imperialism, militarism, reaction, revanche, militant nationalism, regional fanaticism, ideological intolerance, territorial pretensions, and other manifestations of world evil.

Yes, the modern world is full of dangers and threats, including military. Yes, neither the USSR, nor other countries can yet, unfortunately, completely reject the military-technical means of ensuring security. But this is "yet and unfortunately," and not forever and happily. Today's state of mankind must not even be acknowledged to be normal or natural.

We have neared the last trait, the trait of super-violence, and we are beginning to reach the boundaries of the employment of force. If these boundaries are violated, force, regardless of the reasons for its initial employment, and the motives, goals and will of those employing it, turns into violence.

Recognition of these limits also is a chief and distinguishing feature of the new thinking. The new thinking does not exclude the possibility and legitimacy of employing force (which is not equivalent to violence) for protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the right of each people to choose the ways and forms of their own development. But, as soon as attempts are made to use force for "bringing order" in other countries, for "making those who have gone astray listen to

reason," or "educating the ignorant," force, from a tool of legitimate self-protection, turns into violence.

Today it is important not to allow the process of getting rid of violence to be deflected off course, for, in contrast to the past, any deflection may turn out to be irreparable and final. The conditions for continuing the process of getting rid of violence are, first, to change the power thinking that is still predominant in the world, and the stereotypes, dogmas and values that are at its basis, and second, to reduce the physical capabilities for destruction, embodied in the tremendous numbers of weapons of all kinds.

Both we and "they" believed for a long time that "there cannot be too many weapons," and that all weapons, both those in existence and those that are still to be produced, are necessary for defense and to prevent war. We have gotten used to thinking that the most fearsome means of destruction are means of preventing war and ensuring security. Having become accustomed to so thinking, we silently agreed with the refined definition of nuclear weapons as "non-weapons of a non-war," and having agreed with this, unnoticed by ourselves accepted the rules of the strange game, and became most passionate players.

Let us not justify ourselves by saying that we are ordinary people, densely ignorant, simple, good-willed and, most importantly, trusting with regard to these questions—they tell us and we believe. It is necessary to acknowledge that we truly supported the buildup of military might, "fully and entirely." Even today there are those whose hearts ache: Have we not disarmed too much, having eliminated more intermediate and shorter range missiles than "the other side," and begun a unilateral reduction of our glorious tank armadas in Central Europe? As concerns security, here it can be answered with confidence that the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons, and the reduction that is underway in conventional weapons and the forces equipped with them, strengthen stability.

As concerns defense capability, here it is worthwhile to give the question some thought. Defense capability is just the capability to defend oneself; i.e., to ruin the enemy plan, prove to him the unattainability and unreality of his plans, and insofar as possible limit one's own losses and damages. Understood thusly, defense does not anticipate crushing the enemy, destroying his socioeconomic and political system, seizing and holding his territory or a part thereof, or inflicting upon the enemy maximum or, as it is formulated in the nuclear age, unacceptable damage. "Pure" defense provides for grinding up the invading enemy forces, and undermining his physical capability and will to continue the war. Such defense can be either passive or active, but the development of large scale offensive actions on enemy territory (especially with the goal of seizing and holding this territory) is excluded, as is excluded both retribution,

causing the enemy extreme, or all the more so, unacceptable damage, which signifies essentially the destruction of an entire people.

From here arises a more serious objection against defensive defense: Are we really ready to wage war on our own territory, subjecting it to devastation, and forcing our own people to suffer innumerable casualties, which will never be avenged? I believe the time has come to reject the very idea of vengeance, which under today's means of destruction unavoidably turns into the concept of "unacceptable damage."

Let us pay attention to the fact that, in building up offensive might, we are not only not protecting our territory and our people (protection against nuclear missile weapons is impossible, it is generally recognized), but are also creating ever more likelihood that the nerves of those on the "other" side will not hold up, or it will fall into a group delusion about "disarming" us and thereby weakening our retaliatory strike. Thus, offensive defense will lead to incredible destruction and casualties in the rear area, and to the annihilation of that which defense is called upon to protect.

For the present, both we and the "other" side have taken each other hostage. Having become used to this situation, many consider it entirely normal, saying that nothing can be done; "they" would not dare to do anything in return. But, as M. S. Gorbachev stressed, the nuclear protection certificate is not permanent. Human error, technical malfunction, ill will, and the world will cease to exist. Meanwhile, it is characteristic of people to err, and of equipment to break down. Nuclear weapons do not prevent catastrophe; they make it inevitable.

Now I will try to answer the question posed at the beginning of the article: Did the USSR and its allies not adhere to a defensive doctrine in the past? They did. But this doctrine was supported by a capability, in which offensive weapons predominated, which could not help but reflect on the doctrine itself, which warns any aggressor that a "crushing rebuff" awaits him. I believe that everyone knows how this formulation is decoded. Of course, any aggressor must receive a crushing rebuff, but this means that he must be thrown out of the territory that he invaded, and must receive convincing evidence of the unattainability of his goals. In case of attack, an enemy must be denied victory. And that is all.

Today it is obvious that in our military capability, created at the cost of tremendous expenditures and overexertion, much has turned out to be unnecessary for the goals of defense. From this it is necessary to extract a lesson for the future.

In conclusion, I would like to mention the "historically confirmed" principles "if you want peace, prepare for war," and, "the best defense is an offense." The truth of the first of these has been refuted by history quite definitively. Bowing to this dictum, in which "the big lie

is contained," inevitably leads to a situation in which "amorality is elevated to a system, lawlessness finds its own law makers, and the right of might its own codes." Since these words were written by K. Marx, mankind has paid a terrible price for its inability to reject the wisdom of the ancient Romans; terrible, even if it is the price of the beginning of enlightenment.

As concerns the thesis, "the best defense is an offense," history gives sufficient examples of successful defense and catastrophically unsuccessful offenses, especially on foreign territory. Generalizing historical experience, Field Marshal Lord Montgomery put forth two "golden" rules of military art: "Never invade Russia, and never invade China."

In all likelihood the time has come to put forth a universal "golden" rule, which states "never invade anywhere," and, in accordance with this rule, to limit to the utmost those elements of military capabilities that can be used for attack. Countries that adhere to entirely defensive military doctrines are quite reliably protected against threats that may derive from an intelligent enemy. There is no salvation from another's madness in any case.

Military Deputies' Passivity to Criticism in Congress

18010699 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Jun 89 Single Edition p 2

[Report by Lt Col A. Oliynik, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Soldiers' Mandate"]

[Text] From morning yesterday there was excitement on the grounds and in the buildings of the motorized rifle unit. Many deputies were free on Saturday, as we know, and they were visiting their collectives. This included the military deputies.

"The National Congress of People's Deputies is a Congress of Our Hopes," Guards Lt Col N. Bolshakov, chief of the unit political section, told me. The live broadcast has made the congress a national assembly. Since the latest broadcast it has been hard for the people to contain their built-up emotions, thoughts and feelings. Our soldiers and officers, no doubt like all of the Soviet people, feel an acute need constantly to exchange opinions, to discuss the speeches of the deputies and to hear the authoritative opinions of seniors. Recently all of the command personnel and the political workers have been in the barracks with the men. Television sets are turned on in every Lenin room, and radio coverage is broadcast on post grounds.

...The officers' club was filled to overflowing at 16:00. Col Gen N. Kalinin, people's deputy of the USSR and commander of the Moscow Military District, had come to meet with the motorized riflemen. Although the people had a fairly detailed knowledge of the congress,

the commander still managed to tell them much which had escaped their attention.

Nikolay Vasilyevich discussed military issues already brought up at the congress. Among other things, he discussed in greater detail our nation's military outlays. The deputy had not finished speaking before written questions began coming from the floor. There were many. Col Gen Kalinin answered each of them thoroughly.

Here are a few questions from my notebook:

Guards Capt I. Zabayev: "We know that our Armed Forces are represented at the congress by 80 military deputies, including many commanding officers. Like many other officers, I cannot understand their passive stance when one of the deputies tries to discredit the military."

Guards Jr Sgt O. Pokrova: What is your personal opinion on Academician Sakharov's speech at the congress about the soldier/internationalists?"

"The entire audience stood up," Nikolay Vasilyevich answered, "when the former airborne officer who had lost both legs in the performance of his international duty in Afghanistan, a deputy, spoke." At the end of the meeting Guards Lt R. Skoblev read the text of a telegram to the congress from all the unit personnel and delivered it to Col Gen N. Kalinin. Its main mandate from the motorized riflemen to the military deputies was to be more active at the congress.

Military Opinion Poll on Congress of People's Deputies

18010717 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Jun 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Dvinekin and Lieutenant Colonel R. Nadeyev under the rubric "Sociological Work: Opinions, Evaluations, and Comments": "Their Hopes Have Been Justified"]

[Text] The Center for the Study of Public Opinion of Servicemen under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy has summarized servicemen's comments, received through political organs, on the work of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

The opinion of the majority of servicemen reflects the same picture that has formed in society: variety and conflict in opinions, appraisals, and attitudes. Valuing highly, on the whole, the substance of the reports at the congress, many servicemen believe that there should be a more precise delineation of the country's economic situation and a constructive program to bring it out of the crisis.

Special notice was paid to that portion of M.S. Gorbachev's speech in which mention is made for the first

time of real military expenditures and the substantial reductions being planned for 1990-1991. At the same time, there is an opinion that the report did not sufficiently reflect the problems of the armed forces themselves, the subject of considerable attention since the congress's first days of work.

Public opinion in the Army and the Navy, as the analysis indicates, reacted strongly to a constructive proposal by one of the USSR people's deputies on the need to allot a portion of the released funds to refit defense enterprises making the transition to the output of consumer goods. In addition, many urgent tasks have accumulated in both the Army and the Navy.

A group of the center's military sociologists have conducted a poll of servicemen in their units and in the military educational institutions of the Moscow garrison concerning the work of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. In all, 267 officers, noncommissioned officers, and primary-rank enlisted personnel were surveyed. Among issues requiring urgent discussion, the following were picked out by those surveyed: social and legal protections for servicemen (68 percent of those surveyed); problems of implementing the principle of social justice in the armed forces (64 percent); the need for military reform and adoption of a USSR Law on Defense (59 percent); raising the prestige of the armed forces in society (58 percent); improving the material security of servicemen (56 percent); deepening the process of democratization in the Armed Forces (56 percent); improving the daily life and leisure of personnel by redistributing funds from the military budget (47 percent); resolution of cadre issues from the standpoint of glasnost (44 percent); modification of the structure, quantity, and principles of manpower acquisition for the Armed Forces (41 percent); etc.

Both the Army and the Navy have also been affected by a residual attitude, formed during the years of stagnation, on caring for people. Military voters ask why the USSR people's deputies, who actively fought for the votes of servicemen in the course of pre-election campaigns, do not give due attention to their problems.

Comments on the speeches of several deputies concerning events in Tbilisi in April of this year indicate that servicemen are troubled by attempts to "drive a wedge between the armed forces and the people." Thus, Lieutenant Colonel G. Zverev (Far East Military District) declares: "The speeches of several orators confirm that the events in Tbilisi were a provocation, carefully planned in advance." Captain V. Danelyuk (Belorussian Military District), Lieutenant A. Dumbadze (Carpathian Military District), Major N. Tumanov (Air Defense Forces), and many other servicemen maintain the same point of view. Young enlisted personnel actively condemn the "anti-army mood" of some of the speakers. Private Tikhvadze, on behalf of soldiers of Georgian

nationality (Volga Military District), said: "We are satisfied that this tragic event was discussed openly at the congress. I personally do not believe the accusations that soldiers, just like us, committed atrocities against the population. To arrive at the truth, we must await the conclusions of the commission."

At the same time the servicemen suggest that, in the future, the armed forces should not be called upon to carry out functions outside its usual jurisdiction; and in cases of extreme necessity, "to do it only at the judgment of the USSR Supreme Soviet and on the basis of a specially drafted legal act."

The statements of some deputies, concerning the desirability of enlisted personnel serving in the military in their own republics, are being widely discussed in the military units. Responses from the units indicate that servicemen of the various nationalities are not supporting the idea, because it coincides in essence with the proposals of some informal associations to create "ethnic military units." The comment of Private I. Vartanyan is notable: "It's good that we serve in Belorussia. If we had to serve in Transcaucasia, then the majority of the soldiers of Transcaucasian nationality would probably have found themselves drawn into those events."

A group of Georgian enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers from that same Belorussian Military District share the opinion of the majority of their fellow soldiers: that the defense of the fatherland means not only the defense of one's own republic, but also the execution of military duty in the interests of all the republics. At the same time a portion of enlisted conscripts of the various nationalities express the wish to serve closer to their native homes.

The majority of the servicemen's responses repudiate the thesis of one of the LiSSR deputies concerning the occupation, in his view, of Lithuania by the Red Army which took place in the prewar years. A number of servicemen of Lithuanian nationality do not agree with this view either. For example, Major A. Babiyavichus (Siberian Military District) responded in this manner: "It is difficult to call such a statement anything other than provocative and insulting, not only for Russia, but for all the peoples of our homeland. It sounds like blasphemy towards the memory of the many thousands of soldiers who died to free the Baltic region from the Nazis."

It is impossible in a short review to reflect the entire variety of opinions and comments on the work of the congress. The most characteristic conclusion is that the congress has justified expectations and has been held in an atmosphere of democracy and glasnost. Many people emphasize that it is important for solutions, concrete, responsive to the state, and constructive, to follow.

Solovyev Welcomes GDR Navy Officers
*18001245z Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 13 May 89 p 1*

[LenTASS report: "Alliance of Our Friendship"]

[Text] In connection with the friendly visit to our city by a detachment of warships from the GDR, Yu.F. Solovyev, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Leningrad Party Obkom, yesterday received an official delegation from the People's Navy of the German Democratic Republic.

In greeting the representatives of the armed forces of this fraternal country at Smolnyy, he stated that the dynamically developing relations between the Soviet Union and the GDR had now reached a qualitatively new level, corresponding to the requirements of the present-day stage of building socialism in both countries.

Yu.F. Solovyev noted the intensification of the restructuring processes in Soviet society, the politicization of which is proceeding more rapidly than the restructuring of the economy. Hence there are also certain disproportions and complex factors in carrying out the tasks which have been outlined. The efforts of the Leningrad Party Organization have been directed at speeding up the process of renovation, but this very process has revealed the need for changes not only in the economic sphere, but also in people's psychology. This has manifested itself particularly under the conditions of democratization and glasnost.

Yu.F. Solovyev emphasized that the main thing at the present-day stage remains building a state of law, with full power lodged in the people. It is specifically the party which began the revolutionary changes, and now the movement of the entire people, advocating the renovation of socialism, is becoming more and more tangible. But we need to change a great deal in order to fully utilize

all its potential. Work along these lines is proceeding energetically, but sometimes it does not objectively coincide with the desires of certain groups of people. The diversity of their opinions and judgements was particularly manifested in the recently held round of elections of USSR People's Representatives. This was widely and frankly discussed at the joint Plenum of the CPSU Obkom and Gorkom; its decisions are directed at improving all party activity.

In the name of the ships' crews, Vice-Admiral T. Hoffmann, GDR Minister of National Defense and Commander of the GDR People's Navy, expressed his gratitude for the cordial hospitality. For many of us, he said, Leningrad is a second homeland, inasmuch as we received our education here. We are proud of the military cooperation between our armies, and we warmly support your perestroyka, with which we link the beginning process of reducing the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries.

Of particular importance for the present visit of our force of ships, the commander noted, is the fact that it is taking place during the days of celebrating the 44th Anniversary of the Victory over Hitler's Fascism and during the 40th Anniversary of the GDR's formation. Our meeting with the City of Lenin will serve to further deepen fraternal relations and strengthen military cooperation in the interests of the cause of peace and socialism.

Also attending the reception were the following persons: A.S. Tumanov, secretary of the Leningrad Party Obkom, V.A. Lopatnikov, representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Leningrad, and other officials.

On the part of our guests, there was the military, naval, and air force attache from the GDR Embassy in the Soviet Union—Major-General G. Unterderfel. The GDR General Consul in Leningrad, H. Bauer, also attended.

Moiseyev Interviewed on Troop Reduction
18010814 Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK
in Russian No 9, May 89 p 5

[Interview with Army Gen M. A. Moiseyev, chief of USSR Armed Forces General Staff, first deputy minister of defense of the USSR, on the upcoming reduction of forces and armament, by V. Belyayev; date and place not specified: "Soldiers Take Off Their Overcoats"]

[Text]

[Belyayev] The upcoming reduction of the USSR Armed Forces by 500,000 persons unquestionably is a very responsible step which proves that our state adheres unwaveringly in practice to the new political thinking and new military doctrine. The significance of the unilateral reduction in USSR forces and armaments is quite understandable on a general, humanistic, moral plane, but here is the question that arises. We know that the Warsaw Pact Organization today has 1,223,000 persons fewer than NATO. And many are concerned: Will the reduction weaken the country's defensive capability? What is the basis for the boldness of the step that has been taken?

[Moiseyev] We too asked ourselves this question. Everything was carefully thought out. It was taken into account that major positive changes had occurred in the world in recent years thanks above all to CPSU activity: the threat of war was reduced and tension in the international situation abated. On the whole the military-political factors affecting our Motherland's security became more favorable. All this then allowed us to realize in fact the main principle of Soviet Armed Forces organizational development, which is defense sufficiency. This consists of the following: to have an Army and Navy in the minimum makeup necessary for reliable repulse of aggression. It stands to reason that in this case it is a question of a qualitatively different structure of large and small units.

[Belyayev] But obviously it also must be a question of qualitatively different and more advanced armament and a qualitatively different, better trained and more qualified serviceman—soldier and officer. Is that not so?

[Moiseyev] Of course. I will not be revealing a secret when I say that the most modern equipment (by world standards) now is becoming operational. Some kinds were demonstrated by our specialists both to military officials of western states coming to the USSR as well as abroad. Suffice it to recall the interest generated by demonstrating the MIG-29 at the air show in England.

This equipment of course demands that servicemen have a higher level of knowledge. Here one could recall the 1960's, when there was a significant reduction of Armed Forces in the USSR. Well, at that time military schools as a rule were secondary schools with a two-year or three-year training period and they prepared officers

with a secondary military education. Almost all military schools now function under programs of higher educational institutions with a four-year or five-year period of training. The cadets' theoretical and practical training has increased and their general technical and special horizons have expanded. Today the Armed Forces officer corps consists almost entirely of specialists with a higher or higher specialized education.

The physical training facility of higher educational institutions has increased in scope and has been upgraded qualitatively. Here is an indicator: cadet training expenses now are 1.5-2 times higher than in the 1960's.

The personnel's moral and volitional training also plays an important role in military affairs. We can rely on our enlisted men, officers and generals here.

Based on all this I can say with all responsibility that the upcoming reduction will not damage the country's defensive capability. The Soviet Union's Armed Forces are constantly in readiness to reliably defend their Motherland and our allies and to repel any aggression.

[Belyayev] You said that today's officers receive a higher education under the programs of ordinary civilian universities. Does this mean that those who will be discharged from the Armed Forces will be able to work in the national economy?

[Moiseyev] Unquestionably, and the national economy will receive replacements of highly skilled specialists in electronics, nuclear power engineering, electrical engineering, and applied mathematics, i.e., in science-intensive sectors, as they say. Nevertheless, despite good professional training, special education, and the presence of diplomas of a unionwide model, a certain portion of servicemen being discharged will have to undergo retraining or will have to raise qualifications in specific specialties. What is being done in this regard?

The USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems drew up a comprehensive plan of measures for job placement and for solving other problems of social security of servicemen being discharged from the USSR Armed Forces during 1989-1990. This plan in particular provides for retraining servicemen and members of their families in a training-course network of enterprises and organizations, in vocational-technical schools, and in educational institutions.

[Belyayev] And so the principle of social justice will be observed more strictly during the upcoming reduction in the Armed Forces than during the reduction in the 1960's?

[Moiseyev] The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree "On a Reduction in the USSR Armed Forces and in Defense Expenditures During 1989-1990" dated 21 March of this year obligated local soviets of people's

deputies to take necessary steps for job placement and to provide living space for officers, warrant officers, and extended-term servicemen being discharged to the reserve or who are retiring. For its part the Ministry of Defense will build more than 100 60-apartment to 80-apartment houses over a two-year period in various regions of the country for the servicemen being discharged.

[Belyayev] And will an officer discharged from the Armed Forces with consideration of his wishes, as noted in the press, fully receive a pension together with earnings while working in the national economy?

[Moiseyev] In accordance with USSR Council of Ministers Decree No 986 dated 10 November 1982, which is in force, working officer retirees are paid a pension for years served with consideration of earnings in an amount such that the pension together with earnings does not exceed the base pay and allowances for position and military rank received by the serviceman before discharge from active military duty and the percentage increment for years served in officer positions. In all cases, however, the retiree keeps at least half of the designated pension with any amount of earnings.

That procedure for pension payment realistically ensures an opportunity not only for maintaining the discharged officer's level of financial support which existed in the period of his Army service, but also for exceeding this level.

[Belyayev] I would like to return to the basic subject of our conversation. How can a reduction in force be compensated? By improving the quality of personnel training? If the answer is "yes," then will changes in the USSR Law "On Universal Military Obligation" introduced by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase dated 10 April of this year help solve that problem?

[Moiseyev] I think that to pose the question of compensating for a reduction in force would be incorrect. This would signify following the path of NATO countries, which favor compensating for the intermediate and lesser range missiles being eliminated in Europe. We have no plans to compensate for the reduction in force.

With respect to the second part of the question, the decision to call up graduates of higher educational institutions which have no military chairs for one year of military service, as provided for by this Ukase, stems from a need for them to fulfill their constitutional obligation of defending the socialist homeland in one form or another. In this case military training is provided in the form of active military service, but with its duration shortened to one year.

[Belyayev] But will this not lead to certain intellectual losses for society? Let us assume that a student has studied excellently in an institute for all five years and he already has laid certain scientific groundwork; it can be

said that he is a ready-made post-graduate student, but he is called up. On returning from the Army the young man will have to restore what he has lost. It seems there is the alternative of restoring military chairs in all higher educational institutions. Or will military training at civilian higher educational institutions still be contrary to interests of the Armed Forces?

[Moiseyev] The presence of military chairs in a number of higher educational institutions is determined by a real need for peacetime training of the necessary number of reserve officers on a certain list of specific military specialties. There is presently no need to increase the number of higher educational institutions with military chairs, since they essentially will "work" only to free the graduates of these higher educational institutions from active military service.

[Belyayev] Students of higher educational institutions have a deferment from call-up until the completion of training. How about pupils of secondary specialized educational institutions?

[Moiseyev] A deferment for obtaining a secondary education is granted to pupils of secondary schools of general education and secondary specialized educational institutions if they had no secondary education before entering. All youths studying in secondary schools, rural vocational-technical schools and *tekhnikums* based on eight grades comfortably receive a secondary or secondary specialized education up to age 20.

But it is illegal to grant youths a deferment to obtain a secondary education twice (the first time for completing tenth grade and the second time for attaining a specialty in a *tekhnikum*).

[Belyayev] The mass media sometimes express the opinion that it would be more advantageous to have a professional Army where people sign up voluntarily. What thoughts does the military high command have on this score?

[Moiseyev] The Ministry of Defense thoroughly studied and researched this question from all aspects—economic, military, sociopolitical.

I will note first that the volunteer nucleus (officers, warrant officers, extended-term servicemen, and service-women) now makes up approximately 35 percent of the overall strength of the Soviet Army and Navy.

From a military standpoint, of course, the level of professional training and education of Armed Forces personnel with manpower acquisition based on long-term (up to 20-25 years) and short-term (3-6 years) contracts is considerably higher than with manpower acquisition based on universal military obligation with enormously lesser periods of service (up to two years). But the serious flaw of voluntary service is that there is a significant reduction in the possibility of building up

militarily trained reserves needed for Armed Forces deployment under the mobilization plan.

With this in mind, the most suitable is the mixed system of manpower acquisition for the Armed Forces that is in force in the FRG and French armies as well as essentially in the USSR.

From a sociopolitical aspect a professional volunteer army contradicts the fundamental principles of military organizational development of the socialist state that proclaims defense of the homeland to be the duty of every USSR citizen. If we speak of a law-and-order state with principles of social justice, all USSR male citizens must be under equal conditions in performing this constitutional duty.

From an economic standpoint, costs for current upkeep of the Armed Forces will sharply increase (according to our estimates, by three or four times) if they are manned by personnel according to a voluntary principle. Also additional one-time expenses of up to five billion rubles will be required for building and renovating everyday social and cultural facilities. Judge for yourself whether or not this is acceptable now under conditions of financial difficulties.

In this connection I would like to mention what the contribution of the USSR Ministry of Defense can be to the country's economy. USSR Ministry of Defense industrial enterprises are quickly stepping up the production of consumer goods. Their output volume in 1989 will more than double in comparison with 1988 and will quadruple in 1990 in comparison with this same period. The volume of paid services to the population provided by military units, establishments, enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense will increase and will be around a half-billion rubles in 1990.

Continuing Problems of Disruption of Combat Training

18010675 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 May 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Manushkin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Northern Group of Forces: "The Schedule and Orders" or "Why it Is Hard to Eliminate in the Combat Training the Practice of Taking the Personnel Away From Their Classes"]

[Text] The problem of personnel being taken away from their classes is not a new one. There has been a lot said and many orders issued on the matter. The demand is constantly sent down from above to ensure 100% attendance at classes, not to permit classes to be disrupted or postponed and not to put subordinates to work at "outside" jobs.... But the practice still lives! It is easier to issue another order reinforcing the requirements, intensifying the monitoring and demandingness than to actually implement it. I know many commanders who have

been penalized for violating the requirements for conducting classes. When I have asked them why they committed these deviations, however, I have ordinarily been told: "Circumstances forced me to...." Just what are these "circumstances" which prevent the officers in charge from arranging the classes in accordance with the guiding documents? Perhaps the requirements are unrealistic and cannot be met? "No," most of the commanders, including the transgressors, say, "the requirements are proper, but we are frequently unable to mesh them with our other day-to-day tasks. The problems stem from this. Also from the fact that we are not good at planning the combat training."

I saw that this was correct immediately upon arriving in SAM regiment "X." According to the schedule the battery commanded by Maj V. Kachan was supposed to be servicing the equipment. Following 2 hours of political classes, however, the personnel went not to the pool but to drill training. This was the motive. Why take the equipment out of storage after the political classes, since there is not much time left until the noon mess? And the personnel would not have time to really get the work underway.

These things could have been ascribed to happenstance, explained as a coincidence of circumstances, if I had not seen the same the following day and the day after.

The class schedule was not observed also in an adjacent tank regiment.

What I saw brought to mind a session of the Military Council of the Northern Group of Forces which discussed problems in planning the training process. It stressed the inadmissibility of disrupting or postponing classes. If the combat equipment needs to be serviced, let us say, that is just what the schedule should call for. It should not be "crammed" with extra activities.... We can see that it is far more complicated than that, however. Is this not why, when talk turns to the effectiveness and quality of the scheduled training, some commanders are gloomily silent and avert their eyes?

The commander of the SAM unit complained when his subordinates returned from the range with only a satisfactory evaluation. They had been let down by the batteries commanded by Maj S. Konoval and V. Kachan. I naturally wondered whether the personnel had not been taken away from their classes a great deal and were therefore unable to properly prepare for the important test. No, the commander said that classes had been conducted according to plan in the regiment.

I have been familiar with this regiment for a long time, however. I remember well how in years past the subunits too frequently had to deal with suddenly assigned hypothetical situations, and not just at the training alert signal. Instructions frequently poured in as though from the horn of plenty: detail personnel, assign a team, prepare a demonstration class....

"There is not so much excessive organization today" the regimental commander said. "We have more independence...."

Just at that time a messenger arrived and reported: "A soldier has gone AWOL in an adjacent unit. The formation commander orders personnel to be detailed to find him...."

Life is life, after all. And it frequently poses unanticipated problems. But let us look at the logs of telephoned messages and orders in the units. Incidentally, they were "officially established" long ago and assigned to the duty officers (or officers of the day). And the logs of telephoned messages and instructions reflect the work style of many commanders and chiefs as though in a mirror. The entries abound with the words "detail," "appoint," "dispatch," "provide"....

Let us take a closer look. For what needs are the orders "detail" and "appoint" issued? Most frequently it is to police the grounds prior to the arrival of superiors and commissions, to repair the barracks, classrooms, training grounds, firing ranges and tank training areas, to unload coal or other materiel essential to the unit. While excessive "spit and polish" prior to the arrival of commissions has long been ridiculed and criticized, all the rest is actually essential. All of these are operational facilities or facilities which support the vital functioning and combat training of the troops, after all. And combat subunits are frequently assigned to them.

A team was put together to build facilities with internal resources in the reconnaissance company commanded by Capt G. Moskovkin, for example. Personnel of the "reconnaissance construction team" worked 5 days a week and engaged in scheduled combat training only 1 day.

We say that the army services itself and stress the fact that the soldiers peel their own potatoes, do their own laundry and maintain order in the sleeping quarters and on unit grounds. All of this seems only natural and raises no questions. But is it natural for the soldiers sometimes to perform major repairs on barracks, build messhalls, depots and storage facilities, clubs and stalls in the combat vehicle pools? Furthermore, this is frequently done by those who are listed as motorized riflemen, tankmen, artillerymen or missilemen.

Take any project being constructed with internal resources. As a rule people are at work there who are supposed to be engaged in combat training and who have nothing whatsoever to do with construction. And what does the internal-resources method have to do with it? Until recently an entire motorized battalion was employed (and for more than a single year) at a priority construction project in the Northern Group of Forces. When the question arose as to who had issued the order, the answer given in the Combat Training Section of the

Northern Group of Forces was that there was a proper document from Moscow. They were unable to come up with it, however....

What can be said about this? Is this not a manifestation of the great temptation to use "free" manpower at one's own discretion? There are situations, of course, in which the help of soldiers is simply essential. Chernobyl, the earthquake in Armenia, other emergencies.... The people regarded the soldiers as saviors in these cases. And they worked not only and perhaps not so much because they were ordered to as in response to the dictates of their hearts. This is normal for the army. But is it normal when a tankman or missileman is turned into an ordinary subsidiary worker?

It would be difficult to find a unit today whose roster does not contain names of certain NCOs and soldiers followed by the notation, strange at first glance, "extra-T/O." Who are these extra-T/O people? Why are they retained and not transferred to those subunits with a shortage of specialists? And why are they worth their weight in gold in the units? Take tank regiment "X," for example, in which Maj A. Surayev is deputy chief of staff. It retains 12 stokers to service the boilers. They are all "extra-T/O" personnel. Is this not strange? Everyone understands, after all, that where there are barracks and other living and services premises, they have to be heated. So why not add that position to the T/O? It turns out, however, that it is extremely difficult to "clear the way" for any [new] T/O unit. A reduction—perhaps. But it is a big problem to arrange for the military units to provide their own heat on a legal basis and not by the "underground method."

If it were only a matter of stokers alone. That same regiment has an organic tank training area and gunnery training facility. And all of the soldiers servicing them are non-T/O. In an adjacent SAM regiment half of the stokers and all of the "swineherds" (workers on the unit subsidiary farm) are non-T/O.

But there are not enough "extra-T/O workers" for regimental needs. The units are therefore forced to keep some of the personnel not where they are listed in the T/O but where they are vitally needed. Many officers in charge, including inspectors, know about the situation but simply close their eyes to it. Otherwise, life and combat training would come to a halt in the unit. I believe that we must find a way out of the situation, however. The military collectives have long talked about the fact that the T/O structure of the units and subunits does not conform to contemporary requirements. And they have begun writing about this. Glasnost has helped. Is it not time to move from words to action? There are proposals, after all. They call for establishing a T/O structure in the units (and in the army as a whole) which would permit the combat subunits to get on with their combat training. There should be corresponding subunits for the housekeeping jobs and servicing needs. Is it really clearer to those in Moscow where stokers and

"swineherds" are needed, and how many? And that is the situation right now. Why not establish T/O positions for these and certain other jobs locally? Grant the authority to the commander of the group of forces, for example?

Not everything in these proposals is incontrovertible, of course. By weighing all of the pros and cons, however, the best solution can always be found. Only then will it be possible to involve all of the personnel in the scheduled training and achieve qualitative advances in the training process. For now, however, the units keep receiving telephoned messages: "designate a team," "detail so many people...." And the commander looks longingly at the class schedule: once again he will have to take personnel away from their combat training....

Position Of Command Assistant For Legal Work Created

18010696 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
31 May 89 First Edition p 6

[Interview by unnamed *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* correspondent with the Chief of the Legal Service of the USSR Ministry of Defense Colonel of Justice M. Matakina: "Legal Specialists To Become Command Assistants". First paragraph is editorial introduction.]

[Text] By order of the USSR Minister of Defense, the position of assistant for legal work to the commander (chief) is being introduced in combined units, large strategic formations, large garrisons, and military commissariats.

"This is only one of the measures aimed at implementing legal reform in the army and navy," said Colonel of Justice M. Matakina, Chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense's Legal Services, in a conversation with our correspondent. "As *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*'s readers probably already know, the Regulation on Legal Work and the Officer's Legal Minimum took effect earlier, and the USSR Ministry of Defense's Council for Strengthening Legality and Law and Order and the Coordinating and Methodological Council for Personnel Legal Education have been created. In addition, the number of hours that military schools devote to teaching legal disciplines has been increased. And now the time has come to have an official in the services who would be not only first command assistant for organizing universal legal instruction but also a highly skilled legal adviser."

[*KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*] Please describe the new command assistant's duties in greater detail.

[Matakina] His duty is to assist the command in ensuring socialist legality and law and order, which is to say in making proper use of legal means to strengthen troop discipline, protect socialist property, issue orders in accordance with Soviet laws, handle proceedings and claims, and review letters and complaints...

[*KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*] Nevertheless, Mikhail Grigoryevich, is there an urgent need to institute the new position just now, at a time when the Armed Forces are being cut back? After all, we haven't had such a position in the services for many years, and everyone has gotten along just fine without it.

[Matakina] Let me begin with an example. In 1986, an experiment was begun in the Moscow Military District in which legal specialists were assigned to the administrative staffs of combined units and large garrisons and to military commissariats. The district military council and all commanders under whose direction the legal services officers worked expressed unanimous support for putting them in the table or organization.

[*KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*] One must assume that accomplishing the task will require personnel. Where will you get them?

[Matakina] We will indeed need personnel. The existing corps of legal services officers is to be tripled in size in the near future. We therefore intend to enlist in this type of work not only graduates of the USSR Ministry of Defense Military Institute's legal department but also officers who have received legal training in the country's other higher schools, or who are still studying by correspondence. According to our data, many of them are serving in various capacities that do not directly entail use of their legal expertise. We're going to propose that such officers change their line of work.

[*KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*] If necessary, would you like to take this opportunity to inform people who would like to become command assistants for legal work where they should apply?

[Matakina] They should write the following address: Moscow, K-160, USSR Ministry of Defense Administrative Directorate. We mainly need legal services officers who are under age 35, and who have sufficient skills and experience, of course.

People's Control on Troop Reduction, Housing Problem

18010822 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
27 Jun 89 First Edition p 2

[Interview with S. Teteryatnikov, USSR KNK [Committee of People's Control] department chief, by Major I. Ivanyuk: "Providing Work and Shelter"]

[Text] The USSR Committee of People's Control adopted a resolution on implementing control for fulfilling guidelines on job placement and providing housing to servicemen discharged into the reserve or retired in connection with USSR Armed Forces reductions.

We asked S. Teteryatnikov, USSR KNK [Committee of People's Control] department chief, to comment on the provisions contained in it.

[Ivanyuk] Semen Kirillovich, such resolutions are certainly adopted infrequently. What is the reason for issuing this one?

[Teteryatnikov] I think that I do not need to convince KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers that the Armed Forces reduction issue does not only trouble servicemen and members of their families. It affects many layers of society to one degree or another. We are talking about a whole series of socio-economic measures in our nation and we need to implement them in an organized manner so that we do not infringe upon the rights and interests of those who faithfully and loyally served the Motherland in Army formations.

Meanwhile, inspections conducted earlier showed that, despite the party and government resolutions adopted, many local soviets of peoples deputies ispolkoms are not providing housing to those reserve or retired officers and warrant officers within the established time periods. It is clear that the ispolkoms are also experiencing difficulties, whether they are objectively called that or not, but this situation took shape over many years. As a result, servicemen and their families, after so many years of difficult service and numerous transfers, are being forced to search for years to put a roof over their heads. And for all that how many complications with residence permits, job placement, medical insurance, and children's education in schools arise! Taking into account the Army and Navy reductions being conducted, the situation may become even more aggravated since tens of thousands of people will be getting on the "list" to receive housing.

It will also be difficult to conduct job placement for a man who has taken off his military uniform. Many will have to start from scratch to acquire a skill and new experience.

In this situation, the Committee of People's Control considers it necessary to monitor local fulfillment of party and government decisions on this issue: In particular, are those being discharged into the reserve or

retired being granted established benefits and is the principle of social justice being observed at the same time.

[Ivanyuk] What does the resolution specifically provide for?

[Teteryatnikov] Republic, kray, and oblast committees of people's control have been ordered to pay particular attention to the provision of housing to discharged servicemen and the adoption of urgent measures for their temporary placement and residence. Verify compliance of their right to priority entry into housing construction cooperatives and to receipt of plots of land for individual home construction. Assist servicemen who have expressed a desire to settle and work in the country.

We are planning to enlist the cooperation of city and rayon committees of people's control, establish close cooperation with military commissariats, and constantly monitor the committees' work under the soviets of peoples deputies ispolkoms for job placement and provision of housing to servicemen discharged into the reserve or retired.

I want to point out that Army and Navy people's controllers will actively participate in this work. The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate have sent appropriate orders to military soviets, commanders, and political agencies.

[Ivanyuk] And the last question. Judging by the letters to the editor, all of the enumerated problems are already making themselves known. When will the people's controllers begin their inspections?

[Teteryatnikov] We plan to study the state of affairs in various regions of the nation beginning in the second half of this year and we will continue into next year.

[Ivanyuk] And the editorial staff in turn will attempt when possible to cover the course of these inspections in detail.

Coordinating Combined Arms Operation With Flamethrower Subunits

18010808 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Jun 89 First Edition p 1

[Article by Captain M. Kislov: "From Demonstration To Demonstration, Or Why Flamethrower Operators Are Sometimes Forgotten"]

[Text] Transbaykal Military District—The remnants of the routed band ensconced themselves in the ruins of an old fortress surrounded by high, unassailable cliffs. Fire from a heavy machinegun literally pinned the motorized infantrymen to the scorched earth. Sergeant M. Batsev, a flamethrower operator, switched positions several times until finally, under the cover of smokepots ignited and hurled by the infantrymen, he was able to fire an aimed shot. The machinegun fell silent.

Senior Lieutenant A. Rodionov, deputy commander of a flamethrower company, recounted this incident from his Afghan experience to his subordinates at a training session. And not just so they could gain a finer appreciation of their work (at the time, Sergeant Batsev had simply forgotten to bring a smokepot with him). He also wanted to underscore once more the importance for flamethrower operators of coordinated action with troops equipped with different types of weapons.

The latter point is very significant, as Rodionov has more than once encountered commanders to whom flamethrower operators had been assigned but who knew little about the specific nature of their operations and use. Such commanders have given flamethrower operators impossible missions and incorrect positions in combat formations. "What we need, then," the officer concluded, "is greater independence, foresight, and calculation. Above all, we have to rely on our skills..."

There was a good deal of truth in Rodionov's words. But there was also an underlying message. In any case, as I prepared to visit the flamethrower operators, I made a point of asking several commanders of motorized infantry and tank subunits how much they knew about the procedure and special characteristics of using these specialists in a combined-arms engagement. It turned out that even the tactical-technical specifications of infantry jet flamethrowers (RPO) [reaktivnyy pekhotnyy ognemet] are known to by no means all of them, let alone most. Indeed, after that one is inclined to believe that, in their anecdotes, officers of flamethrower subunits are not exaggerating in the least.

Once, for example, the flamethrower company (at the time it was commanded by Captain G. Sivtsov) was assigned to a tank division and throughout an entire exercise never given a single mission. When the company commander asked the division commander why the flamethrower operators were not being used, the latter simply threw up his arms and said, "You'll burn up my tanks." True, in the final stage of the exercise a job was

found for Captain Sivtsov's subordinates, too. However, the flamethrower operators had to attack the forward edge of the "enemy" without cover; they couldn't have gotten off a single shot. In another instance, the flamethrower operators were assigned the mission of counterattacking "enemy" tanks penetrating from the flank.

The question arises: Despite the obvious fact that combined-arms commanders are obliged to know the particulars of the use of infantry jet flamethrowers, why are they often incompetent in this matter?

Let us consider, for example, how the use of flamethrowers in combined-arms engagements is covered in training sessions for commanders. The fact is that there's not a lot to consider, because such questions are hardly ever raised in officer training exercises in the field and in short tactical exercises. Study of the tactical-technical specifications of flamethrowers, the procedure for using these weapons, and their capabilities is also a rare exception at training sessions for subunit commanders.

But perhaps the shortage of technical training is offset by practical experience gained in joint tactical training sessions and exercises involving motorized infantrymen and flamethrower operators?

Alas, examples of this sort are extremely rare as well. For example, the flamethrower subunit in question and the unit in which Guards Major A. Bazhenov serves are neighbors. But in the training sessions mentioned at the beginning of this article, the flamethrower operators themselves "recognized and identified" the motorized infantrymen. And yet training on a tactical field not far away was a motorized infantry company with which, it cannot be ruled out, the flamethrower operators will have to cooperate in some demonstration exercise. Can it really be that a weapon that, as combat experience in Afghanistan shows, is highly effective exists solely for "demonstrations"?

Of course, they are certain differences in the training programs for flamethrower and combined-arms subunits. However, there are quite a few points of contact in their combat training. No doubt such training in the field could be planned to serve their common interests—at least an attempt could be made. Needless to say, the initiative here has to be mutual.

It seems that a discussion of this subject would be incomplete were we to fail to touch on the problems that confront the flamethrower operators themselves, above all where their training program is concerned. The program is the same as that for supply subunits. And yet when he uses his weapon on the battlefield, the flamethrower operator essentially performs as a "bona fide" motorized infantryman. It's no accident that he also has a machinegun. But at present these specialists fire their automatic weapons relatively infrequently, and the exercises they perform are simple ones.

As for firing the infantry jet flamethrower itself, a flamethrower operator is supposed to take more than 10 actual shots in the course of the training year. In practice, however, he fires his weapon once or twice. To explain this, arguments of an economic nature are most often cited: The ammunition is costly, and in short supply at that. That's all true. As a consequence, however, clarity is required: Either we proceed from the premise that proficiency with this weapon is costly, or we bring the existing requirements into line with reality.

Incidentally, despite all these problems and difficulties, the subunit in which Senior Lieutenant Rodionov serves

has achieved quite good results. The platoons commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Trushkin and Lieutenant N. Zatsepin achieved excellent marks for the 1988 training year. They also completed the winter training session successfully, above all thanks to their men's great dedication and the effective use of small-caliber training flamethrowers and other means of intensifying the training process.

Nevertheless, there seem to be considerable possibilities for enhancing the combat readiness of this and similar subunits—namely, the possibilities discussed above.

Role of Command Independence in Naval Training, Operations

18010689 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
First Edition 25 May 89 p 2

[Article by Capt. 2nd Rank V. Somov, "Reduced Independence"]

[Text] Once the following incident occurred in a command post exercise in which I happened to be an umpire. The commander of a ship at sea sent a radiogram to the command post: "Have detected an 'enemy' submarine. Request 'go-ahead' to attack."

In response the senior officer at once ordered that the ship be given an unsatisfactory evaluation. His adherence to principle is understandable—in a combat situation, approval for an attack is not asked. But this story again eloquently reminded us of one common trait of many ship commanders, alas, their training to act with caution.

I believe an explanation for this must be sought first of all in the current system of combat training, which has done little to open up the creative action of the command level. Incidentally, more than once in its pages KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has raised the question of the reduced independence of the organizers of combat training on board ship. Following the authors of critical remarks on this subject, I can also bear witness to the fact that after the introduction of new shipboard training courses, the commanders continue to be oriented toward the "barrage", where the main thing becomes "covering" the plan in time, and fitting into the other normative documents, which in addition are duplicated at different levels.

The total regulation also has had its effect on the work of officers of combat training sections and directorates. From year to year they increasingly remind one of office workers who expend the bulk of their time on assembling and transmitting essentially trivial information, all sorts of agreements, coordinations, and settlements, in other words, routine. For what? If we look at it honestly, for the sake of trivial oversight of ship commanders.

In this regard it was interesting to read in the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 1 April an article by Rear Admiral V. Zatula: "...But There Aren't Many Suggestions", in which he expresses his disagreement with criticism coming from below. "Despite the fact that the training course is a program-methods document and it must be implemented", Rear Admiral V. Zatula asserts, "for the independent, thinking commander it is only a basis, a kind of platform, and allows great opportunity for invention, creativity, trying out something of his own in the organization and conduct of combat training on ships and in the formation."

Fine. But let us look at what happens in real life. For example, for the execution of anti-submarine tasks, a

formation is assigned a specific time period, say a few weeks. This year, exercising his rights as senior officer on board, Capt. 1st Rank V. Martirosyan assigned the ship a scenario statement requiring the use of anti-submarine weapons at the very start of this period, which in a sense was a surprise to the crew, since usually firing is preceded by long training. For reasons that had nothing to do with the personnel, the fire had to be halted. If we look at this with an open mind, thanks to the unplanned scenario statement (that is, the initiative of a senior officer), it was possible to generally prevent a breakdown in the given combat exercise, since a lot of time still remained to repeat it after the problem had been corrected. But in the higher staff for some reason this rescheduling was counted as failure to meet the combat training plan. They said that the "box" for it remained unchecked after they put to sea.

People will say to me, what has this to do with a training course as such? I agree, in this case it appears to have nothing to do with it. If we look at it in isolation, simply as a program-methods document. But if we tie it to the organization of combat training as a whole, then "inventing, creating, testing something of one's own" becomes very difficult, since you risk being put off the plan, and this is a mortal sin.

Here's another typical situation. According to the plan of an exercise held not too long ago, surface ships were supposed to repel an aerial attack. In the corresponding documents a specific time was assigned for working with the aircraft—only on this condition is this type of combat exercise counted. But due to unforeseen circumstances having nothing to do with the sailors, the aircraft remained in the air for one hour less. However the time was quite sufficient for the shipboard AD systems to do their job. Nevertheless, the higher staff again called the result into question: the terms for execution of the fire had been violated.

What should the "independent-minded commander" do in this case, he for whom the "training course is only a basis, a kind of platform"? Prove that in a present-day battle the adversary will be more likely to spend mere minutes rather than hours in the air raid? That the fire crews train better when the targets appear for short periods? I dare say that most of our commanders will choose (and do choose) a different route: as soon as something is knocked out of its customary channel, it is better not to assume all responsibility, but to go again to superiors with the request that they decide and evaluate, count or not count the results.

Of course we can blame the commanders in this. But should we blame them alone? The training process has its own objective principles, which by their very nature restrict both independence and initiative. And however much we try to improve the training programs, they still boil down to a specific list of measures and a specific sequence for their execution.

Take for instance, course tasks. Logically they represent an intermediate link in training, but in fact that have assumed primary importance in the evaluation of results of ship and formation training, and consequently their combat readiness as well. A seemingly insignificant substitution of criteria, but it distorts the state of affairs.

Recently for example we encountered a case where soon after passing the second course task, the technical readiness of one missile cruiser suddenly dropped sharply. When the ship was checked it was in order, and when the testers went away, the order disappeared. And not because the testing was bad, but because it was convenient for no one that the ship not pass the course task on time. Some will call this window dressing, fakery, etc., but let us consider what prompts this? To whom are we displaying the window dressing? Where does this kind of phenomenon begin and at what level does it end? And does it end? Now if we think about it, no one needs window dressing, no one gets any satisfaction from it, everyone would like to live in a system of true measurements, and not fake ones.

But we do not have this yet, since very often we try to implement the shift to qualitative indices in a schoolboy fashion, increasingly burdening the schoolboys (that is, the commanders) with new assignments. But it would be better to unburden them. If we rid ourselves of everything that is unfeasible, unrealistic, scientifically unfounded, legally unsound, socially unsupported, this demonstrative zeal would simply lose its point, or else would be looked upon truly with condemnation, not as it is today. Finally, let us admit that combat training still is closer in nature to a production cycle than a training cycle. That work to maintain combat readiness does not abide fractionalization, periods of decline and growth of combat proficiency (which is natural for the training process tied to the calendar), or trivial regimentation.

What difference is it to the Navy's Main Staff what evaluation the patrol combatant "Retiviy", for instance, received on its last sea duty? For it, the Main Staff, this ship is listed in the continuous readiness forces, and consequently represents a certain value operationally, with the tasks imposed on it, regardless of the month or training period. This, it seems to me, is the approach that should be borrowed in developing the criteria of shipboard combat training. Let a formation be assigned one basic mission for a year: who, in what composition, with what deadlines, to be ready by when. In such a case shipboard training could be reduced to two course missions—a base mission consisting of practicing measures to prepare the ship for battle and for cruising, and a sea-going mission, the conduct of combat actions by a single ship.

And that is all. With this organization (understandably, all of this is just a rough outline; if necessary I could present a more detailed plan), the commander of the formation, first of all independently with his staff, would decide what has to be done on a specific ship to maintain it at the established combat readiness, in what volume to

use the training course, and what help is required for this from the organs of command and control, supply etc.

I am certain one need not fear oversimplification here. After all, monitoring by the higher staffs would remain in all its forms. Especially necessary would be surprise inspections, which clearly are insufficient. But as for the monitoring functions allegedly included in the current plan report, it would be more reasonable to reduce them. After all, today we send information upward, to fleet authorities, even about certain purely shipboard matters. Why for example must the Pacific Fleet Staff be informed that on such-and-such a date on such-and-such small antisubmarine ship, they will be working on organizational questions at base? In order to check execution? But at long range that can't be done in any case.

In exchanging opinions on these proposals with the commanders of formations and ships, I heard from many of them that if they were granted genuine independence, the first thing they would do would be to make corrections in the weekly schedule. From their observations, it would be much more correct to assign the first days of the week to tactical-special training, and shift the political classes from Monday to Friday. By that time it is possible to summarize some results, which would more tightly tie political training to life, as we say.

Now I cite these ideas, which seem to me personally to be worthy of attention, and again I think: dreams, dreams... For you see, with us when something is put into law, when it is laid down in the lines of a directive, the way is usually blocked to initiative. It is time we recalled the "biting" observation of a Russian satirist of the early 19th century: "They dreamt of rights; they were given rights: their tight trousers were made loose".

It's time we rid ourselves of hobbling—our work could only gain from it.

Soviet Submarines Sold to West As Scrap Metal
Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian
17 May 89 Second Edition p 6

[Letter by M. Biryukov and editorial response; "Pepsico" and Submarines"]

[Excerpt] **They say that the company "Pepsico" is buying up submarines in the USSR. What relation do they have to the production of cold soft-drinks?**

On this subject we will provide editorial information.

"Pepsico" purchased in the USSR not only 17 submarines for \$150,000 each, but also a cruiser, an ASW ship, and a destroyer. They will all be resold in the US for scrap metal. The head of "Pepsico", D. Kendall has even joked that his company is "disarming" the USSR quicker than anyone. The American company also purchased some new Soviet tankers in the framework of a

joint Soviet-Norwegian enterprise. These will be either leased or sold on the open market.

According to an announcement of the leadership of the company "Pepsico", such deals are essential to the company for the expansion of business contacts with the USSR. "Pepsico" already has 21 enterprises in the Soviet Union and wants to open another 26. The question arises: how to convert in the U.S. its share of the profits received in rubles?

At some point this question was solved by giving "Pepsico" exclusive rights to U.S. sales of "Stolichnaya" vodka. But the market for this product is not limitless, and the volume of the company's operations in the USSR grew. A solution was found. "Pepsico" concluded a contract with the corresponding Soviet organizations for the delivery of obsolete military equipment to be used for scrap metal. And while such an arrangement evoked ironic remarks from the American press, it is continuing to operate: business is business.

Journalist Visits Deep-Water Submersible Test Site

18010719 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Jun 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Capt 2d Rank S. Turchenko: "Tester Heads for the Depths: Secret Classification Lifted"]

[Text] *Our navymen scuttled half the Black Sea Fleet squadron near Novorossiysk on 18 June 1918 so that the interventionists would not get the ships.*

A total of some 50 warships and 300 merchant vessels had been buried in the Black Sea, and many of them perished in waters of the Baltic, White and Barents seas. The Soviet government viewed the refloating of these undersea treasures as a very important part of restoration work in the country. The Council of People's Commissars decree nationalizing diving property signed by V. I. Lenin on 19 June 1919 was of exceptional importance in carrying out this national task. Soviet diving originated that day.

On the eve of the 70th anniversary of Lenin's decree our correspondent visited a naval test site where aquanauts—divers and testers of deep-water submersibles—work. Not very long ago this work was conducted under a "secret" or "top secret" classification, but perestroika arrived here too. A delegation from a French firm developing deep-water gear visited the test site. We had an opportunity to take a look at this mysterious alma mater of naval aquanauts.

The tall stone building outwardly differed in no way from the old structures typical of this area, but inside everything was unusual. In a large section of the house there were no floors or ceilings between stories, and here

strange cylindrical constructions resembling submarines with bow and stern trimmed off towered the full height of the house.

"This is our hydropressure chamber," said Department Chief Capt 1st Rank G. Belenitsyn. "It is designed for testing equipment, including diving gear, created by industry for the Search and Rescue Service, and for medical and physiological research of the possibilities of aquanauts working at great depths. The most up-to-date and advanced method, that of saturation diving, is used here."

"As you know, the traditional heavy gear bound a diver very firmly to the surface vessel. Invention of the aqualung severed this umbilical cord, but the problem of gas mixtures arose. Oxygen at great depths and under pressure becomes a toxic agent. Its amount in the mixture began to be reduced, displaced by nitrogen, but the latter turned into a narcotic at depths greater than 60 meters. It was replaced by helium, but this too was a dead end. As with any inert gas, helium dissolves in human blood; the higher the pressure, the more it dissolves. This in itself is not harmful, but with a pressure drop (with the diver's return to the surface) the passage of helium from the blood into the tissue is a slow process. Because of this a diver who has worked only 30 minutes at a depth of 180 meters must be brought to the surface over a period of at least 12 hours, otherwise the blood will begin boiling with small helium bubbles like champagne, and this means death. From a depth of 500 meters the ascent would last around two weeks, which made use of a helium mixture devoid of practical meaning. But a way out of this dead end also was found—the saturation diving method. In the special chamber the pressure of the helium mixture would be increased to a level corresponding to the necessary depth and the divers' blood would be saturated with the inert gas. They could remain in this state for a rather long time (weeks, months), exiting into the water through a lock wearing gear and performing necessary work there. This method initially was tested on animals, then people entered the underwater helium houses. The names of the first aquanauts—heroes of hydrospace—were unknown to us for many years. We proudly give their names today—Nikolay Ivanovich Belov, Viktor Alekseyevich Vishnyakov, V. S. Kurochkis (unfortunately the author did not find the full first name and patronymic), Aleksandr Isosifovich Lisovskiy and Grigoriy Romanovich Pelykh. All are former navymen and have been given state awards. The creators of the saturation diving method—Col Med Serv Zinoviy Samuilovich Gusinskiy, Col Med Serv Vladimir Vasilyevich Smolin, Col Med Serv Valeriy Vladimirovich Semko, Col Med Serv Gennadiy Mikhaylovich Sokolov, and Col Med Serv Aleksey Petrovich Fokin—were recognized with the USSR State Prize.

"The hydropressure chamber," continued Capt 1st Rank Belenitsyn, "can be installed in a special rescue submarine or surface vessel (in this case the aquanauts go down with the help of a diving bell), and its self-contained use

as an underwater home also is possible. The hydropressure chamber at our test site is coupled through a lock system with a sealed basin, where water pressure is created corresponding to the necessary depth (down to 500 meters)."

Tests of one type of diving gear were ending at the test site that day. Six aquanauts were "at depth" in the hydropressure chamber, among them two physicians (for if someone gets sick help will have to be given there inside, since a pressure reduction—decompression—takes several days). Today they had entered the basin through the lock wearing gear, worked there four hours, and now were resting.

I managed to inspect the inner spaces of the hydropressure chamber through portholes: the spaces resembled scaled-down submarine compartments. There was a wardroom, head, and bunk room. At that time five aquanauts were sleeping and the sixth, WO Aleksandr Mudrik, was on watch. Unfortunately, I did not manage to converse with him in the full sense of the word (the human voice becomes unintelligible "chirping" in the helium mixture), but everything involving the test divers' work was explained to me by Lt Col Med Serv G. Lastochkin, Lt Col Med Serv A. Sinkov, Lt Col Med Serv S. Gonenko, Lt Col Med Serv A. Derbenev, Maj Med Serv A. Boytsov, Sr WO N. Danilkin, and Capt 2d Rank V. Slasten, the officer in charge of the dive.

The aquanauts' work is fraught with the strong effect of depth and the helium mixture on the body. Suffice it to say that at 500 meters they are subjected to more than 50 times normal pressure! The load on the cardiovascular system is the very same as for a long-distance runner who is continuously starting. In addition, mental and physical working capacity is reduced by 40 percent under those conditions and a high-pressure nervous syndrome is manifested. All this dictates the most rigid selection of aquanauts as well as continuous medical monitoring of their condition (using special electronic sensors connected to a computer) when working at depth. The data processed also is used to study human capabilities of mastering great depths.

The aquanauts do not work just at the test site (although here too they sometimes have to work for months in the hydropressure chamber under high pressure), but also at sea in full-scale tests of deep-water submersibles in a real situation. In addition, all of them are part of a special Search and Rescue Service subunit and are ready to take off at any minute to help persons in distress.

By the way, had the work of the rescue gear's developers and testers been given more attention, seamen of the sunken submarine "Komsomolets" would have had more effective survival aids.

Work for the national economy is the most important direction of aquanaut activity. According to scientists' estimates, some 80 percent of oil and natural gas reserves are hidden beneath the water. Installation, adjustment and

routine repair of extraction equipment and modernization and re-equipping of rigs—operations performed easily on the surface of the sea—turn into difficult puzzles in drilling and operating underwater wells, especially at great depths. One cannot get by without aquanauts here. Naval test site specialists not only work out appropriate recommendations, but also take a direct part in developing undersea oil and gas production. Suffice it to say that the first naval aquanauts Vishnyakov, Sokolov and Pelykh and many other specialists have gone over to work for the Minneftegazprom [Ministry of the Petroleum and Gas Industry]. All this permits mention of the great economic effect for the national economy which the work of this naval test site provides. But this effect itself, scientific achievements in this area, and the quality of development of new types of survival aids would be considerably higher were it not for the problems which the specialists told me about with bitterness.

[Capt 2d Rank V. Slasten] "It is a paradox: we are conducting tests at the very leading edge of hydrospace development, but logistic support of the tests is at the level of the time of Lenin's first decree on the diving service, especially where it concerns the human factor. We still have not defined the aquanaut's status as a test diver. Hence the pay is laughable and considers neither the risk nor loss of health. Hence the difficulties with personnel."

[Lt Col Med Serv A. Derbenev] "Take a look at how our aquanauts are dressed in the tests: in whatever is available. Common clothing is not provided. The fact is, however, working conditions demand special clothing. The helium environment creates special temperature discomfort. Suffice it to say that at a temperature of four degrees above zero an aquanaut feels like it is minus thirty. But the officials, who are far from understanding such nuances, tell us: if you were working in the Far North, then we would give you the appropriate clothing.

"Furthermore, under pressure in the helium mixture even a person at rest loses more calories than in heavy physical work in a normal atmosphere. In addition, the helium completely deprives one of the senses of taste and smell and a person loses his appetite. Many kinds of ordinary food break down under pressure (for example, bread loses porosity and is crushed to a pulp). In short, a special diet is necessary. One has been developed by our specialists, but we do not have the basic means for implementing it in working tests. Aquanauts in the pressure chamber leave money with watch service personnel, who go to the store and buy food (and what you buy there!) for testers assailing hydrospace. Then it is passed to them through the lock. We do not even have a galley."

[Lt Col Med Serv G. Lastochkin] "There is special concern over the fact that our best ideas and inventions are being adopted inadmissibly slowly. Even this hyperbaric hydrosystem, so needed both by the Navy and the national economy, took over ten years from development to metal. Now there are enormous difficulties in sufficiently equipping the Navy with it. Everything rests

on a lack of funds, but I believe that additional capital investments are not necessary. It is necessary only to eliminate the dissipation of resources. Every department (Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, Ministry of the Fish Industry and so on) which has vessels now is dragging out its own program for developing a search and rescue service and for corresponding research. On 18 August 1988 PRAVDA posed the question of establishing a single national search and rescue service. With that approach there will be a concentration of resources, which means they can be used many times more effectively and purposefully."

That suggestion obviously makes great sense. I had occasion to talk on this subject with Vice Adm V. Chirov, chief of the Navy Search and Rescue Service. He also is inclined toward the idea of a single national search and rescue service under the aegis of the CIC of the Navy such as was done in the Air Force. It is a matter of taking specific steps and it is probably time for the heads of the Navy and interested ministries to go to the government with this proposal.

Ryzhkov Opens Naval Arms Control Forum
Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Jun 89 First Edition p 1

[Statement by N. Ryzhkov; "to the Participants of the XVII International 'Peace on the Seas' Conference"]

[Text] I welcome the participants of the XVII International "Peace on the Seas" Conference.

All countries are deeply interested in the use of the seas and oceans as transportation routes, as sources of food and industrial raw materials, as sources of energy, and as objects for researching and getting to know nature. The path to this lies through the curtailing of the naval arms race, through limiting naval activities on the seas, through the creation of nuclear weapons free zones.

The Soviet Union is in favor of naval forces, which are an important component of the military power of governments and alliances, becoming the object of an active international dialogue on the reduction of arms and disarmament. It is necessary at the same time to guarantee the security of sea communications, to exclude the use of force on the seas, and to fully eliminate all concerns which governments may have on this account.

A wide discussion of these and other essential problems at your conference, and the active presentations of various social circles in support of law and order and the defense of the environment in the world's oceans and for the recognition of the primacy of international law, will allow a genuine and stable security for all governments and peoples.

Your conference, is yet another testimony to the growing role of non-government organizations and people's diplomacy in the international arena.

I wish you success in your work for the good of the world and for progress.

Belorussian DOSAAF Chairman Responds to Lithuanian Criticism

*18010815 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
24 May 89 p 2*

[Article by P. Maksimov: "Unify or Separate?"]

[Text] **The Chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee of Belorussia P. Maksimov gives his opinion on a number of arguments presented by his Lithuanian colleague on the pages of SOVETSKIY PATRIOT.**

A published conversation with the Chairman of the DOSAAF CC of Lithuania G. Taurinskas on the problems of perestroika in the defense Society has prompted me to speak out on a number of questions touched on in his arguments. One cannot but agree that perestroika is proceeding slowly and creakily from its lowest levels to the staff of the Society, its Central Committee. Often, especially in the subordinate organizations, they limit themselves to half-measures that do not bring about any fundamental changes. Decisions on questions of mass defense work often are not reinforced organizationally or supported materially.

But I believe that G. Taurinskas is not convincing or thorough enough in his discussion of certain theses.

Starting even with the title of the talk. Why actually must confidence be restored? The confidence that the Soviet people repose in the defense-patriotic organization and its governing bodies is not a resource to be lent for a specific period of time; it is an expression of worker acknowledgement of the significance and importance of the goals and tasks of the Society. The granting to DOSAAF, one of the mass civic organizations, of 15 mandates in the elections of Peoples' Deputies of the USSR, makes profound sense.

G. Taurinskas raises the question of the renaming of DOSAAF. The problem is not new. This question was debated on the pages of SOVETSKIY PATRIOT during discussions preceding the 10th All-Union Congress of the defense Society, but did not receive support.

I believe that behind the proposals for a DOSAAF name-change lie fundamental questions of the goals of the defense Society, its purpose, and the range of tasks it performs. It is not legitimate to assert that assistance to the army, air force, and navy consists only of preparing specialists for the Armed Forces in the training organizations of DOSAAF. Military-patriotic education of youth has been and remains a most important task of the defense Society; the propaganda of glorious combat traditions, inculcation of love for the Armed Forces, and constant readiness to defend the Fatherland flow from its essence and its mission. In the training of youth for military service it is hard to overestimate the technical and applied military types of sports that are becoming increasingly popular.

I find unjustified the fear of combinations such as military-patriotic propaganda and applied military types of sports, and their categorization as outmoded and less acceptable for modern youth. Suffice to say that 177 peoples' universities of military-patriotic youth education are operating in Belorussia, and there are clubs for the future officer in all fields. The number of military-patriotic societies and clubs in residential areas is growing, and former soldier-internationalists are being called upon to work in them. Today in Minsk alone there are 17 such clubs operating, bringing together hundreds of children and adolescents.

DOSAAF organizations look with great understanding on demands for an increased military propensity in the education and training of specialists for the Armed Forces.

Of course recurrences of pacifist appeals by certain men of letters to cultivate "anti-military patriots" are manifested in some parts of Belorussia as well. And this urgently requires us not to fear the "smell of the barracks", and to ensure that propaganda work is conducted by up-to-date methods and means, and touches the mind and the heart of each person.

In his arguments, G. Taurinskas narrows the circle of tasks of the Society, reducing them practically to sports, production, and cost accounting. What, if not this, is the point of his proposal to combine the raykoms, gorkoms, and sports-technical clubs of DOSAAF under the "roof of the STKs [sports-technical clubs]"? In other words, to make the regional and municipal DOSAAF organizations and their elective organs appendages of the sports-technical clubs. But you see, this contradicts the DOSAAF Charter. A decree of the 11th plenary session of the CC, USSR DOSAAF recommends uniting the raykoms (gorkoms) and STKs into a single body.

In many regions of Belorussia this unification is being carried out precisely on the basis of the governing role of the ray(gor) committees of DOSAAF. Unfortunately, due to the imperfections of the departmental instructions, the proposal regarding awarding of bonuses to STK workers does not apply to the raykom chairman, and his wages are less than the manager of the STK. Nor has the question of raising the wages of the senior bookkeepers of the STKs been answered. They bear responsibility for the financial management of the DOSAAF raykom.

G. Taurinskas terms absurd the decision to create technical circles and sports sections in primary organizations numbering 100 or more DOSAAF members. A vicious circle has been created: rayon, city, and primary DOSAAF organizations do not operate where there are no facilities, and consequently no conditions for technical training and sports. At the same time, the demands to create these conditions are proclaimed unacceptable. Of course creating circles and sections in most primary organizations of DOSAAF is impossible from the outset.

For precisely this reason a specific deadline was set by resolution of the 10th All-Union Congress. Apparently we should begin with the primary organizations of general-educational schools and other academic institutions where there are realistic opportunities to become involved in technical modeling, radio sports and competitive shooting, and to develop an applied military multievent competition. Today many kolkhoz and sovkhoz managers, for whom securing young people for rural areas is important, have shown an interest in the development of sports, including applied military types.

In short, strengthening the primary organizations that make up the basis of the defense Society and raising their role in labor and academic collectives remain, in my opinion, a most important task for the leaders of DOSAAF committees at all levels.

The primary organizations of major enterprises and VUZ' numbering five or more thousand Society members occupy a special place. They all generally have organic sports-technical clubs and a solid training and sports base, and work under the jurisdiction of the DOSAAF raykoms. It is no accident therefore that there has been sharp negative reaction to the decision of the CC, USSR DOSAAF to reduce the staff positions of the committee chairmen of these organizations. This could do irreparable harm to the Society.

As is known, the reduction also touched a significant portion of the ray(gor) committees of DOSAAF,

although the rayon level of control of other civic organizations, as well as state organs, was left substantially unchanged. But in the staff of many DOSAAF raykoms there remains only a chairman, and this undoubtedly complicates the leadership of the rayon organizations of the Society.

I would also like to disagree with G. Taurinskas on the question of membership dues. After all, it is not a question of what percentage of the budget is raised by the dues of Society members. It is truly not high, and half the funds remain at the disposal of the primary organization, while the rest go to the municipal and rayon committees. The most important thing is that the membership dues testify to the membership of citizens in the patriotic defense Society.

One can understand completely the concern of the leadership of the DOSAAF CC of Lithuania at the elimination of a number of primary organizations, including in the Komsomol Central Committees of the Republic. To bring things to the point of breakup of the lower levels of DOSAAF, to diminish the role of the raykoms and gorkoms means to transform the defense Society from a civic organization into a state sports association. We cannot allow this to happen.

In conclusion it seems appropriate to recall a resolution of the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU, which posited freedom of discussion at the question-discussing stage, and unity of actions after the majority had reached a decision. Thus undoubtedly also applies to the decisions of the 10th Congress of the USSR DOSAAF.

Discussion of U.S. Strategic Aviation in Exercises
18010688a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 May 89 p 3 First Edition

[Article by Lt Col S. Ostroumov: "'Humanists' From SAC"]

[Text] Scarcely had the American-South Korean "Team Spirit-89" maneuvers died down when the Pentagon conducted the "Giant Warrior" exercise with the 15th Air Army of the U.S. Strategic Air Command in late March and early April in the same region. The goal of the exercise was a practical test of the operational plans developed by American staffs for the use of heavy bombers in armed conflicts of various intensity in the countries of the Pacific and Indian Ocean basin.

It is well known that in 1965-1973 attempts to implement such plans failed during the inglorious U.S. aggression in Indochina. However in the last few years American generals have been stepping up efforts to renew the theoretical basis justifying the extensive use of conventional weapons in those regions and countries where a "threat" to U.S. interests arises. In these theoretical structures, an important place is assigned to strategic bomber aviation, which is planned for delivery of strikes with both conventional and nuclear weapons against targets in remote theaters of war. And the new series of war "games" by strategic bomber aviation was a preparation for the practical actions that generally follow such theories: the "Mighty Warrior" exercise conducted in 1988 as applied to European TVDs and the Near East region, and the "Giant Warrior" exercise which closed the global circle of these, for the time being, practice wars through the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

To carry out the tasks of the exercise, more than 60 bombers of the USAF Strategic Air Command, including the latest B-1B aircraft, were sent to Elmendorf and Eielson AFB in Alaska and Andersen AFB on the island of Guam in the western part of the Pacific Ocean. Such a force grouping of U.S. strategic bomber aviation was created in the forward zones for the first time since the end of the Vietnam war. In the most intensive periods of those years, no more than a hundred B-52 bombers were called upon, operating from that same Andersen AFB.

During the exercise, strategic bombers operated with the forces and assets of the U.S. military grouping in the zone of the Pacific Ocean, the USAF in Alaska and the USAF unified central command, and problems of the organization of coordination, command, control, and communications, and offensive operations were practiced.

Official reports particularly stress the "conventional" nature of the war in the "Giant Warrior" exercise scenario. Wars which the American military leadership considers more "humane" than a nuclear war. However the flight paths of the heavy U.S. bombers, which crisscrossed the Pacific and Indian Oceans from Alaska to

Australia and from Thailand to Somalia testify to their desire to resolve all complex questions through military force. The coat of arms of the USAF SAC shows a mailed fist with a sheaf of coiled lightning. Even today American strategists do not want to rid themselves of the habit of banging this fist in the most inappropriate cases.

Reaction to U.S.-Thai 'Cobra Gold-89' Exercise
18010688b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 May 89 p 3 First Edition

[Article by A. Golts: "...And Again the 'Cobra' Slithered Out"]

[Text] According to reports from the foreign press, the American-Thai "Cobra Gold-89" maneuvers began yesterday. They will be held in two northeastern provinces, Sukhothai and Phitsanulok, and will last for around one month. To judge from official reports, these maneuvers were planned as quite routine ones. The usual number of participants is around 10 thousand service members, the normal scenario is the repulse of aggression from outside. In contrast to previous years, participation of such militarist "superstars" as for example the battleship NEW JERSEY, which is equipped with nuclear cruise missiles, is not planned for the current military show.

So is it worth while calling attention to these maneuvers? I believe it is, and here is why. For all these years, "Cobra Gold" has "slithered out" in Thailand under the pretext that the Vietnamese volunteer forces in Kampuchea might attack that country. They say, Vietnam occupied Kampuchea and any day now may launch an aggression against Thailand.

This is precisely how Washington politicians explained the placement of the most up-to-date arms in Thailand, including F-16 fighter-bombers, tanks, and artillery systems, and the construction of American weapons depots on Thai soil. And this is also how they explain the conduct of provocative maneuvers in direct proximity to the borders of Kampuchea.

However, the military-political situation in Southeast Asia is now changed quite fundamentally. Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea are conducting a consistent policy aimed at eliminating confrontation and resolving conflict by political means. And a decision has already been made for the withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteers from Kampuchea before the end of September of this year. Thus the Pentagon, right before our eyes, is being stripped of any pretext for conducting military preparations in Thailand (I must note in parentheses that American generals cannot forget how they ran things on the bases in Thailand—Uttapao, Ta Khli, Dhonmyinga, and others).

And so even now, when the conduct of militarist rehearsals has entirely lost its point, the Pentagon conducts them. And of course it is not a matter of staff bureaucrats who cannot keep pace with the growing movement of

Southeast Asian states toward greater security. It has to do with the desire artificially to maintain the existing tension. The United States wants to demonstrate everywhere in Asia, as one of the administration leaders emphasized, that "the defensive goals and defensive obligations of the U.S. remain as before".

The conduct of military maneuvers in Thailand is only a part of this policy. It is certainly no accident, at a time when the cause of the Kampuchean settlement appears to have emerged from the deadlock, when the prerequisites have been created for a political settlement of the conflict, that Washington is discussing the question of shipping weapons to the Kampuchean armed opposition. "In the opinion of most diplomats and analysts," the WASHINGTON POST pointed out, "the question of whether or not the U.S. should begin to ship weapons to the Kampuchean resistance is not a policy, but the absence of one".

And in fact, one cannot help but see that in a fundamentally new situation, when a dialogue has begun between the states of Indochina and the ASEAN countries, Washington is operating by standards that are five years old, in sending arms and organizing the "Cobra Gold" maneuvers. In short, it is being provocative.

Development of U.S. LHX, Hovercraft Programs

U.S. LHX Program

18010697a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 May 89 First Edition p 5

[Article by V. Belyayev: "New Combat Helicopter"]

[Text] At the present time, problems associated with the realization of the LHX program are being quite actively discussed in the U.S. press. This program for creating a combat rotary-wing aircraft by the beginning of the next century is estimated to cost 33 billion dollars. As "Flight International" weekly writes, its result will be the manufacture of approximately 2,100 light combat helicopters. In perspective, it is emphasized in the Western press that this model must assume a leading position and allow reduction to a minimum type of military helicopters (the current American helicopter fleet consists of several thousand light models of 13 types.)

According to the tactical technical requirements in the approved program, it is proposed that the LHX helicopter will have a take-off weight of 4,500-5,000 kilograms, a cruising speed of 315 kilometers per hour, and a power plant consisting of two 1,200 horsepower capacity GTD's [Gas Turbine Engines]. It will be armed with cannons and missiles.

As reported in the Western press, two groups of firms are participating in the development of the LHX helicopter: Sikorskiy and Boeing Helicopter, and McDonnell Douglas and Bell. Each of the groups is confining itself to its concept.

For example, Sikorskiy and Boeing Helicopter Firms. According to information in the "Air and Space" weekly, this helicopter has been designed in a single rotor configuration with a four bladed 12.5 meter diameter main rotor. The use of a multi-bladed rotor in a ring channel as a tail rotor is being proposed. All of this will be mounted in a V-shaped tail.

The helicopter has a two-seat cockpit. Armament includes turret-mounted cannons under the nose portion of the fuselage and eight Hellfire ATGM's [anti-tank guided missiles] (four missiles mounted in fuselage compartments and the remaining missiles mounted on external stores). They also envision two externally mounted Stinger air-to-air missiles.

The LHX helicopter design variant proposed by the Bell and McDonnell Douglas firms also has a two-seat cockpit. The main rotor is four-bladed and, for direction of travel, the use of directed air ejection from the engine's compressors through a deflector system at the end of the fuselage tail section is being proposed. This system, the press points out, has already undergone flight testing and has proven its viability. All of the helicopter's weaponry, as contrasted with the previous design, will be mounted on thick side fairings which play the role of small wings.

As reported in the Western press, each group of firms and developers will receive 165 million dollars for the project. In December 1990, a painstaking analysis will be conducted and the best concept will be selected. Allocation of 2.5 billion dollars for a full-scale development model is planned. The execution period is five and one half years. The first flight of the test aircraft is planned for August 1993 with deliveries to the Army beginning in March 1996.

The Western press is discussing the possibility of involving Western European firms, which are currently developing the RAN-2/NAR light combat helicopter, in the LHX Program. "Jane's Defense Weekly" described the attempts of Italy's Defense Ministry to make contact with the Pentagon. However, the American side has thus far not responded positively. Nevertheless, the weekly emphasizes that experts from the American firms Garrett and Allison have selected this Italian combat helicopter for flight testing the engines of the future helicopter, considering it the most acceptable according to technical characteristics.

U.S. and European Hovercraft

18010697a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 May 89 First Edition p 5

[Article by V. Belyayev: "Air Cushion Vehicles"]

[Text] It is obvious from the foreign press that overseas designers' interests are not waning in heavy air cushion vehicles (AVP) which are capable of transporting hundreds and thousands of tons of cargo. Evidence of this is the American SES [Surface Effect Ship] program which is intended to create a whole family of transport craft on

air cushions with take-off weights of 500, 2,000, and 10,000 tons. The press has reported on a series of tests which have been successfully completed on this program.

One more case. In 1987, the U.S. Navy proposed that three leading shipbuilding firms carry out conceptual research on promising SES-type air cushion vehicles designed for transporting cargoes weighing up to 4,500 tons for distances of up to 3,500 miles at speeds of not less than 55 knots. Each of the three firms, working independently, came to the conclusion that the U.S. has the technological prerequisites for developing heavy AVP's and that this could be done with minimal technological and financial risk. The proposed model has been designated SFS. Its take-off weight will exceed 20,000 tons, the craft will be 245 meters long and its width will be 46-49 meters. Proposed power plant capacity is 240,000 horse power.

Litton Ingalls, which selected a catamaran design with a rigid side barrier for its craft, published detailed information about its project. In contrast to ordinary AVP's, it will not completely hover over the water but its hull will remain partially submerged in the water. A flexible barrier is envisioned in the bow and stern sections which will create a space for forming an air cushion.

Personnel and combat equipment are intended to be located on three decks on the catamaran's hulls and on the deck constructed between the hulls. The craft can accommodate up to 187 pieces of combat equipment including seven Apache helicopters, eight reconnaissance helicopters, nine Chinook or Black Hawk combat-transport helicopters, six 155 mm self-propelled howitzers, 58 tanks, 18 armored personnel carriers, and 70 transport vehicles... An aircraft elevator is envisioned if the craft is used as an aircraft carrier. A helicopter landing pad is located on the central portion of the deck.

According to the U.S. military, whose opinion was published in the press, the U.S. Navy needs 21 of these SFS craft at first and later on it may need up to 63 at a cost of 300 million dollars each.

The Western press also reports that France's Naval leadership intends to accept the Agnes class antisubmarine warfare AVP's into the inventory. The AS 363 Dauphine antisubmarine warfare helicopter could be based on it. In March 1987, the SMN Shipbuilding Firm received a contract to build this craft and its launch is scheduled for autumn of this year after which testing will begin.

A project for the heavier Zol AVP is being developed in accordance with a French Naval leadership task. The Zol has a 1,400 ton take-off weight and is designed for escorting combat task forces. The catamaran-type craft can carry two to three helicopters. It will be introduced into service early in the next century and it will be able to replace ordinary frigates.

At the present time, Spanish firms are quite energetically carrying out an air cushion vehicle test program. The military department has allocated 640 million pesetas for its development. The press emphasizes that this is only the first step toward development of combat air cushion craft. In particular, one such variant (BES-50) should enter the inventory in 1993. It is planned to be used as a fast-moving small missile boat. Its weaponry includes two twin Harpoon missile launcher and two twin-barreled 20 mm dual-purpose guns. A helipad is planned for the stern. As with the craft described above, this AVP is designed as a catamaran. Its take-off weight is 340 tons and its maximum speed is 50 knots.

The other craft developed by Spanish designers was designated the BES-95. This craft has a 2,000 ton take-off weight and it will serve as a fast-moving corvette. It is 95 meters in length and is 20.4 meters wide. Armament includes two antiaircraft missile systems with a vertical launch capability (a total of 16 launchers), one 76 mm dual-purpose gun, two torpedo launchers, and one antisubmarine warfare helicopter. They also envision installing three Sea Javelin antiaircraft missile systems for destroying aircraft at low altitudes.

Thus, judging by articles in the foreign press, we see that a number of capitalist countries are making an obvious attempt to attain new highly effective sea warfare assets and they are allocating significant funds for development of these craft.

Pustov on Brussels NATO Meeting

*18010697b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 May 89 First Edition p 5*

[Article by Pustov: "Taking the Spirit of the Times into Account?"]

[Text] The two-day session of the NATO Council which took place in Brussels at the Head of State and Head of Government level was dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the bloc. And therefore, there was no shortage of solemn speeches. However, it was not the gala portion of the meeting that attracted the attention of observers. What kind of contribution will it make in overcoming the vestiges of the "Cold War" in Europe and in the world as a whole, in overcoming the maintained division of our continent into opposing military alliances—this is primarily what can and should determine its significance. Not all of the participants' speeches and not all decisions made have yet received sufficient press coverage. But what we already know allows us to make certain conclusions about the results of the current NATO forum.

European society quite reasonably expected a positive reaction from it to the constructive initiatives which the Warsaw Treaty Organization members proposed to the NATO member-countries last week. We are talking, in particular, about armed forces reductions to levels sufficient for defense and that the disarmament process

which ensures confidence building and must encompass all armed forces which relate to Europe. And this means not only ground and air forces (they are already included in the ongoing conventional arms negotiations in Vienna), but also naval forces too and, not only conventional means for conducting war, but nuclear and chemical, too.

The Brussels session showed that its participants could not bypass the important initiatives of the WTO [Warsaw Treaty Organization] States. The four point proposal on conventional arms and armed forces reductions in Europe set forth by the U.S. President are being assessed as evidence of this. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's readers are already acquainted with them. Some time will be required to closely study and comprehend this proposal. Only then will we be able answer the question with certainty of how much they meet the needs of our days. But even today we are struck that in a number of points it is proposed that the Soviet Union and its allies conduct quite a bit more of a reduction than the NATO countries. Not a word is said in the American proposal about the need for reducing naval forces in which, as you know, the NATO countries have enormous superiority.

In the U.S. itself, the initiatives set forth by the President are being connected with other very important issues. As the "Washington Post" points out, "administrative representatives are expressing the hope that the American proposal on ground forces in Europe will attract quite a bit more international attention to the meeting in Brussels than the inability to resolve the missile problem which West German and other European politicians are so sensitive to."

However, neither this broadly applied overseas sensation nor the anniversary appeals to unity and solidarity helped to hide the sharp disagreements which have been manifesting themselves for a long time within NATO on the issue of the notorious modernization of American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe which Washington is stubbornly insisting on with the unconditional support of only London alone. The FRG as well as a host of other European States had decisively expressed their disagreement with this well in advance of the NATO Council session. They are advocating that negotiations be conducted with the USSR and the WTO on tactical nuclear weapons parallel with the talks in Vienna on conventional armed forces. The U.S. and Great Britain oppose this approach.

The participants at the Brussels session discussed these and other more quarrelsome issues behind closed doors. Information for the press was issued while taking the anniversary celebration into account, without allowing it to be overshadowed by other issues. But, as they say, the truth will out. And it was not by accident that while President G. Bush was still on his way to Europe, the proposal was stated that the contradictions indicated

above were so acute that, in all likelihood, they would have to discuss them and seek compromises after the NATO meeting. Despite the formulations adopted at the meeting on final documents, it seems that this is how it is turning out.

Commentary on NATO's 'Central Enterprise-89'
18010713 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Jun 89 Single Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel M. Akimov under the rubric "Military Rehearsal": "Central Enterprise-89"]

[Text] A NATO exercise under the code name "Central Enterprise-89" took place on the territory and in the air space of the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the northeastern regions of France on 5-9 June. Participating in it were coalition and national air commands of the NATO countries in the Central European Sector (AFCent), the staffs of the 2d and 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces, the men and equipment of the Central Air Defense Area, and the "AWACS-NATO" [air-born warning and command system] long-range radar and command and control element—in all, up to 1,000 combat and auxiliary aircraft from the composition of the Air Forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, and France.

The exercise "Central Enterprise" has been conducted since 1982. It is the largest annual exercise of NATO's joint air forces in the AFCent. Usually in the course of the exercise measures are carried out to upgrade aviation units and sub-units and PVO [air defense] men and equipment stationed in the AFCent from a state of peace to a war footing, and plans for the conduct of early air operations during the initial phase of a conventional war in Europe are practiced and refined. As a rule, all matters of tactical application and conduct of combat operations are conducted with the use of conventional weapons. However offensive nuclear weapons are maintained at a high level of combat readiness. The simulated use of chemical weapons is not excluded.

According to the reports of the foreign press, these considerations were the main focus of this year's exercise too. The scenario provided for practice in raising the combat readiness of forces. Towards this end, provision was made for a build-up of air combat forces by transferring additional aviation sub-units from the continent of North America. In particular, aircraft from the the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command were transferred from the United States to the FRG in May to participate in this and several other exercises.

According to reports in the Western press, NATO's joint air forces and the men and equipment of the Central Air Defense Area first and foremost practiced conducting

offensive air operations in the course of "Central Enterprise-89." Tactical aircraft simulated techniques of penetrating the air defense of the opponent using low-altitude flight. In accordance with the American concept of "air-land operations (battle)," missile and attacks were practiced on the troops and combat equipment of the opponent. With the intent of further developing the theory and practice of NATO's offensive concept of "Follow-on Forces Attack" (reserves), so-called "deep" strikes were simulated with various types of aircraft genuinely selected for designation to combat operations. Methods of tactical application under conditions of rocket and bomb attacks on specific ground targets are practiced on training grounds in the FRG.

In the exercise "Central Enterprise-89" consideration was also given to matters of defensive air operations with emphasis on the timely acquisition of air targets through the use of E-3A "AWACS-NATO" aircraft, as well as on the organization of efficient coordination of anti-aircraft guided missile units and PVO fighter aviation in the repulse of the opponent's air attacks.

On the whole, the exercise "Central Enterprise-89" is one of the principal operational and combat training activities of NATO's combined air forces in the AFCent in 1989. Its purpose is the comprehensive training of NATO's aviation and air defense men and equipment in the conduct of military operations—first and foremost, offensive—against the participant states of the Warsaw Pact.

Rail Gun Test in UK Fails

18070690 Moscow TRUD in Russian 8 Jul 89 p 1

[Article by Ye. Piskunov: "Farce at Testing Grounds"]

[Text] England laughed when the results of a test of an "electromagnetic cannon" conducted in County Kent became public. This is a new type of offensive weapon on which work has been carried out in an environment of strictest secrecy for 5 years now. The cannon was termed "a miracle weapon" ahead of time, and it had been identified to take its place in the "star wars" program implemented by the Pentagon.

As its creators have calculated, a hit on the target by a small-size—only several centimeters long—projectile of the weapon should be equivalent to a hit by a round weighing 1 ton due to the tremendous velocity. This would make it possible to destroy nuclear ballistic missiles and tanks with the strongest armor.

At the Kent testing grounds, the cannon was loaded with a plastic projectile. However, it flew out through the side assembly rather than the muzzle, striking one of the fathers of this miracle weapon, (David Rayburn), in the head. The victim got away with barely a scare because the power of the projectile hit turned out to be no more than that... of a cricket ball.

The leadership of the British Defense Ministry was not laughing. Their depression was exacerbated by an inquiry by a group of members of Parliament who demanded exact information on the true scale of the country's participation in the "star wars" program and on the amount already spent by Great Britain for the "electromagnetic cannon."

Neglect of Withdrawn Troops Recounted
*18010720 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in
Russian 18 Jun 89 p 2*

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent D. Shevarov, Turkmen SSR: "The Forgotten Landing Force: From the Former 'Afghaners' Recollections of Their First Days After the War..."]

[Text] "...We were told that the homeland would greet us fittingly. We would be given leave and sent to the central districts. Following the parade in honor of our withdrawal, however, we were placed in a tent city next to a pigsty and told that we would be living there 2-3 months 'in the interest of state security.' An adjacent unit found itself in the same kind of mess. They were placed in a former clothing depot, where they still have neither water nor electricity or heat. In answer to our questions we always hear the same thing: 'Hang in there, fellows! You have gone through a hard school....' We are prepared to perform our duty, but just when are we going to see our families"?

The above is from a letter to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. The letter was signed by 27 officers and warrant officers.

This letter was from the April mailbag. We were told that the situation had changed by mid-May. No one was living in a camp now. Most of the enlisted men had been discharged into the reserve, and the officers and warrant officers had departed for new stations or are on leave. Case closed. It became clear after our correspondent visited one of the garrisons in the Turkestan Military District, however, that it is still too early to place the letter into the archives.

Everything to the north of here is called the Union. It is only 2 kilometers to the border from the front door of any officer's apartment.

For 9 years the post was considered to be on the front. The war had such an effect that almost none of the people who had lived there in '79 were left. The war affected life there, affected the people.

Vodka disappeared from the city at the beginning of February. It was available during all of January, and then it disappeared. This was a valid sign that troops would arrive in the city any day. Reporters were the second sign of important events. Even four Americans came. These hardened fellows were prepared to live even in a trench, but they were housed in the brand new "Inturist" hotel. They could see that Russian hospitality existed even in a closed border zone.

The city was preparing to greet the "Afghaners." The soldiers made room in the barracks, built back before the Russo-Japanese war. The officers also made room in the dormitories, and apartments were readied for married personnel. Three days before the withdrawal, however, it

was learned that the garrison would be receiving considerably more people than planned. The explanation for it all was higher strategic interests, but one cannot feed or warm people with these. The entire city was on its feet. For several days and nights, without sleeping, the garrison soldiers and officers set up tent camps, field kitchens, built temporary structures and emptied storage facilities to be used as barracks.

There was not a word about this "crash effort" in the newspapers. And when the units, exhausted from the difficult trip, entered the equally exhausted city, the press reported only about the meeting. "The festive meeting has ended. Now the military column is setting out for its permanent location. The combat equipment is departing...."

Perhaps the equipment departed, but the people remained. The inconvenient living conditions, the accumulated fatigue and the postponement of their meeting with families, which many could not understand—all of this took its toll in the form of "the old ways" and drunken fights.

Sr Lt Pavel Samoylov, deputy company commander for political affairs, left Afghanistan on 8 February 1989:

"They threw bricks at us when I traveled through Shindand in an armored vehicle. I did not even look around. I sat there with my weapon and thought to myself how the people were tired, exhausted. Let them throw. Just don't let them shoot me in the back. We crossed the border with tears in our eyes. I was glad that I had lived to the age of 27. My birthday was 12 February. I was sick at heart that day, and angry. Here I am on my birthday, I thought to myself, and I can't even find a corner for myself.

And so I roamed the city...."

Sr Lt Sergey Khodko, deputy company commander for political affairs:

"My first thought was that we were not expected. There was no housing and no room at the hotel. There was nothing to eat. You would go to the mess hall and stand the entire time for a piece of mutton. I did not even end up with all of the presents I had bought for family members.

"The Japanese cassettes so scarce in the Union today went to traders.

"Many of them contained Afghan notes and the last songs recorded between the final battles on foreign soil. Everything on them was about home. About the life which I would have in the homeland.

"When I return from Afghan, I'll begin a beautiful life. I'll forget all the suffering and grasp the meaning of life."

Capt Viktor Ponomarenko, deputy battalion commander for political affairs:

"I wanted to pick up my wife as soon as possible. All the time I was in Afghanistan I could not forgive myself for leaving her that way.... I left for Afghan from the Belorussian district. They had promised me an apartment there. The chief of the personnel department of the army's political directorate had sworn to me. 'I give you my word. You serve well!' I only got as far as Tashkent, however, when I learned that they had put my wife out onto the street. The deputy commander for rear services had come and forced her out of the dormitory. I learned with difficulty that they had given my wife a small room of 8 square meters in a communal apartment.

"Who needed that February landing force dropped beneath the Turkmen hills and forgotten for 2 long months? Why was it necessary to drag out the long awaited meeting with family, to torture the nerves of people who had already suffered so much?

"The command element of unit 'X,' now stationed in the city, explained to me most definitely that the decision for the strange reception for the 'Afghaners' had been made at the highest levels and was based on the very highest interests. People's power in Kabul held out those most critical spring months, and our fellows held out here. All is well that ends well.

"I did not argue about what constitutes 'highest interests.' I simply thought about the fact that the Afghan war had begun 10 years before with words about 'the highest state interests.' We would have fought another 20 years if we had not recognized the fact that people are the highest interest and that all other interests can have meaning only based on this understanding. The phrase 'Save the People!' began to appear in orders at that time. And awards began to be made not just for successful operations, but also for saving people from death. The order, valid for those who fought in the face of dushman bullets, seemed overly sentimental to some people back home.

"But those who survived and returned could see that nothing had changed here. Only the children had grown up a little, and the mothers had grown older. But their life had been totally destroyed, and everything had to be started over again from scratch."

Maj Vladimir Petrakov:

"Here, in the Union, the army is still the same, and they want to put us 'Afghaners' back into the same old prewar situation. Here they continue to value the toady, the one who advances over the bones of subordinates. While previously they would say 'Do as I do,' they now put it more simply: 'I order....'"

Capt Andrey Chamanskiy, who returned from Afghanistan in 1986:

"In the very beginning a serviceman without insignia spoke at the club. Obviously an important chief. He made a lot of promises: that they would replace us within a year, that the housing problems would be solved. Two and one half years went by, however, and there was no replacement. I think they simply forgot about us. I was told last year that all soldier/internationalists are being awarded a special badge and the Certificate of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Not one 'Afghaner' here has either of them yet. A general, a deputy chief of the General Staff, was a candidate for deputy from our district. I voted against him in the elections. On the back side of the ballot I wrote: 'What kind of concern is the general showing for our needs in the Turkmen Military District?'"

To those who watched the troop withdrawal by television the operation might have appeared instantaneous. The withdrawal was a tortuously long event for the city. The first human wave reached the city back in October of 1986. "Yesterday morning another regiment marched triumphantly into one of the southern sites in our nation," the newspapers wrote. "Military medics accompanied the regiment. They had nothing in particular to do, however...."

Lt Col Viktor Klyakhin, chief of the garrison hospital:

"I recall those months as a catastrophe.... The withdrawn troops brought serious infectious diseases: Epidemic hepatitis, typhoid fever, malaria. Half the city was in the hospital by December: soldiers, women, children. We closed all the departments except surgery and infectious diseases. People lay in the halls and in tents. The water shortage drove us to distraction; tons of solution had to be administered to the sick. We expected help. Instead of that, however, our outpatient department at the hospital was reduced at the end of '86. Since then we have continued to operate on the status of a frontline hospital. We have only slightly more than a third of a full staff. There is only one medical attendant for two sections, maternity and pediatrics...."

"This medical attendant is a legend at the hospital. He gives children shots while they sleep, delivers babies, and the women say that he has lucky hands. The medical attendant is 19-year-old 'Afghaner' Ivan Sidorov, a first-year private.

"There are no old people in the city, but there is a cemetery. And there are iron crosses and stars there. They cannot be seen from the Inturist hotel, and commissions and inspection parties do not go there. It is not a military spot; it is only a spot on our conscience...."

"There are many children here now. There are many very small children, two- and three-year-olds. I never saw them play war. As I leafed through my notes following my TDY, I tried to understand why everyone, from the commander down to the soldier, talked about the children. With love, with hope and pain. It seems to me that the children are returning many 'Afghaners' to a normal

life. They are saving their fathers from nightmares and bitterness; they are protecting....

"The doctors say that the main thing for those who served in Afghanistan is to feel secure. This is not a weakness. It is simply that the 'Afghaners' have understood as no one else the extreme fragility of human life. It is so easy to kill a person, to wipe him off the face of the earth. The soldiers who returned through Salang told me that the most difficult thing for them on the trip home was not the avalanches and not the ambushes; the most terrible thing was to leave homemade markers for our fallen men on the Afghan roads. There are around 30 in Salang alone.

"Following the war it was as though the 'Afghaners' had been given a new assignment—more accurately, a new destination. They began to feel not like fathers-and-commanders but simply like fathers. The separation from a son or daughter became unbearable. Ordinary children's ailments gave them no peace.

"The children of the 40th Army.... The Children's Fund assumed the care of those who lost their fathers, but it seems to me that those whose fathers returned alive also need special attention. The children were the first victims of that war. A child who has been without a father for 2 or 3 years, is he not an orphan? And many 'Afghaners' are still living away from their families; there is no housing where they are stationed.

"It is difficult for children at a garrison; the climate is hard, and there is the constant threat of infectious diseases. And how many sites are there in the Union, where a serviceman, eternally sacrificing himself, is also sacrificing the health of those near and dear to him? These circumstances do not affect one's length of service. These losses are not compensated for by the Ministry of Defense. A serviceman can have nothing personal except his 'personal file.'"

Capt Vladimir Mironov (the name was changed—D. Sh.), company commander, left Afghanistan in 1986.

"At the beginning of the year of the withdrawal, my daughter contracted epidemic hepatitis. I had spent days at the barracks and did not know about this. My wife took my daughter to the rayon hospital. They did not even examine the 6-year-old girl. She was left in the hall together with adults with hepatitis and typhus. The toilet for the hospital was outside. There was actually no equipment or medicine. I requested leave from the unit. I hurried to the hospital, picked up my daughter and

took her to our hospital. But there is no children's infectious disease department there, and they would not accept her. What was I to do? I hurried home. We fixed up a corner for our daughter, brought in a dropper and began caring for her ourselves. The next day a policeman came and told us: "You can't do that!" It seems that this kind of illness cannot be treated at home; the SES [medical and epidemiological station] has forbidden it. I told him that I would not let my daughter go, even if they stormed our house. I have nothing to lose except her. He brought another policeman, but I got off with a fine, and they left us in peace. We survived...."

Officially there is a children's outpatient clinic with two doctors in the city. It is housed in a building which could be called nothing but a barracks. The city police department was housed there until last year (a new building has been built for it). I went to the clinic several times at different hours of day, but there was always a big padlock on the door....

The war has ended, but the problems remain the same at the military post: how to place a child in a kindergarten (I have just one, but there are more than just a thousand of the children!), How to feed the child...? When they deliver milk, one can stand in line until dinner. Those who stand long enough are rewarded! One cannot get pureed fruits or vegetables.

People always go to meet the Ashkhabad train here, even if there is not a single passenger left on the train at the end of the line. If they are lucky they can buy sausages at four rubles and 18 kopecks a kilogram or 10 eggs at one ruble and 70 kopecks. Officers' wives come here with their children an hour or an hour and a half in advance in order to get a place in line.

The door of the dining car does not open at once. The "shop" owner likes to torment the people, almost fainting from the noonday heat, and waits to open the door. Holding a bottle of Pepsi in one hand, he asks: "Can I help you, hungry people?"

Everything which has happened since the parade of "Afghaners" returning to the garrison cannot be attributed just to the disorganization and negligence of the specific rear service or to the unkept promises of some specific rank. There is more to it than that. After all, we (the people, to use a high-sounding word) promised the fellows: "You just return home, and we will pay the price...."

The "Afghaners" have returned, however, and it turns out that the price was precisely the hangup.

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